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As in many other countries, the administration of disability and unemployment insurance in the Netherlands is carried out by both public and private organisations. In this article, we sketch the major dilemmas in the (mixed) provision of social insurance and discuss the various types of arrangements that prevail. In doing so, we particularly focus on current administrative arrangements in the Netherlands. We also raise a number of research questions that are relevant for policy but are as yet unexplored, particularly with respect to mixed systems.

Abstract
This paper estimates Age–Period–Cohort models on employment rates of Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) applicants. We find that the substantial decrease in employment between 1999 and 2013 is explained by year-of-application cohort effects and that period effects are negligible. In turn, application cohort effects partly stem from increasing shares of applicants without permanent contracts. Changes in application cohort effects are largely confined to the years following two DI reforms that increased self-screening among workers. We next analyze changes in employment rates of awarded and rejected applicants and follow a Difference-in-Differences approach. Assuming common compositional cohort effects, we infer negligible effects of changes in benefit conditions.

AbstractThis paper performs a cross-country level analysis on the impact of the level of specific youth minimum wages on the labor market performance of young individuals. We use information on the use and level of youth minimum wages, as compared to the level of adult minimum wages as well as to the median wage (i.e., the Kaitz index). We complement these data with variables on the employment, labor force participation, and unemployment rates of 5-year age interval categories—all derived from the official OECD database. We distinguish between countries without minimum wages, countries with uniform minimum wages for all age groups, and countries with separate youth and adult minimum wages. Our results indicate that the relative employment rates of young individuals below the age of 25—as compared to the older workers—in countries with youth minimum wages are close to those in countries without minimum wages at all. Turning to the smaller sample of countries with minimum wages, increases in the level of (youth) minimum wages exert a substantial negative impact on the employment rate for young individuals.JEL Classification:J21, J23, J31

In the past two decades the OECD has regularly voiced concern about the labor market exclusion of people with disabilities and about the cost of disability insurance programs. This paper examines whether the fundamental disability insurance reforms that were implemented in the Netherlands have helped or hindered employment opportunities of workers with health problems or disability. An important component of the Dutch reforms was to enhance employer incentives, which was done by making them responsible for paying sickness benefits and by strengthening their sickness monitoring obligations. These employer incentives may stimulate preventive and reintegration activities by firms, thereby improving the employment opportunities of disabled workers. However, the reforms also impose substantial costs on employers when an employee gets sick and may therefore reduce employme nt opportunities of disabled workers. We use data from the Dutch Labor Force Survey and rich administrative data from hospital admission records, social security records, and the municipality registers containing demographic information to examine whether the disability reforms have in fact improved the economic situation for the disabled. On balance, we conclude that the DI reforms implemented by the Dutch government have mainly protected those who already have a job, and may have inadvertently reduced the hiring opportunities of people with a disability.

In the past two decades the OECD has regularly voiced concern about the labor market exclusion of people with disabilities and about the cost of disability insurance programs. This paper examines whether the fundamental disability insurance reforms that were implemented in the Netherlands have helped or hindered employment opportunities of workers with health problems or disability. An important component of the Dutch reforms was to enhance employer incentives, which was done by making them responsible for paying sickness benefits and by strengthening their sickness monitoring obligations. These employer incentives may stimulate preventive and reintegration activities by firms, thereby improving the employment opportunities of disabled workers. However, the reforms also impose substantial costs on employers when an employee gets sick and may therefore reduce employment opportunities of disabled workers. We use data from the Dutch Labor Force Survey and rich administrative data from hospital admission records, social security records, and the municipality registers containing demographic information to examine whether the disability reforms have in fact improved the economic situation for the disabled. On balance, we conclude that the DI reforms implemented by the Dutch government have mainly protected those who already have a job, and may have inadvertently reduced the hiring opportunities of people with a disability.