Suchergebnisse

The Nordic working life model (NWLM) promotes 'good work' on societal and workplace levels. However, this model is now challenged by emerging business models in the platform economy. This study investigates how digital labor platforms respond to conflicting institutional logics and how platform-mediated work intervenes with the inherent logic of the NWLM. The authors examine platform business strategies and their implications for working environment regulations, co-determination, and collective bargaining. Empirical data comprising 50 interviews with food delivery workers, platform managers, union representatives, employer association representatives, and occupational health and safety regulators from the Norwegian Labor Inspection Authority were analyzed by applying institutional complexity as a theoretical framework. The findings illustrate that a high degree of institutional complexity provides companies with discretionary space, which they utilize to achieve legitimacy and competitive advantages. The authors introduce the term institutional opportunism to describe how adaptation is performed. The study reveals that the platform economy, characterized by workers with limited experience of and knowledge about working life and strong market pressures, poses a challenge to the NWLM.

Over the past decades, government safety management regulation has been driven by deregulation, simplification and organization-level regimes of inspection. So-called functional rule-making requires organizations to implement safety management systems appropriate for their operations. The paradox that seems to have arisen is that overregulation is common in many organizations. Research has found over-proceduralization, safety clutter, bureaucratic overload, and procedures not at the service of safety. To explore the paradoxical relationship between governmental deregulatory measures and organizational overregulation, we analyze empirical data from Norwegian fish farming and coastal transport. The data confirms that practitioners experience a rapidly grown abundance of internal rules and protocols, ill-fitting procedures, and pervasive, exaggerated safety management. We trace three mechanisms that have driven internal overregulation: work auditability; managerial insecurity and liability; and audit practices. These mechanisms show how functional regulation can have unintended consequences when it meets other accountability expectations. Expectations of market doctrine, bureaucratic entrepreneurism and control can lead a company transforming simple governmental regulations into vastly overcomplicated safety management systems. We conclude our study with prescriptions of how this aspect of safety could be done differently. ; publishedVersion ; Available online 21 April 2020 0925-7535/ © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/)

Over the past decades, government safety management regulation has been driven by deregulation, simplification and organization-level regimes of inspection. So-called functional rule-making requires organizations to implement safety management systems appropriate for their operations. The paradox that seems to have arisen is that overregulation is common in many organizations. Research has found over-proceduralization, safety clutter, bureaucratic overload, and procedures not at the service of safety. To explore the paradoxical relationship between governmental deregulatory measures and organizational overregulation, we analyze empirical data from Norwegian fish farming and coastal transport. The data confirms that practitioners experience a rapidly grown abundance of internal rules and protocols, ill-fitting procedures, and pervasive, exaggerated safety management. We trace three mechanisms that have driven internal overregulation: work auditability; managerial insecurity and liability; and audit practices. These mechanisms show how functional regulation can have unintended consequences when it meets other accountability expectations. Expectations of market doctrine, bureaucratic entrepreneurism and control can lead a company transforming simple governmental regulations into vastly overcomplicated safety management systems. We conclude our study with prescriptions of how this aspect of safety could be done differently. ; publishedVersion

The contributions cover a wide range of methodologies and application areas for safety and reliability that contribute to safe societies in a changing world. These methodologies and applications include: - foundations of risk and reliability assessment and management
- mathematical methods in reliability and safety
- risk assessment
- risk management
- system reliability
- uncertainty analysis
- digitalization and big data
- prognostics and system health management
- occupational safety
- accident and incident modeling
- maintenance modeling and applications
- simulation for safety and reliability analysis
- dynamic risk and barrier management
- organizational factors and safety culture
- human factors and human reliability
- resilience engineering
- structural reliability
- natural hazards
- security
- economic analysis in risk management