Assortative Matching with Externalities and Farsighted Agents
In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 497-509
ISSN: 2153-0793
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In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 497-509
ISSN: 2153-0793
In: Social choice and welfare, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 205-221
ISSN: 1432-217X
We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to influence the government's choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987 JET), we show that the set of equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to an 'intuitive' hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global efficiency. It is not necessarily true that an equilibrium lobby group is formed by the players with highest willingness-to-pay, nor is it a consecutive group with respect to their willingnesses-to-pay. We also show that the equilibrium level of public goods provision shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated.
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In: Journal of international economics, Band 72, Heft 2, S. 310-335
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Public choice, Band 125, Heft 1-2, S. 129-149
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 125, Heft 1, S. 129-150
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Progress in nuclear energy: the international review journal covering all aspects of nuclear energy, Band 1, Heft 2-4, S. 219-229
ISSN: 0149-1970
In: Public choice, Band 182, Heft 1-2, S. 93-117
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 26, Heft 6, S. 1029-1052
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Journal of international economics, Band 49, Heft 2, S. 289-308
ISSN: 0022-1996
SSRN
Working paper
In: Research in economics: Ricerche economiche, Band 51, Heft 1, S. 19-30
ISSN: 1090-9451
In: JEBO-D-22-00154
SSRN
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, S. 1-23
ISSN: 2049-8489
Abstract
Under closed-list proportional representation, a party's electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party lists create incentives for candidates that may lead parties not to place their best candidates at the top of the list. We examine this trade-off in a game-theoretical model in which parties rank their candidates on a list, candidates choose their campaign effort, and the election is a team contest for multiple prizes. We analyze how the candidates' objectives, voters' attention and media coverage, incumbency, the number of parties competing in the election, and the electoral environment influence how parties rank candidates.
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