Suchergebnisse

This Element aims to provide an overview of Thai politics with an up-to-date discussion of the characteristics of political regimes, political economy, and identity and mobilization that are grounded in historical analysis stretching back to the formation of the modern nation state. The thematic topics will focus on a) the chronic instability and ever-changing nature of political regimes resulting in the failure of democratic consolidation, b) the nexus of business and politics sustained by a patrimonial state structure, patronage politics and political corruption, and c) the contestation of identity and the causes and consequences of mass mobilization in the civic space and street politics.

Thailand fits the pattern of pernicious polarized politics identified in this volume, where a previously excluded group successfully gains political power through the ballot box, governs unilaterally to pursue radical reforms, and produces a backlash from the traditional power elites. In Thailand, elite conflict has been a major part of the story, but this article argues that political polarization there cannot be merely understood as "elite-driven": conflict among the elites and the masses, and the interaction between them, produced polarized and unstable politics. Violent struggle is caused by class structure and regional, urban-rural disparities; elite struggle activates the existing social cleavages; and ideological framing deepens the polarization. While the Yellow Shirts and traditional elites want to restore and uphold the "Thai-style democracy" with royal nationalism, the Red Shirts espouse the "populist democracy" of strong elected government with popular nationalism and egalitarian social order.

From 1997 to 2006, the 1997 Constitution and its newly designed electoral system and the rise of a strong populist party led by Thaksin Shinawatra and the 2006 coup transformed local political structures and power balances. Thaksin's ambitious goal of monopolizing the political market raised the stakes of electoral competition, forcing provincial bosses to employ violent tactics to defeat their competitors. Consequently, the demand for and supply of electoral violence increased, as witnessed in the 2001 and 2005 elections. After the 2006 coup, political settings at the national and local levels underwent another major change. The royal-military intervention in the electoral process combined with growing ideological politics stifled and marginalized provincial bosses, thereby decreasing the demand for violence. As a result, incidents of violence during the 2007 and 2011 elections declined. Thai electoral politics and its pattern of violence are currently in a state of transition. Some new elements have emerged, but they have not yet completely replaced the old ones. The exercise of privatized violence by the provincial bosses was a remnant of the political and economic order established in the 1980s. This unsettling phenomenon will not entirely disappear until the patrimonial structure of the state is radically transformed and personalistic fighting over government spoils and rent-distribution are substantially reduced. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)