Suchergebnisse

AbstractWe analyze the economic performance of countries after a multi‐decade political ruler, defined as having been in office 20 or more years, loses power. For 37 countries experiencing such an end‐of‐reign event in the period 1971–2005, we use an event study approach to compare growth in the decade following the event with growth in pre‐event periods. The results show that event countries have below average growth in the year a long‐term political leader leaves office and that cumulative growth in the ensuing decade at best matches and at worst falls significantly short of pre‐event growth levels. Growth contractions are no different following irregular transitions than after regular transitions, suggesting our results are not explained by inadvertent post‐reign turmoil. Our results instead suggest that post‐event contractions may be shaped by deliberate efforts by long‐term leaders to concentrate power while in office and poison the post‐reign economic or political environment.

In October 2010, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. The Chinese Government responded by freezing political and economic relations with Norway, introducing sanctions on imports of fish and other products, and limiting diplomatic interaction. Using a synthetic control approach, we estimate the effect of Chinese sanctions on Norwegian exports to China and on Norwegian foreign policy. We find that the sanctions reduced direct exports of fish to China by between 125 and 176 million US$ in the period 2011–2013, and direct total exports from Norway to China by between 780 and 1300 million US$. Moreover, immediately following the peace prize, Norwegian agreement with Chinese voting on UN human rights resolutions increased. The results suggest that the Chinese Government can effectively use economic sanctions to affect the foreign policy positions of democratic governments, with potentially chilling effects for international progress on human rights.

Human rights imply duties. The question is, duties for whom? Without a well-defined scheme for assigning duties correlative to human rights, these rights remain illusory. This paper develops core elements of a general scheme of duty assignment and studies the implications for corporations. A key distinction in such an assignment is between unconditional and conditional duties. Unconditional duties apply to every agent regardless of the conduct of others. Conditional duties reflect a division of moral labour where different tasks are assigned to specific agents, whose default activates back-up duties of other agents. Corporations face unconditional duties to not directly violate the rights of others, and not undermine the division of moral labour through practices such as tax evasion or corruption. Being unconditional, these duties cannot be deviated from by reference to the misconduct of competitors. In addition, corporate conditional duties to protect, promote or fulfil rights can be activated if the state and other designated duty-bearers fail to discharge their duties. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article studies the relation between self‐serving elite behaviour and citizen political participation. It uses a fixed effects approach to analyse the association between portfolio investment in tax havens and voter turnout, using data from 213 parliamentary elections in 65 countries for the period 1998–2014. For well‐functioning democracies a positive relation between the use of tax havens and voter turnout is found, suggesting that self‐serving elite behaviour is associated with citizen political mobilisation rather than voter apathy. The estimated relationship is stronger in the period after the 2008 economic crisis, when elite behaviour was a particularly salient issue.

Does self-serving elite behaviour make citizens more politically active? This paper presents the results of a randomized field experiment where voters in Tanzania were given information about elite use of tax havens. Information provided in a neutral form had no effect on voting intentions. Information phrased in more morally charged terms led to a reduction in voting intentions. Additional evidence suggests that rather than increase the perceived importance of voting, charged information tends to undermine confidence in political institutions and the social contract. The effects are particularly pronounced among the less well-off, indicating that increased transparency in the absence of perceived agency may not improve democratic accountability.

Does diversification of an economy improve the chances of democracy? In theory, diversification may reduce elite cohesion and improve citizens' outside options, making democracy more likely. This paper estimates the effect of export diversification on democracy, using data from 143 countries. We use variability within countries in fertile soil as an instrument for diversification, controlling for country size. To address the possibility that current fertile soil variability may have been influenced by historical country characteristics that could also have affected democracy today, we control for historical changes in land cover. We identify a statistically significant, positive effect of diversification on democracy.