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AbstractPolitical parties face hard choices when balancing desires to influence public policy, to gain executive office and to win votes. The existing literature examining such party preferences has traditionally focused on rather static aspects of the parties, such as size, policy positions and the level of intraparty democracy. This article argues that party actors' sophisticated estimations of whether to enter into coalition can be affected by fluctuating public opinion, thereby having a more dynamic aspect. Drawing on a survey experiment on youth politicians in Norway, we test how perceived standing in the polls affects how politicians weigh up policy versus office and votes versus office. The experimental effect of perceived standings was investigated in addition to the respondents' positions within the party, as well as their parties' former governing history, political orientation and size. Results show that, in the presence of the treatment condition (party is perceived to do well in the polls), the preference for policy over office is lessened. We find no experimental effect for vote versus office. These results advance our understanding of the dynamic aspects of party goals and coalition formation.

This article contributes to the emerging scholarship on the gender gap in political ambitions. While appointed party positions offer politically minded people the opportunity to have further political careers outside the elected path, the extent to which women prefer such alternative careers is unclear. This article investigates the gender gap in the political ambitions of young people in Norway. Studying the gender gap in a country with numerous role models and established opportunity structures allows us to understand how individual and contextual factors might affect ambitions for different elected and appointed political positions. This research also explores the impact of personality and upbringing. The article draws on a 2019–20 survey of young party member elites. Multivariate analysis reveals that gender is a main factor in differences in ambition for elected positions but less so for appointed positions.

Public agencies have varying degrees of self-determination. In the existing literature this autonomy is often explained by sector and task. Although agencies are increasingly subject to media scrutiny and public attention, the literature on the autonomy of agencies has not focused much on the impact of the media. Visible agencies might be more able to resist the control of superior bodies. However, reputational threats and poor media management might tempt ministers to increase political control and decrease the autonomy of agencies, or in other words, tighten the leash. Drawing on a 2016 survey of civil servants in Norwegian agencies, this article investigates four aspects of agency autonomy, and relates this to media appearance and media management in the organisation. The results show that agencies frequently in the written press report lower levels of autonomy, while agencies with competent media management have higher levels of autonomy. This suggests that media appearance and media management should be seen as important factors when aiming to explain agency autonomy.

ABSTRACTPublic agencies have varying degrees of self-determination. In the existing literature this autonomy is often explained by sector and task. Although agencies are increasingly subject to media scrutiny and public attention, the literature on the autonomy of agencies has not focused much on the impact of the media. Visible agencies might be more able to resist the control of superior bodies. However, reputational threats and poor media management might tempt ministers to increase political control and decrease the autonomy of agencies, or in other words, tighten the leash. Drawing on a 2016 survey of civil servants in Norwegian agencies, this article investigates four aspects of agency autonomy, and relates this to media appearance and media management in the organisation. The results show that agencies frequently in the written press report lower levels of autonomy, while agencies with competent media management have higher levels of autonomy. This suggests that media appearance and media management should be seen as important factors when aiming to explain agency autonomy. Keywords: public agencies, autonom, control, media, ministers

Public agencies have varying degrees of self-determination. In the existing literature this autonomy is often explained by sector and task. Although agencies are increasingly subject to media scrutiny and public attention, the literature on the autonomy of agencies has not focused much on the impact of the media. Visible agencies might be more able to resist the control of superior bodies. However, reputational threats and poor media management might tempt ministers to increase political control and decrease the autonomy of agencies, or in other words, tighten the leash. Drawing on a 2016 survey of civil servants in Norwegian agencies, this article investigates four aspects of agency autonomy, and relates this to media appearance and media management in the organisation. The results show that agencies frequently in the written press report lower levels of autonomy, while agencies with competent media management have higher levels of autonomy. This suggests that media appearance and media management should be seen as important factors when aiming to explain agency autonomy.

Bo Smith-rapporten foreslår en rekke ulike endringer for å gjøre det danske politisk-administrative systemet bedre tilpasset nye vilkår og krav i samfunnet. I denne artikkelen vurderes flere av disse endringsforslagene i lys av erfaringene fra Norge. Danmark og Norge har en felles arv etter over 400 år med samme monarki, men utviklingstakten i systemene har vært noe forskjellig; ikke minst når det gjelder politiske ansatte i departementene har de to landene gått ulike veier. Artikkelen kommer inn på hvordan det politisk-administrative apparatet fungerer i Norge, før de ulike danske endringsforslagene vurderes. Artikkelen argumenterer for at klare retningslinjer og en utvidet politisk ledelse i departementene kan gjøre det enklere for embetsverket å agere partipolitisk nøytralt.

The Bo Smith report suggests various changes to make the Danish political-administrative system better adapted to new demands in society. In this article, several of these changes are considered in light of experience from Norway. Denmark and Norway share a common heritage, but their systems have developed somewhat differently, not least when it comes to the number and function of political appointees in ministries. The article first describes the political-administrative system in Norway before considering the various proposals. The Bo Smith report does not suggest introducing more political appointees in Danish ministries. The article argues, however, that a strengthening of the political layer together with written guidelines might make it easier for civil servants to act party politically neutral.

The Bo Smith report suggests various changes to make the Danish political-administrative system better adapted to new demands in society. In this article, several of these changes are considered in light of experience from Norway. Denmark and Norway share a common heritage, but their systems have developed somewhat differently, not least when it comes to the number and function of political appointees in ministries. The article first describes the political-administrative system in Norway before considering the various proposals. The Bo Smith report does not suggest introducing more political appointees in Danish ministries. The article argues, however, that a strengthening of the political layer together with written guidelines might make it easier for civil servants to act party politically neutral.

Dans plusieurs pays, diverses mesures ont été prises en vue d'améliorer la capacité de coordination et de contrôle de la politique publique au sein du centre de l'exécutif. La littérature sur l'ensemble du gouvernement (« whole-of-government ») et le gouvernement décloisonné considère ces évolutions comme une réaffirmation des initiatives visant à contrer les effets négatifs des anciennes réformes du NMP. La principale question de recherche examinée dans le présent article est celle de savoir si le renforcement du centre de l'exécutif doit aussi s'expliquer par les évolutions plus larges dans la société et par les caractéristiques du gouvernement proprement dit. Nous tâcherons de répondre à cette question en examinant les évolutions survenues en Norvège depuis trente ans. Même si les anciennes réformes du NMP jouent un rôle dans le cas de la Norvège, nous verrons dans cet article que les mesures prises doivent aussi s'expliquer par le désir d'améliorer le processus décisionnel du gouvernement et de résoudre les conflits entre les partis qui le composent. Remarques l'intention des praticiens Dans le présent article, nous examinons différentes explications de l'évolution survenue au sein du centre de l'exécutif en Norvège. Au cours des trente dernières années, le centre de l'exécutif norvégien s'est renforcé grâce au nombre accru de personnes désignées pour des raisons politiques au sein des ministères, mais aussi de l'élargissement du bureau du Premier ministre, où un ministre de la Coordination a été désigné en 2009, et de l'officialisation d'un cabinet restreint. Les données empiriques sont extraites de documents ministériels internes et d'entretiens semi-structurés réalisés avec des responsables administratifs et politiques. Nous verrons que les évolutions en Norvège ont plusieurs explications, ce qui tend à indiquer que les changements survenus au sein du centre de l'exécutif sont hétérogènes et sont rarement réalisés dans un but unique.

In several countries, attempts have been made to increase the capacity to coordinate and control public policy in the executive centre. The literature on whole-of-government and joined-up government describes these changes as reassertion efforts to counter the negative effects of former New Public Management (NPM) reforms. The main research question discussed in this article is whether the strengthening of the executive centre also should be explained by broader developments in society and by features of the cabinet itself. The research question is answered by looking at changes in Norway over the last three decades. Although former NPM reforms play a part in the Norwegian case, the article finds that the efforts undertaken should also be explained by the wish to improve cabinet decision-making and to solve conflicts between parties in cabinet.Points for practitionersThis article examines different explanations for change in the executive centre in Norway. Over the last three decades, the Norwegian executive centre has been strengthened by the increased number of political appointees in ministries, by the enlargement of the Prime Minister's Office where its own coordination minister was appointed in 2009, and by the formalization of an inner cabinet. The empirical data are gathered from internal cabinet documents and semi-structured interviews with administrative and political leaders. The article finds that developments in Norway have several explanations, suggesting that changes in the executive centre are heterogeneous, and are seldom undertaken to serve only one purpose.

AbstractThe empowerment of chief executives has been apparent in several parliamentary democracies in recent decades. However, few accounts have been produced of developments in recent Norwegian cabinets. The aim of this article is two-fold. First, changes regarding the concentration of decision-making power in Norwegian cabinets in the past 15 years are examined and, second, how political factors have contributed to the concentration of power is also examined. Drawing on interviews with 19 ministers from the Bondevik II and Stoltenberg II cabinets, the article finds that collegial elements of cabinets have been weakened, and there has been a centralization of power around an inner cabinet, the so-called subcommittee, consisting of the prime minister and the party leaders. The article also shows how political distances between coalition parties and the cabinet's parliamentary basis have affected the concentration of power.