Kanzler, Minister und Sachverstandige. Eine Untersuchung der Bedeutung von Vertrauen fur die Delegation von Reformen am Beispiel der Hartz-Reformen
In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift: PVS : German political science quarterly, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 182-210
ISSN: 0032-3470
This article investigates under which conditions it is possible to overcome the inherent interest divergence among chancellors, ministers and experts. Following a model of Fang and Stone (2013), the existence of a reform-prone minister is a necessary condition for chancellors to trust experts' reform recommendations. Using data on the recommendations for the German Hartz reforms, I find that the political parties put emphasis on the topics of this reform neither in their programmatic manifestos for the 2002 election nor in their coalition agreements. However, I show that the Economic Expert Council changed its recommendation strategy in its annual report of 2002/03 after the reform-prone minister Wolfgang Clement came into office. The government incorporated the recommendations in the following 2003 economic report and implemented the Hartz reforms until 2005. Adapted from the source document.