Suchergebnisse

Introduction: First Principles -- Gains from Trade -- A Primer in Markets and Institutions: Introduction -- Supply and Demand Under Perfect Competition -- Normative Economics -- Externalities and the Limits of Markets -- Foundations of Demand and Supply: Decisions and Consumer Behavior -- Costs -- Firm Behavior and Industrial Organization: A Second Look at Firm Behavior Under Perfect Competition -- Firm Behavior in Monopolistic Markets -- Principles of Game Theory -- Firm Behavior in Oligopolistic Markets -- Appendix: A Case Study -- Mathematical Appendix.

The present paper analyzes situations in which groups compete for rents. A major result in the literature has been that there are both cases where larger groups have advantages and cases where they have disadvantages. The paper provides two intuitive criteria which for groups with homogenous valuations of the rent determine whether there are advantages or disadvantages for larger groups. For groups with heterogenous valuations the complementarity of group members' efforts is shown to play a role as a further factor

Institutional change is guided by rules. In the European Union these rules are given by Art. 250-252 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. These articles define the actors and rules that bring about changes in policies in the European Union. We analyze these articles as games in extensive form and characterize and compare the equilibria of these games. This analysis identifies the decisive actors the conditions under which it comes to institutional change within the European Union. In addition we analyze the tendencies for centralization inherent in these decision procedures as well as their ability to come up with solutions that are a good compromise between all actors.

Herschel Grossman was one of the most creative & productive economists of his generation in the field of political economy. This paper surveys his scientific contributions to the field. References. [Copyright 2005 Elsevier B.V.]

Institutional change is guided by rules. In the European Union these rules are given by Art. 250-252 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. These articles define the actors and rules that bring about changes in policies in the European Union. We analyze these articles as games in extensive form and characterize and compare the equilibria of these games. This analysis identifies the decisive actors the conditions under which it comes to institutional change within the European Union. In addition we analyze the tendencies for centralization inherent in these decision procedures as well as their ability to come up with solutions that are a good compromise between all actors.