Suchergebnisse

The need to better adapt EU development policy to the varying levels of development of partner countries ("differentiation") and the extent to which middle-income countries (MICs) should continue to receive EU aid have become contentious issues of the EU's new development policy agenda as well as in the negotiations on the next multi-annual financial framework. Due to the EU's mandate to ensure its global presence in all developing countries, development cooperation with MICs is more a question of how such cooperation should be framed rather than withdrawing from these countries. The Commission's proposal foresees ending bilateral aid allocations to 19 developing countries but continuing cooperation under thematic and regional programmes. Ongoing discussions between the Commission, Member States and the European Parliament have so far focussed mainly on the "right" criteria for such graduation and the extent to which specific countries should be exempt from the rule. So far, the EU has not presented a clear strategy of how exactly it aims to change its development programmes with this group of advanced developing countries, and has thus created some ambiguity on the actual implications of a differentiated approach. What are the strategic priorities and policy objectives of these new forms of cooperation? Will the EU continue to focus on poverty reduction or will the cooperation objectives shift to addressing regional and global development challenges? The debate on differentiation needs to be placed in the context of two interlinked challenges – both being of fundamental importance for the future direction of EU development policy: the phenomenon of continued poverty and rising inequality in countries that have generated fast economic growth; and the growing range of global challenges and the strategically important role of many MICs in securing global commons. With regards to the implications for EU developmentpolicy, there are two main conclusions: Tackling global poverty needs both better "technical" solutions for classifying countries and, on the political level, a better coordinated cross-country division of labour and joint EU strategy towards advanced developing countries; The EU needs to address the mismatch between partner country portfolio and development objectives. Due to its global presence, the EU is ideally placed to adopt a global rationale of development policy, in particular in its cooperation with MICs. This global outlook on development will increase the coordination challenges of EU development policy and other European external policies substantially. The EU's instrument framework – and in particular the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – needs to be designed to allow for the continued funding of poverty reduction and social cohesion programmes in graduating countries. At the same time, it should make sufficient resources for the proposed "Global Public Goods" programme available to demonstrate a clear shift towards a global rationale of development policy.

This paper looks into the issue of how European Union (EU) development policy can respond to a changing development landscape that is characterised by a different geography of power and wealth and a changing geography of global poverty. The question of how to differentiate its partnerships and how to best engage with middle-income countries (MICs) has been among the most discussed issues in the ongoing process of modernising EU development policy. The analysis in this paper puts the question of aid to MICs in the context of two interlinked challenges: (i) the need to reconceptualise dominant approaches to global poverty reduction that prioritise national income as a key guiding criterion to classify countries, and (ii) the growing range of global challenges that require development policy to diversify its objectives. With regards to the implications for EU development policy, the paper draws two main conclusions. First, tackling global poverty needs a better coordinated cross-country division of labour at the EU level to avoid marginalising countries that have become wealthier in per capita terms but that continue to experience internal development challenges. Second, addressing challenges related to complex global public goods requires EU development policy to continue its engagement with emerging economies and other increasingly powerful developing countries. Such diversification of objectives, however, will increase the coordination challenges of EU development policy and other European external policies substantially.

The European Green Deal conveys the EU's ambition to adjust and "green" its economic growth trajectory and become climate-neutral by 2050, as part of its contribution to the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals. While being ambitiously pursued within the Union's own borders, the Green Deal also has strong external ramifications, as the EU leaves a tremendous ecological footprint in other parts of the world. The EU has referred to this "external dimension" of the Green Deal without further defining it, and appears to primarily understand it as a reflection of the internal strategies and as a call for the EU's partner countries to follow a sustainable recovery trajectory similar to its own.A number of proposed EU domestic strategies (e.g. biodiversity, blue economy or farm-to-fork) contain chapters on global aspects, yet the EU seems to follow a predominantly sectoral logic to implementing the external dimension of the Green Deal. This approach has certain shortcomings. For one, it creates uncertainty for partner countries on how to adapt to the EU's new rules, regulations and standards, and the extent of EU support for adjusting to this. It also creates a vacuum for member state engagement by means of their economy, finance, climate and foreign policies. Last but not least, it lacks clear governance mechanisms to address potentially conflicting policy objectives and to strive for greater coherence of domestic and external EU policies.Ultimately, the EU needs to define the different external dimensions of the Green Deal and promote an integrated approach. Whereas this applies universally to all partner countries of the EU, we focus in particular on developing countries in this paper. We consider these dimensions to be (1) promoting the Green Deal in bilateral and regional cooperation, (2) ensuring coherence and addressing negative spillovers, both in trade and domestic policies and (3) the EU's global leadership in multilateral fora. Combining those three dimensions and governing them across EU institutions and member states allows for the external response to become an integral part of the EU Green Deal.Such an integrated approach allows the EU to claim leadership vis-à-vis other global powers, make credible commitments in multilateral fora for successful "green diplomacy", and use its market and regulatory power to transform itself and others. In its bilateral relationships, the EU needs to strike a "deal" in the true sense of the word: together formulating and "owning" cooperation agendas that are clear in terms of what is in it for the EU's partners and how the EU will cushion the potential negative adjustment costs of partners. Overall, the EU needs to avoid a "projectisation" of the external dimension of the Green Deal and clarify how the different Commission services and member states aim to work together to deliver the Green Deal, including through its various external policy areas, of which development is just one.

The European Green Deal conveys the EU's ambition to adjust and "green" its economic growth trajectory and become climate-neutral by 2050, as part of its contribution to the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals. While being ambitiously pursued within the Union's own borders, the Green Deal also has strong external ramifications, as the EU leaves a tremendous ecological footprint in other parts of the world. The EU has referred to this "external dimension" of the Green Deal without further defining it, and appears to primarily understand it as a reflection of the internal strategies and as a call for the EU's partner countries to follow a sustainable recovery trajectory similar to its own. A number of proposed EU domestic strategies (e.g. biodiversity, blue economy or farm-to-fork) contain chapters on global aspects, yet the EU seems to follow a predominantly sectoral logic to implementing the external dimension of the Green Deal. This approach has certain shortcomings. For one, it creates uncertainty for partner countries on how to adapt to the EU's new rules, regulations and standards, and the extent of EU support for adjusting to this. It also creates a vacuum for member state engagement by means of their economy, finance, climate and foreign policies. Last but not least, it lacks clear governance mechanisms to address potentially conflicting policy objectives and to strive for greater coherence of domestic and external EU policies. Ultimately, the EU needs to define the different external dimensions of the Green Deal and promote an integrated approach. Whereas this applies universally to all partner countries of the EU, we focus in particular on developing countries in this paper. We consider these dimensions to be (1) promoting the Green Deal in bilateral and regional cooperation, (2) ensuring coherence and addressing negative spillovers, both in trade and domestic policies and (3) the EU's global leadership in multilateral fora. Combining those three dimensions and governing them across EU institutions and member states allows for the external response to become an integral part of the EU Green Deal. Such an integrated approach allows the EU to claim leadership vis-à-vis other global powers, make credible commitments in multilateral fora for successful "green diplomacy", and use its market and regulatory power to transform itself and others. In its bilateral relationships, the EU needs to strike a "deal" in the true sense of the word: together formulating and "owning" cooperation agendas that are clear in terms of what is in it for the EU's partners and how the EU will cushion the potential negative adjustment costs of partners. Overall, the EU needs to avoid a "projectisation" of the external dimension of the Green Deal and clarify how the different Commission services and member states aim to work together to deliver the Green Deal, including through its various external policy areas, of which development is just one.

We analyse domestic factors within European donor countries that have influenced their provision of budget support. Budget support has been one of the most promising, and at the same time, controversial aid instruments aimed at improving aid effectiveness as well as donor harmonisation. Based on theoretical considerations, our econometric analysis for the 2002–2012 period shows that government ideology, the economic context in donor countries, as well as the structure of their aid systems have been important determinants of budget support provision. A comparison of Germany and the United Kingdom sustains these findings with qualitative evidence. Our findings also indicate that these ideological, economic and bureaucratic factors have worked as important barriers to improved donor harmonisation within Europe.

This paper assesses the preferences of EU institutions and member states for the Union's development policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Addressing both the effects of climate change and biodiversity loss and the exacerbating socio-economic inequalities requires a response that links the short-term recovery of the pandemic with longer-term socio-ecological transformations. Our findings show that the EU and its member states have mainly responded to that challenge through Team Europe and Team Europe Initiatives. While these have contributed to defining a joint European response to the pandemic, the strong focus on climate and green transitions and the lack of connections to the broader SDG agenda as well as social and human development have created tensions between some member states and the EU. A key challenge ahead in further defining the European response to the pandemic is finding new strategic directions and operational means for bridging these differing priorities.