ECONOMIC THEORIES OF ORGANIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN POLITICAL PARTIES
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 251-263
ISSN: 1354-0688
THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE APPLIES THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, THAT IS, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES AND THEIR INTRA-PARTY CONSTITUENCIES, IN THREE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES. IT EXAMINES WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THESIS PROVIDES A USEFUL METHODOLOGICAL TOOL OR THE ANALYSIS OF INTRA-PARTY STRUGGLES OVER ORGANIZATIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF POWER. THE STUDY CONCLUDES THAT THE MODEL IN INDEED APPLICABLE TO THE STUDY O INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AND CONFLICT, BUT THAT A MORE RIGOROUS TEST AND APPLICATION IS NECESSARY TO FULLY ASCERTAIN ITS METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL VALUE FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN GENERAL.