Suchergebnisse

AbstractResearch on the timing of events during the transition to adulthood, such as first union, sex, and birth in low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs), focused predominantly on measures of central tendency, notably median or mean ages. In this report, we adopt a different perspective on this topic by examining disparities in the timing of these events in 46 LMICs spanning four decades. Using Demographic and Health Surveys, we estimate ages at which 25 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent of women have first union, birth, and sex. We compute interquartile ranges to measure within‐country variation and disparities in the timing of sexual initiation and family formation. Variation in the timing of first union, birth, and sex generally increases as the median ages at these events increase. Disparities in the timing of first union and birth grew in West Africa and Latin America, and women who experience these events relatively early increasingly lag behind women who experience them relatively late. Documenting trends in measures of central tendency is insufficient to capture the complexity of ongoing changes because they mask growing disparities in the timing of family formation across many LMICs. These results are important for assessing progress toward the achievement of sustainable development goals related to the reduction of early marriages and pregnancies and highlight a need for more holistic approaches to measure the timing of family formation.

While new empirical findings and theoretical frameworks provide insight into the interrelations between socioeconomic development, gender equity, and low fertility, puzzling exceptions and outliers in these findings call for a more all‐encompassing framework to understand the interplay between these processes. We argue that the pace and onset of development are two important factors to be considered when analyzing gender equity and fertility. Within the developed world, "first‐wave developers"—or countries that began socioeconomic development in the nineteenth/early twentieth century—currently have much higher fertility levels than "late developers." We lay out a novel theoretical approach to explain why this is the case and provide empirical evidence to support our argument. Our approach not only explains historical periods of low fertility but also sheds light on why there exists such large variance in fertility rates among today's developed countries.

SummaryAn increasing number of developing countries are experiencing below replacement fertility rates. Although the factors associated with low fertility in developed countries have been widely explored in the literature, studies of low fertility in middle- and low-income countries continue to be rare. To help fill this gap, Brazil was used as a case study to assess whether human development, gender equality and the ability of mothers with young children to work are associated with the likelihood of married or cohabiting women to have a child. For this purpose, multilevel logistic regressions were estimated using the 1991, 2000 and 2010 Brazilian Demographic Censuses. It was found that human development was negatively associated with fertility in the three periods analysed. Gender equality and the ability of mothers with young children to work were positively associated with the odds of having higher order births in Brazil in 2000 and 2010. In 1991, these variables were not associated with higher order births, and gender equality was negatively associated with first births. The positive association found in 2000 and 2010 may constitute a reversal of the relationship that in all likelihood prevailed earlier in the demographic transition when gender equality was most likely negatively correlated with fertility levels.

En los últimos veinticinco años la fecundidad española medida por el ISF ha experimentadouna caída muy importante, alcanzando niveles de entre los más bajos del mundo. Esto ha ocurridosimultáneamente con un retraso en la edad al tener hijos. En este artículo presentamosresultados de investigaciones recientes sobre cómo los retrasos en la edad al tener hijos hacenque el ISF sea más pequeño que el que se observaría si la edad a la maternidad fuera estable. Setrata del denominado efecto calendario. Mediante la aplicación al caso español de los métodosde corrección del efecto calendario propuestos por Ryder; Bongaarts y Feeney, y Kohler y Philipov,mostramos cómo el efecto calendario es particularmente intenso en España y que la mayorparte de las caídas en los primeros y segundos nacimientos se deben al retraso de la fecundidad.Si este retraso no se hubiera producido apenas habría caído la fecundidad de estos órdenes. Esla caída en la intensidad de los terceros nacimientos y superiores la que caracteriza la recientedisminución de la fecundidad española. Aquí es donde radica el motivo de que la fecundidadespañola, aun después de eliminar el efecto calendario, no alcance el nivel de reemplazo. Elnivel que se observaría en ausencia de retraso de la fecundidad estaría, la mayor parte de losaños a partir de 1985, entre 1,7 y 1,9, un valor significativamente mayor que los ISF observados,en torno a 1-1,3.