Suchergebnisse

Wilfred Kohl analyzes the development of France's atomic force, focusing on the role of nuclear weapons in de Gaulle's policies and its impact on French relations with NATO, her key alliance partners (the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany), and the U.S.S.R. He emphasizes the discontinuity between de Gaulle's grandiose designs and the more modest programs envisaged by cither the preceding governments of the Fourth Republic or the succeeding Pompidou government. Originally published in 1972. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make ava

Wilfred Kohl analyzes the development of France's atomic force, focusing on the role of nuclear weapons in de Gaulle's policies and its impact on French relations with NATO, her key alliance partners (the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany), and the U.S.S.R. He emphasizes the discontinuity between de Gaulle's grandiose designs and the more modest programs envisaged by cither the preceding governments of the Fourth Republic or the succeeding Pompidou government. Originally published in 1972. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make ava.

Energy policy in the European Community has been limited, thus far, to the collection of information, the setting of objectives, support for some research and demon stration projects, and the making of recommendations to member countries. This situation is likely to continue in the near future, because the institutions of the Community were not set up to cope with the complexities of a common energy policy. More importantly, there are major differences in resource endowments and energy policies of the member states, which inhibit cooperation, since energy is an extremely sensitive area of national sovereignty. Since the 1973-74 oil crisis, more energy policy has been made at the national level than at the European level. However, on the whole, west European countries have responded more rapidly with revisions and improvements in their energy policies than has the United States. They have acted to set objectives whereby Community dependence on imported energy would be reduced by 1985, and to encourage adjustment of the mix of energy sources. Even if these objectives are achieved, the EC will remain an area dependent on the outside world for approximately 50 percent of its energy needs in the mid-1980s.

Energy policy in the European Community has been limited, thus far, to the collection of information, the setting of objectives, the gaining of support for some research & demonstration projects, & the making of recommendations to member countries. This situation is likely to continue in the near future because the institutions of the Community were not set up to cope with the complexities of a common energy policy. More importantly, there are major differences in resource endowments & energy policies of the member states which inhibit cooperation, since energy is an extremely sensitive area of national sovereignty. Since the 1973/74 oil crisis, more energy policy has been made at the national level than at the European level. However, on the whole, West European countries have responded more rapidly with revisions & improvements in their energy policies than has the US. They have acted to set objectives whereby Community dependence on important energy would be reduced by 1985, & to encourage adjustment of the mix of energy sources. Even if these objectives are achieved, the European Community will remain an area dependent on the outside world for approximately 50% of its energy needs in the mid-1980s. HA.

No single model adequately explains the American foreign policy-making process. At least six models are required, singly or in some combination, to understand recent American foreign policy formation under the Nixon Administration. The six models are: democratic politics, organizational process/bureaucratic politics, the royal-court model, multiple advocacy, groupthink, and shared images or mind-sets. After a review of the rules of the foreign policy game in Washington and the main elements of the Nixon-Kissinger National Security Council system, the article seeks to apply the models to a number of cases in recent American policy making toward Europe. U.S.-Soviet relations, the "Year of Europe," and Nixon's New Economic Policy of August 1971 are examined as cases of royal-court decision making. A second category of cases exhibits mixed patterns of decision making: SALT, the Berlin negotiations, U.S. troops in Europe, MBFR, and U.S. trade policy. Bureaucratic variables alone explained policy outcomes in international economic policy making in the autumn of 1971, and an organizational process model was found to be dominant generally in the formation of recent international monetary policy, led by the Treasury Department. The conclusion considers the relationships between the models and certain kinds of policies.