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Recent analyses of collective choice predict convergence among the outcomes of simple-majority decisions. I estimate the extent of convergence under restricted preference maximizing through a computer simulation of majority choice by committees in which individual decisions on proposal location and voting are constrained. The simulation generates distributions of majority-adopted proposals in two-dimensional space: nondeterministic outcomes of simple-majority choice. The proposal distributions provide data for a quantitative evaluation of the effects on convergence of relaxing conventional preference-maximizing assumptions. I find convergence of majority-adopted proposals in all cases, and that convergence increases under restricted proposal location. Moreover, under some voting restrictions, experiments yield stable outcomes that demonstrate remarkable convergence. I conclude that restricted preference maximizing generally increases the probability that simple-majority outcomes reflect the central tendency of member preference distributions. Since committees and legislatures are important formal procedures for democratic collective choice, this conclusion applies to a large class of political decisions.

Recent analyses of collective choice predict convergence among the outcomes of simple-majority decisions. I estimate the extent of convergence under restricted preference maximizing through a computer simulation of majority choice by committees in which individual decisions on proposal location & voting are constrained. The simulation generates distributions of majority-adopted proposals in two-dimensional space: nondeterministic outcomes of simple-majority choice. The proposal distributions provide data for a quantitative evaluation of the effects on convergence of relaxing conventional preference-maximizing assumptions. I find convergence of majority-adopted proposals in all cases, & that convergence increases under restricted proposal location. Moreover, under some voting restrictions, experiments yield stable outcomes that demonstrate remarkable convergence. I conclude that restricted preference maximizing generally increases the probability that simple-majority outcomes reflect the central tendency of member preference distributions. Since committees & legislatures are important formal procedures for democratic collective choice, this conclusion applies to a large class of political decisions. 2 Tables, 3 Figures, 24 References. Adapted from the source document.

Two important findings from n-person game theory are that coalition formation is superadditive if and only if a game possesses an empty core, and Riker's size principle. Up to the present, both theorems have been proved and critiqued under the assumption of transferable cardinal utility.This analysis eliminates the cardinal utility assumption on the grounds that it is generally inconsistent with the conditions that characterize collective choice on political issues. Instead, a model of collective decision making is set forth in terms of ordinal preferences, and the two theorems are reconsidered. The superadditivity theorem survives intact, whereas the size principle is weakened. Circumstances are identified in which there is no incentive to reduce an oversized winning coalition; however, under no condition is there an incentive to increase the size of a winning coalition. A number of coalition-size hypotheses are tested using roll-call data from the U.S. Senate. The results raise new questions about the role of coalition formation in legislative voting strategy.

The literature on Ur services delivery supports the conclusions that the distribution of services is a function of bureaucratic norms & professionalism, & is largely impervious to political forces. A recent study of the distribution of park facilities in Chicago, Ill, showed essentially no relationship to city politics, in terms of race (Madenka, K. R. "The Urban Bureaucracy and the Chicago Political Machine: Who Gets What and the Limits of Political Control," The American Political Science Review, 1980, 74, 991-998). Using a similar research design, & 1983 data from the Chicago Park District's Table of Parks and Park Facilities, the 1980 findings are replicated; however, it is shown that the results are equally attributable to exogenous variables that were not considered in the earlier study, & that have generally been overlooked in research on this subject. A regression model is estimated to test several competing explanations of Ur services distribution. The results show that efficiency & politics are independently significant explanatory factors in the distribution of park facilities, while equity is not. 6 Tables, 1 Appendix, 51 References. Modified HA

Reexamination of a 1980 study of the distribution of park facilities in Chicago, by Kenneth Mladenka.