Suchergebnisse

This article belongs to the special cluster "Here to Stay: The Politics of History in Eastern Europe", guest-edited by Félix Krawatzek & George Soroka. The rise of historical memory, which began in the 1970s and 1980s, has made the past an increasingly important soft-power resource. At its initial stage, the rise of memory contributed to the decay of self-congratulatory national narratives and to the formation of a "cosmopolitan" memory centered on the Holocaust and other crimes against humanity and informed by the notion of state repentance for the wrongdoings of the past. Laws criminalizing the denial of these crimes, which were adopted in "old" continental democracies in the 1980s and 1990s, were a characteristic expression of this democratic culture of memory. However, with the rise of national populism and the formation of the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes in Russia, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland in the 2000s and 2010s, the politics of memory has taken a significantly different turn. National populists are remarkably persistent in whitewashing their countries' history and using it to promote nationalist mobilization. This process has manifested itself in the formation of new types of memory laws, which shift the blame for historical injustices to other countries (the 1998 Polish, the 2000 Czech, the 2010 Lithuanian, the June 2010 Hungarian, and the 2014 Latvian statutes) and, in some cases, openly protect the memory of the perpetrators of crimes against humanity (the 2005 Turkish, the 2014 Russian, the 2015 Ukrainian, the 2006 and the 2018 Polish enactments). The article examines Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian legislation regarding the past that demonstrates the current linkage between populism and memory.

The article examines the approaches of the Putin regime to what its ideologists con- ceptualize as historical propaganda. It shows that the notion of historical truth, which is often invoked to justify the official position of the Russian government, is interpreted by the Kremlin in a "postmodernist" sense: there can be no "objective truth", the truth is what corresponds to Russia's interests. The article further discusses Russian legisla- tion of the past and the role of the most important governmental institutions involved in designing and implementing Putin's memory politics. These institutions include, in particular, the Presidential Administration and the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and culture.

L'article examine la loi mémorielle russe de 2014 dans le contexte de l'idéologie de Poutine et des conflits de mémoire dans l'Europe de l'Est. Cette loi qui criminalise la « diffusion de fausses informations concernant les actions de l'URSS pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale » est unique parmi les lois mémorielles, parce qu'elle protège la mémoire d'un régime oppressif plutôt que celle des victimes des crimes contre l'humanité.

El artículo de Nikolay Koposov analiza específicamente un proyecto de ley sobre memoria, puesto en discusión por el Parlamento ruso en 2009. El proyecto se remonta al conflicto ruso-estonio de 2007 con motivo del traslado del monumento de bronce "al soldado desconocido soviético" del centro de Tallin a un cementerio militar: uno de los tantos conflictos de memoria abiertos en el curso de los últimos años entre Rusia y algunos de sus vecinos (Ucrania, Polonia, Países Bálticos). Rusia se ha mostrado particularmente sensible a cualquier crítica relativa al papel de la Unión Soviética en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Después del fin de la URSS, la memoria de la guerra se ha transformado en el principal basamento de la identidad nacional rusa, la que a su vez sirve para eclipsar otra memoria: la del terror estalinista, con la que, ni los sucesivos gobiernos postsoviéticos ni la mayoría de la población han querido, hasta ahora, hacerse cargo. Otra de sus funciones consiste en el interés de convencer al pueblo ruso del papel positivo del Estado en la historia nacional, núcleo ideológico central el poder ruso actual. Si al inicio de los años noventa la concepción neoestalinista de la historia parecía por completo superada, posteriormente ha cobrado fuerza e incluso se ha asistido a una cierta rehabilitación del difunto dictador tanto como vencedor de la guerra mundial como modernizador de la sociedad rusa. El mito del pueblo inocente y heroico y la glorificación del Estado aparecen en el centro de las representaciones colectivas. En este contexto de avivamiento de un nacionalismo ruso es donde se ha situado éste proyecto de ley sobre la memoria, del cual Koposov describe sus itinerarios y conclusiones. ; The article by Nikolay Koposov specifically analyzes a draft law on memory, which was discussed by the Russian Parliament in 2009. The project dates back to the Russian-Estonian conflict of 2007 on the occasion of the transfer of the bronze monument "to the unknown Soviet soldier" from the center of Tallinn to a military cemetery: one of the many memory conflicts opened in the course of recent years between Russia and some of its neighbors (Ukraine, Poland, Baltic countries). Russia has been particularly sensitive to any criticism concerning the role of the Soviet Union in World War II. After the end of the USSR, the memory of the war has become the main foundation of the Russian national identity, which in turn serves to eclipse another memory: the Stalinist terror, with which neither successive post-Soviet governments nor the majority of the population have wanted, until now, to take charge. Another of its functions consists in the interest of convincing the Russian people of the positive role of the State in national history, the central ideological core of the current Russian power. If at the beginning of the nineties the neo-Stalinist conception of history seemed completely overcome, then it has gained strength and has even witnessed a certain rehabilitation of the late dictator as both the victor of the world war and the modernizer of Russian society. The myth of the innocent and heroic people and the glorification of the State appear at the center of collective representations. In this context of revival of a Russian nationalism is where this project on memory has been placed, of which Koposov describes its itineraries and conclusions.

El artículo de Nikolay Koposov analiza específicamente un proyecto de ley sobre memoria, puesto en discusión por el Parlamento ruso en 2009. El proyecto se remonta al conflicto ruso-estonio de 2007 con motivo del traslado del monumento de bronce "al soldado desconocido soviético" del centro de Tallin a un cementerio militar: uno de los tantos conflictos de memoria abiertos en el curso de los últimos años entre Rusia y algunos de sus vecinos (Ucrania, Polonia, Países Bálticos). Rusia se ha mostrado particularmente sensible a cualquier crítica relativa al papel de la Unión Soviética en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Después del fin de la URSS, la memoria de la guerra se ha transformado en el principal basamento de la identidad nacional rusa, la que a su vez sirve para eclipsar otra memoria: la del terror estalinista, con la que, ni los sucesivos gobiernos postsoviéticos ni la mayoría de la población han querido, hasta ahora, hacerse cargo. Otra de sus funciones consiste en el interés de convencer al pueblo ruso del papel positivo del Estado en la historia nacional, núcleo ideológico central el poder ruso actual. Si al inicio de los años noventa la concepción neoestalinista de la historia parecía por completo superada, posteriormente ha cobrado fuerza e incluso se ha asistido a una cierta rehabilitación del difunto dictador tanto como vencedor de la guerra mundial como modernizador de la sociedad rusa. El mito del pueblo inocente y heroico y la glorificación del Estado aparecen en el centro de las representaciones colectivas. En este contexto de avivamiento de un nacionalismo ruso es donde se ha situado éste proyecto de ley sobre la memoria, del cual Koposov describe sus itinerarios y conclusiones. ; The article by Nikolay Koposov specifically analyzes a draft law on memory, which was discussed by the Russian Parliament in 2009. The project dates back to the Russian-Estonian conflict of 2007 on the occasion of the transfer of the bronze monument "to the unknown Soviet soldier" from the center of Tallinn to a military cemetery: one of the many memory conflicts opened in the course of recent years between Russia and some of its neighbors (Ukraine, Poland, Baltic countries). Russia has been particularly sensitive to any criticism concerning the role of the Soviet Union in World War II. After the end of the USSR, the memory of the war has become the main foundation of the Russian national identity, which in turn serves to eclipse another memory: the Stalinist terror, with which neither successive post-Soviet governments nor the majority of the population have wanted, until now, to take charge. Another of its functions consists in the interest of convincing the Russian people of the positive role of the State in national history, the central ideological core of the current Russian power. If at the beginning of the nineties the neo-Stalinist conception of history seemed completely overcome, then it has gained strength and has even witnessed a certain rehabilitation of the late dictator as both the victor of the world war and the modernizer of Russian society. The myth of the innocent and heroic people and the glorification of the State appear at the center of collective representations. In this context of revival of a Russian nationalism is where this project on memory has been placed, of which Koposov describes its itineraries and conclusions. ; Dossier: La mundialización de las memorias: sus recorridos en la Europa del Este ; Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación (FAHCE)

El artículo de Nikolay Koposov analiza específicamente un proyecto de ley sobre memoria, puesto en discusión por el Parlamento ruso en 2009. El proyecto se remonta al conflicto ruso-estonio de 2007 con motivo del traslado del monumento de bronce "al soldado desconocido soviético" del centro de Tallin a un cementerio militar: uno de los tantos conflictos de memoria abiertos en el curso de los últimos años entre Rusia y algunos de sus vecinos (Ucrania, Polonia, Países Bálticos). Rusia se ha mostrado particularmente sensible a cualquier crítica relativa al papel de la Unión Soviética en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Después del fin de la URSS, la memoria de la guerra se ha transformado en el principal basamento de la identidad nacional rusa, la que a su vez sirve para eclipsar otra memoria: la del terror estalinista, con la que, ni los sucesivos gobiernos postsoviéticos ni la mayoría de la población han querido, hasta ahora, hacerse cargo. Otra de sus funciones consiste en el interés de convencer al pueblo ruso del papel positivo del Estado en la historia nacional, núcleo ideológico central el poder ruso actual. Si al inicio de los años noventa la concepción neoestalinista de la historia parecía por completo superada, posteriormente ha cobrado fuerza e incluso se ha asistido a una cierta rehabilitación del difunto dictador tanto como vencedor de la guerra mundial como modernizador de la sociedad rusa. El mito del pueblo inocente y heroico y la glorificación del Estado aparecen en el centro de las representaciones colectivas. En este contexto de avivamiento de un nacionalismo ruso es donde se ha situado éste proyecto de ley sobre la memoria, del cual Koposov describe sus itinerarios y conclusiones. ; The article by Nikolay Koposov specifically analyzes a draft law on memory, which was discussed by the Russian Parliament in 2009. The project dates back to the Russian-Estonian conflict of 2007 on the occasion of the transfer of the bronze monument "to the unknown Soviet soldier" from the center of Tallinn to a military cemetery: one of the many memory conflicts opened in the course of recent years between Russia and some of its neighbors (Ukraine, Poland, Baltic countries). Russia has been particularly sensitive to any criticism concerning the role of the Soviet Union in World War II. After the end of the USSR, the memory of the war has become the main foundation of the Russian national identity, which in turn serves to eclipse another memory: the Stalinist terror, with which neither successive post-Soviet governments nor the majority of the population have wanted, until now, to take charge. Another of its functions consists in the interest of convincing the Russian people of the positive role of the State in national history, the central ideological core of the current Russian power. If at the beginning of the nineties the neo-Stalinist conception of history seemed completely overcome, then it has gained strength and has even witnessed a certain rehabilitation of the late dictator as both the victor of the world war and the modernizer of Russian society. The myth of the innocent and heroic people and the glorification of the State appear at the center of collective representations. In this context of revival of a Russian nationalism is where this project on memory has been placed, of which Koposov describes its itineraries and conclusions.