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There is a growing concern that China has become more assertive in its foreign policies. The fear is whether China's economic growth may translate into modern and effective military advancement. This engenders the critical question of whether China feels comfortable in the current international order, which is defined by international law and institutions. This article argues that the Chinese approach to international law and institutions is tightly associated with its evolving perception of sovereignty, and national interests vis-à-vis international law and institutions, and is characterised by a love-hate attitude towards them. With its opening up, China now views multilateralism as a way for the international community to constrain the capriciousness of a superpower, and regards the international institutions simply as power-sharing development. However, China's integration in international institutions represents its attempt to work within international norms to pursue its interests. China's ambivalence towards international judicial settlement of disputes signals the historical legacy as well as China's uneasiness with playing an active role in international institution-building and rule-making. (China/GIGA)

In response to strident and frequent domestic political outcries, some of China's trade partners have recently accused the Chinese government of intervening in its currency markets, and are threatening to lodge complaints with the World Trade Organization. However, can the WTO assert jurisdiction over China's RMB issue? Analysis of the relevant WTO rules applicable to exchange rate policies does not provide a clear-cut or easy answer. A case like this would likely require expansive interpretation of vague WTO provisions, and also a broadening of its authority into peripheral trade-related areas. Moreover, it is doubtful that China's trading partners could actually make a convincing case that China has violated its commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on Subsidy and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). (China/GIGA)

Post-Mao China has obviously moved away from the centrally planned command economy in the past two decades of reform. However, the key issue is in what direction and how far. To determine what direction China is headed for and how far China has moved in that direction, this article examines and evaluates the nature of institutional change in the ownership structure, particularly collectives, SOEs, and land ownership, which is then followed by a closer look at the post-Mao shareholding reform, its trends and problems from the basic perspective of property rights theory. (J Contemp China/DÜI) + The fifteenth congress of the Chinese Communist Party inaugurated a sweeping reform that has been transforming the ownership of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Though a term "common ownership" was the official name given to the scheme, it was regarded as a coded reference to privatization. If this is true, given the size of China's economy, this is probably the most ambitious privatization plan ever in the world. Bearing in mind that for nearly half a century the Chinese economy has remained based on the dominance of the state sector, it is understandable that the scheme had a shocking psychological effect at home and abroad the moment it was officially declared. For some people, China's privatization foretold a crusade. As a matter of fact, it ignited political debate at home and also sparked speculation abroad about the political tendency in China. From the academic perspective, it is of interest to figure out whether the scheme is privatization; if yes, how a decision could be made to privatize in the context of one of the few remaining socialist countries. One aim of this paper is to give an explanation to the paradox from the political-legal point of view. The paper argues that privatization is a natural result of the strategy for modernizing enterprises. However, the paper observes that the political and particularly the legal climates are not prepared for the privatization scheme, which poses a substantial restriction on the scheme. Then, the paper argues that the worth of the privatization scheme that has been proceeding in China does not lie in the novelty of its common ownership suggestion, but in its representing a near consensus on the Chinese leadership to push forward the experiment ownership suggestion, but in its representing a near consensus on the Chinese leadership to push forward the experiment already undertaken over the preceding years. Finally the paper ends by predicting briefly what can be expected of the scheme and how meaningful it will be

Part 1: The Foreign Investment Law and Its Interpretation Article by Article -- Part 2: The Foreign Investment Regime in Practice Since the Entry into Force of the Foreign Investment Law -- Chapter 1 Drafting History of the Basic Law for Foreign Investment -- Chapter 2 The Origin of the Title of the Foreign Investment Law in Chinese -- Chapter 3 Basic Norms of the Foreign Investment Law.-Chapter 4 The Foreign Investment Law and the Rule of Law -- Chapter 5 The Foreign Investment Law and the Negative List -- Chapter 6 The Foreign Investment Law and Enterprise Laws -- Chapter 7 The Foreign Investment Law and International Investment Agreements -- Chapter 8 Concluding Remarks -- Part 3: Harmonization and Coordination of the Foreign Investment Law with other Relevant Laws and Regulations -- Chapter 9 Linkage between the Foreign Investment Law and the Catalogue of Special Management Measures for Admission of Foreign Investment -- Chapter 10 Linkage between the Foreign Investment Law and Relevant Laws, Regulations and Rules on National security review -- Chapter 11 Harmonisation between the Foreign Investment Law and the Relevant Rules on Foreign Investment Verification and Recordation System.-Chapter 12 Relationship between the Foreign Investment Law and the Company Law and Partnership Law -- Chapter 13 The Relationship between the Foreign Investment Law and the Contract Law -- Chapter 14 The Relationship between the Foreign Investment Law and the Antimonopoly Law -- Chapter 15 The relationship between the Foreign Investment Law and the Government Procurement Law -- Chapter 16 The relationship between the Foreign Investment Law and the previous foreign investment-related ministerial rules -- Chapter 17 Negative List and the Negative List for Free Trade Zones -- Part 4: China's Foreign Investment Law from the Comparative Law Perspective -- Chapter 18 Admission of Foreign Investment -- Chapter 19 National security Review -- Chapter 20 Antimonopoly Review -- Chapter 21 Investment promotion -- Chapter 22 Investment protection -- Chapter 23 Information reporting -- Chapter 24 Concluding Remarks -- Part 5: Interaction between China and International Investment Rules -- Chapter 25 China's Place in the Rapidly Changing Landscape of Global Investment Flow -- Chapter 26 International Investment Rules and Their Development -- Chapter 27 Interaction between China's Foreign Investment Legislation and International Investment Rules -- Chapter 28 The Future Evolution of International Investment Rules and Its Impact on China's Foreign Investment Regime -- Chapter 29 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix 1:The Regulations on the Implementation of the Foreign Investment Law -- Appendix 2: Special Management Measures for Foreign Investment Admission (Negative List)(2020) -- Appendix 3: List of the Normative Documents relating to the Foreign Investment Law.

The recent years witnessed the emergence of international investment agreements (iias), such as the u.s. model bit in 2012, and more prominently, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (tpp) in 2015, which often embody provisions for state-owned enterprises (soes). The soe rules, as well as their predecessor, the oecd Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, aim to impose strict regulations on the soes and to exert great influence on the state-led economies. China has been seen in constant reform of its soes, and is now in the midst of negotiating a bit with, and the u.s., and a bit with the European Union. Against this backdrop, China's soe reform will be relevant to the emerging investment rules governing soes.