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In recent years, a considerable number of PhD-dissertations have appeared in the Netherlands and Flanders (Belgium) on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) for the provision of public infrastructures such as transport infrastructure and public buildings. These PhD-theses provide valuable insights into how PPPs perform and especially into the conditions that influence their performance. We identified four clusters of relevant conditions: (1) public procurement procedures, (2) contract management, (3) transaction costs, and (4) democratic legitimacy and accountability. By discussing the theses in this article, their lessons learned become available for the international PPP-community. Our analysis of the PhD-theses shows that there are no definite arguments for or against the use of PPPs. The performance of PPP-arrangements depends on agency: on the skills and commitment of parties involved and on the way in which the arrangements are applied. The dissertations show that policymakers have to find ways to balance the need to reduce transaction costs through contract standardization with the need for tailor-made solutions in specific projects. Furthermore, the dissertations show that 'soft' contract management aspects, such as the quality of collaborative behavior and process management, are particularly important for the performance of PPPs. Finally, the theses bring to the fore the democratic issues involved in PPPs, showing their mixed results in terms of legitimacy and accountability.

Policy scientists and public policymakers are continuously struggling with the troublesome relationship between knowledge and policy. On the one hand, policy and policy processes are generally recognized as having a political nature because they prioritize the generation of will rather than knowledge. On the other hand, it is difficult to accept that knowledge is being wasted or used strategically. One of the main challenges for public policymakers is to reconcile the political rationality of policy processes with the scientific rationality of knowledge and research, for instance by intelligent organization of knowledge generation and knowledge use. This article aims to contribute to the debate on this topic by comparing three policy implementation processes in which knowledge played an authoritative role. On the basis of this analysis of these three 'white ravens,' lessons are drawn regarding the conditions under which knowledge becomes authoritative in policy implementation practices.

In this contribution, we provide a comparative analysis of the Dutch government's attempts to realize private investments in three national railway mega-projects: the Betuwe Route, a dedicated freight railway line connecting the Rotterdam harbour to the German rail network, the High Speed Line (HSL South) between the Belgian border and Amsterdam and the Zuiderzee Line between Amsterdam and Groningen, for which a private consortium led by Siemens suggests the use of Maglev technology. The privatization of the first two railway lines was attempted for during the nineties and beginning of this decade. In June 2007 operation of the Betuwe Route began. To date, the government has not succeeded in involving private parties in the Betuwe Route. Although the privatization of the HSL South has partly been realized by engaging into a complex mix of contract-arrangements, it has proven difficult to keep under control. Recently operation has been postponed until October 2008. During the project study of the third railway project, which started in 2000, government again tried to realize privatization while avoiding the mistakes of the earlier two projects. In 2005 government decided not to move forward with the tender procedure and consider alternatives. Building on theory and earlier experiences with privatization and public private partnerships we compare the three cases with respect to motives for privatization, strategies and results. We seek explanations for the way privatization evolved within each project and generic lessons that can be drawn from the cases.

Four significant features of public–private partnership (PPP) contracts are analysed to understand their impact on performance. These are whether the contract allows sanctions to be imposed; its complexity; its flexibility; and whether renegotiation is possible. The effects of these characteristics were investigated by surveying participants in all of the PPP projects in The Netherlands. The only feature considered to have any significant impact on perceived performance was the possibility of imposing sanctions. The authors' findings cast doubt on earlier research into managing PPP performance and suggest that researchers, governments and the private sector need to look beyond contract terms to prope

__Abstract__ In this article we address the elaboratlon of the central concepts of a theory of networks and of network management. We suggest that the network approach builds on several theoretical traditions After this we clarify the theoretical concepts and axioms of the policy network approach and argue that this framework has important explanatory power both on the level of strategic interaction processes as well as on the level of institutional relations. We argue that government's special resources and its unique legitimacy as representative of the common Interest make it the outstanding candidate for fulfilling the role of network manager, a role whlch means arranging and facilitating interaction processes within networks In such a way that problems of under or non representation are pro

In recent years, a considerable number of PhD-dissertations have appeared in the Netherlands and Flanders (Belgium) on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) for the provision of public infrastructures such as transport infrastructure and public buildings. These PhD-theses provide valuable insights into how PPPs perform and especially into the conditions that influence their performance. We identified four clusters of relevant conditions: (1) public procurement procedures, (2) contract management, (3) transaction costs, and (4) democratic legitimacy and accountability. By discussing the theses in this article, their lessons learned become available for the international PPP-community. Our analysis of the PhD-theses shows that there are no definite arguments for or against the use of PPPs. The performance of PPP-arrangements depends on agency: on the skills and commitment of parties involved and on the way in which the arrangements are applied. The dissertations show that policymakers have to find ways to balance the need to reduce transaction costs through contract standardization with the need for tailor-made solutions in specific projects. Furthermore, the dissertations show that 'soft' contract management aspects, such as the quality of collaborative behavior and process management, are particularly important for the performance of PPPs. Finally, the theses bring to the fore the democratic issues involved in PPPs, showing their mixed results in terms of legitimacy and accountability.

In recent years, governing environmental conflicts concerning the planning, construction, and operation of urban facilities has increasingly become a challenge for Chinese local governments. Chinese governments seek adequate responses to deal with these conflicts, for instance by ignoring criticism and sticking to initial decisions, by suppressing protests, or by compromising. In this article, by analysing 10 conflict cases in China using crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA), we aim to investigate which combinations of diverse conditions lead to changes in local governments' decisions. Four contextualized paths to explain both the presence and the absence of these changes are identified. These findings increase our understanding of the mechanisms underlying the governance of environmental conflicts in China and may inform Chinese governments and non-state actors seeking ways to deal adequately with them.

__Abstract__ Public private partnerships (PPP) have become a popular policy instrument in many Western European countries. Governments assume that the involvement of private actors in the provision of services, or in the realization of policy goals will increase quality and provide better value for money. It is believed that more intense co-production between public and private actors will generate better results. In the literature on PPPs, these benefits are typically referred to as 'added value' (Osborne 2000; Ghobadian et al. 2004). According to the literature in this area, the main characteristics of PPP are: 1. Mutual coordination of activities and daily routines: co-ordination is essential for any partnership, including public-private ones. The activities of the public and private organizations have to be well coordinated (Mulford and Rogers 1982; Hodge and Greve, 2005) or the desired exchange of information cannot be realized (Savas 2000). 2. A level of shared risk and profit sharing is needed: the co-operation between public and private actors has to result in at least some risk sharing, and if possible, in some level of profit sharing (Huxham and Vangen 2005). Authors point out that profit sharing does not always have to take the form of financial profits. It may be that the private actors have financial profits and the public actors get recognizable societal benefits from the co-operation, for instance a higher quality of service (Audit Commission 2003; Hodge and Greve 2005). 3. A form of organizational arrangement between the partners to enhance the co-operation process (see, for example, Savas 2000; Hodge et al, 2010). Most partnerships are structured around organizational arrangements that are meant to simplify co-ordination and secure the shared risk and profits. These arrangements can take the form of an informal project group, newly established consortiums or other hybrid organizational forms (Waddock 1991; Savas, 2000).

Public-private partnerships are a vehicle used a lot by governments all around the world. When it was introduced the idea relied a lot on economic reasoning in which contracts, monitoring and performance criteria were important to achieve results. But from the beginning PPP's were a hybrid idea because there were also assumptions about collaborations and synergy that fused the idea. In this chapter we explore the ideas behind PPP, the importance of collaboration to make PPP's work and we show, with recent research results, that PPP's actually need a mix of contracts and collaboration to work.