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How and when do intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) promote incorporation of international norms in domestic politics? In this article, I assess the impact of the International Labour Organization (ILO) on national labour regulations. I advance a new argument regarding how and when labour regulations are shaped by the ILO. More specifically, I argue that the ILO can shape labour regulations during the preparatory process of international labour standards. I theorize that the preparatory period of international labour conventions constitutes a propitious condition for mechanisms of elite socialisation, learning and domestic mobilisation. To test our argument, we focus on national dismissal regulations covering the period 1970-2013. The findings provide evidence in line with my argument that states improve their regulations during the adoption process. However, I find no evidence that states improve their regulations after formal adoption. The results have substantive implications for our understanding of IGOs and labor standards in particular.

How do international non-governmental organizations select countries for naming and shaming? I argue that three focal actors influence non-governmental organizations' shaming decisions: inter-governmental organizations, governments, and non-governmental organization members. Moreover, drawing on existing research, non-governmental organizations might respond differently to focal actors' preferences, by either targeting states that have been criticized by focal actors or, alternatively, targeting those who have escaped their scrutiny. To test these propositions, the article conducts multiple interviews and gathers original data on shaming within the International Trade Union Confederation during period 1991–2011. The main findings are threefold. First, focal actors, except governments, have a significant influence on International Trade Union Confederation shaming. The members' preferences regarding which states should be singled out have the strongest impact. Second, the International Trade Union Confederation is likely to adopt a bandwagoning strategy by shaming states that have been targeted by focal actors, rather than focusing on states that have escaped their criticism. Third, as a result of the bandwagoning approach, the International Trade Union Confederation mainly targets states with poor labor rights conditions.

Why do some states name and shame norm-violating states while other states abstain? Inter-state naming and shaming is typically viewed as a political tool to punish adversaries and reward allies. In this study, I propose a regime-type explanation for inter-state shaming in international politics. I pose two interrelated questions. First, are democracies more prone to condemn norm violations than non-democratic countries? Second, are democracies likely to shame each other in cases of norm violations? In search of answers to these questions, I use a unique dataset on inter-state shaming the International Labour Organization (ILO) for the period 1991–2011. In line with my main argument, the results suggest that democracies are more likely than non-democracies to engage in the shaming of norm violators, while providing no evidence for special relations between democracies. In addition, this study unpacks other factors influencing the inter-state shaming. The findings have implications for how we understand state interactions in international politics.

In the current international system, the use of centralized, hard enforcement mechanisms is often deemed either politically impossible or too costly. As a consequence, many international organizations (IOs) rely on so-called naming and shaming strategies as tools of political influence. Naming and shaming is the public exposure and condemnation of states that violate international rules and norms. It is not designed to simply renegade violators, but to produce compliance through reputational and status concerns. But how does naming and shaming work and what impact does it have on state behavior? In this dissertation, I adopt a comprehensive approach to the study of naming and shaming by examining its underlying politics and determinants as well as its impact on state behavior. In search for answers, I focus on the naming and shaming strategies employed in the International Labour Organization (ILO) during the period 1989-2011. Drawing on the theories of international politics, I develop a set of hypotheses that are tested by means of statistical as well as process tracing techniques. The overall conclusions of the dissertation are fourfold. First, the results indicate that ILO naming and shaming is used to punish violators of international labor standards. This implies that IOs, under the right conditions, can thwart the politicization of naming and shaming that has been observed in other IOs. Second, I find support for my argument that the decision to engage in naming and shaming primarily is determined by the democratic character of states. This enhances our understanding of when states participate in pressuring targets and the patterns of inter-state shaming. Third, the dissertation finds that ILO naming and shaming can improve international labor standards. The impact of ILO naming and shaming is stronger when target states are democratic and resourceful. This implies that IOs can overcome international collective problems without hard enforcement mechanisms and that IO naming and shaming, under certain propitious conditions, can produce compliance. Fourth, while democracies are more likely to respond to international criticism, not all democracies do. This dissertation demonstrates that ILO naming and shaming is a powerful tool among democracies that have strong and united labor unions. This implies that IO naming and shaming of democratic states is likely to work through domestic pressure mechanisms. ; At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Submitted. Paper 3: Submitted. Paper 4: Manuscript.

Abstract
Multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) in global environmental governance are either praised for their problem-solving capacities and inclusion of various societal actors or criticized for their limited accountability and corporate dominance. Despite the lively scholarly debate and the continued promotion of MSPs by international organizations and governments, knowledge about how environmental MSPs are perceived by the public is very limited. Understanding the sources of public support for MSPs is important, given its crucial role in MSPs' abilities to secure resources and achieve their goals. In this article, we evaluate whether and how institutional features of MSPs influence citizens' legitimacy beliefs. Building on previous studies, we theorize which institutional dimensions of MSPs matter for citizens' level of support. We conduct population-based survey experiments in Brazil, the United Kingdom, and the United States, encompassing more than 6,000 respondents. The results from the survey experiments have substantive implications for our understanding of the role of MSPs.

Diplomacy is a chief instrument of foreign policy. Through high-level diplomatic visits, governments can facilitate cooperation and signal the quality of their relations with other states. Because host countries cannot receive an indefinite number of visits, they must make strategic decisions, prioritizing some countries over others. This reveals information about their foreign policy priorities as well as diplomatic hierarchies and practices in the system as a whole. But what determines high-level diplomatic visits? Existing scholarship disagrees. In this research note, we assess the determinants of high-level diplomatic visits to the U.S. Theoretically, we draw on previous studies and formulate structural, domestic, and practice-oriented accounts of high-level visits as tools of foreign policy. Empirically, we gather original data on diplomatic visits to the U.S. by foreign leaders from 1946 to 2012. Our main results are two-fold. First, high-level diplomatic visits to the U.S. are primarily determined by structural factors such as economic relations. Second, we find clear differences in invited country profiles during and after the Cold War, demonstrating that high-level visits are used strategically to promote shifting foreign policy priorities.

Does INGO climate shaming translate into actual climate laws, or is it ineffective in altering the behavior of governments? This article provides the first systematic assessment of whether and under what conditions INGO climate shaming can influence national climate policymaking. Drawing on social movement and NGO literatures, we argue that INGO climate shaming can incur reputational costs for governments through two main pathways: public opinion and transnational politics. To test our propositions, we generate a unique dataset on INGO climate shaming, utilizing natural language processing (NLP) to extract INGO climate shaming events from media sources, covering the period 1990–2020. We find that climate shaming is generally effective in pushing government to introduce climate laws. Particularly, we find that climate shaming is consequential when governments are trade-dependent and have committed to global climate norms. Our findings provide substantive implications for the global climate governance literature.

AbstractDo international shaming efforts affect citizens' support for government policies? While it is a frequent claim in the literature that shaming works through domestic politics, we know little about how and when international criticism affects domestic public opinion. We address this question through an originally designed survey experiment in Sweden, which (i) compares the effects of international shaming in two issue areas—human rights and climate change, and (ii) tests whether government responses to criticism moderate the impact of shaming. Our main findings are fourfold. First, we find substantial effects of international shaming on domestic public opinion. These effects hold across both issue areas and irrespective of whether citizens support government parties or not. Second, human rights shaming has a stronger impact on citizens' support for government policies than climate shaming. Third, shaming is most effective among citizens who are more supportive of climate action, human rights, and international cooperation. Finally, our findings are mixed with respect to the effect of government responses. While government responses do not moderate the effects of human rights shaming, they seem to mitigate the effects of climate shaming.