As American leadership over climate change declines, China has begun to identify itself as a great power by formulating ambitious climate policies. Based on the premise that great powers have unique responsibilities, this book explores how China's rise to great power status transforms notions of great power responsibility in general and international climate politics in particular. The author looks empirically at the Chinese party-state's conceptions of state responsibility, discusses the influence of those notions on China's role in international climate politics, and considers both how China will act out its climate responsibility in the future and the broader implications of these actions. Alongside the argument that the international norm of climate responsibility is an emerging attribute of great power responsibility, Kopra develops a normative framework of great power responsibility to shed new light on the transformations China's rise will yield and the kind of great power China will prove to be. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, China studies, foreign policy studies, international organizations, international ethics and environmental politics.
In: Kopra , S 2018 , ' China and the UN Climate Regime : Climate Responsibility from an English School Perspective ' , Journal of international organization studies , vol. 9 , no. 2 , pp. 59-74 .
This paper analyzes how states have negotiated, distributed, and contested responsibilities within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It applies the English School (ES) theory and argues that climate responsibility constitutes an emerging primary institution of international society. Due to its rising great power status, China plays an increasingly important role in social processes in which international society defines and distributes states' responsibilities, especially those of the great powers, now and in the future. Therefore, this paper pays particular attention to China's contribution to the UNFCCC. Ultimately, the paper offers ES empirical observations about the relationship between primary and secondary institutions as well as the role of agency in institutional change.
Kansainvälisessä politiikassa, ja erityisesti kansainvälisessä ilmastopolitiikassa, on puhuttu viime vuosina paljon vastuullisuudesta. Kiinan "nousu" on kiihdyttänyt keskustelua, koska sekä poliitikot että tutkijat väittelevät ja spekuloivat, onko se uhka vai mahdollisuus maailmalle. Poliittinen väittely Kiinan vastuullisuudesta on erityisen kiivas kansainvälisissä ilmastoneuvotteluissa, joissa Kiinaa on usein syytetty "vastuuttomuudesta" tai "neuvotteluiden jarruttamisesta". Kiina itse puolestaan on itsepintaisesti korostanut kehitysmaastatustaan ja rakentanut vastuullisen kehitysmaan imagoa kansainvälisissä ilmastoneuvotteluissa. "Vastuullisuus" on kuitenkin hyvin epäselvä käsite, eikä ole lainkaan selvää, mitä sillä maailmanpolitiikassa tarkoitetaan. Mitä tarkoittaa olla vastuullinen? Kuka arvioi vastuullisuutta kansainvälisessä yhteisössä? Kenelle valtiot ovat vastuullisia ja mistä? Mitä valtioiden tulee tehdä, tai pidättäytyä tekemästä, ollakseen, tai näyttääkseen, vastuullisilta kansainvälisen yhteisön jäseniltä? Tämä tutkimus tarkastelee vastuullisuuden monia merkityksiä ja ulottuvuuksia kansainvälisessä ilmastopolitiikassa kansainvälisten suhteiden englantilaisen koulukunnan näkökulmasta. Se väittää, että vastuullisuus on intentionaalinen sosiaalinen käytänne, joka määrittelee kuka on vastuussa mistä ja kenelle. Kuten kaikki vastuut, ilmastovastuullisuus on konstruoitu sosiaalisessa vuorovaikutuksessa: se ei ole staattista tai annettua, vaan se on muotoutunut sosiaalisessa kanssakäymisessä, kun valtiot esittelevät, väittelevät ja soveltavat vastuullisuuden määritelmiä. Nousevan kansainvälisen statuksensa vuoksi Kiina on epäilemättä merkittävä osallistuja missä tahansa kansainvälisen vastuullisuuden käytänteessä, mutta ilmastovastuullisuuden yhteydessä sen rooli on erityisen keskeinen sekä teoreettisesti että empiirisesti. Sen vuoksi tämä tutkimus tarkastelee ilmastovastuullisuuden kansainvälisen käytänteen muotoutumista ja analysoi Kiinan tulkintoja ilmastovastuullisuudesta ja osallistumista käytänteen kehittymiseen. Tutkimus on erityisen kiinnostunut siitä, miten Kiina on vaikuttanut kansainvälisten ilmastokäytänteiden muotoutumiseen, ja vastaavasti kuinka kansainväliset ilmastokäytänteet ovat vaikuttaneet Kiinan kansallisiin käytänteisiin. Tutkimuksen lähestymistapa aiheeseen on kahtalainen: työn teoreettinen keskustelu kuvaa, millaisia moniulotteisia vastuita valtioilla on, ja työn empiirinen osuus tarkastelee millaista ilmastovastuullisuutta valtiot, ja etenkin Kiina, kantavat todellisuudessa. Lisäksi tutkimus osallistuu englantilaisen koulukunnan meneillä olevaan keskusteluun kansainvälisen yhteisön instituutioiden määritelmistä ja roolista niin sanotun yhteiskuntatieteiden "käytännesuuntauksen" näkökulmasta. Se väittää, että käytännesuuntaus voi olla avuksi kehitettäessä englantitilaisen koulukunnan primääri- ja sekundääri-instituutioiden käsitteitä. Tutkimus päättelee, että ilmastovastuullisuus on kansainvälisen yhteisön nouseva primääri-instituutio, ja Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien ilmastonmuutosta koskeva puitesopimus, joka on ilmastohallinnan keskeisin sekundaari-instituutio, toimii silloittavana käytänteenä sen ja kansainvälisen yhteisön jokapäiväisen politiikan välillä. Ilmastovastuullisuus on selvästikin edelleen vain nouseva primääri-instituutio, koska sen säännöistä on edelleen paljon kiistaa ja koska se on ristiriidassa olemassa olevien instituutioiden kanssa. Tärkeä kysymys kuitenkin on, voiko ilmastovastuullisuudesta kehittyä uusi "sivilisaation moraalikäsitys", joka määrittelee ja vahvistaa "sivistyneet" kansainvälisen yhteisön ja kansalaisyhteiskunnan jäsenet tulevaisuudessa. Kiinalla on yhä tärkeämpi rooli tässä prosessissa. Vaikka Kiinan vastuullisuuden kohde on edelleen pääasiassa kommunistinen puolue, valtio ja Kiinan kansa, eikä ihmiskunta tai ympäristö sinänsä, Kiina ei enää keskity vain pelkästään kansallisiin vastuihinsa. Vaikuttaa siltä, että Kiina identifioi itsensä lisääntyvissä määrin suurvallaksi, mikä tuo sille samalla suurta vastuuta. ; With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? China and the International Practice of Climate Responsibility In recent years, there has been much talk about responsibility in world politics in general, and in international climate politics in particular. China's "rise" has also fuelled the debate on international responsibility as both politicians and academics argue and speculate about whether it will represent a threat or opportunity for the world. Political debate over China's responsibility has been especially heated in international climate negotiations where China has often been accused of "being irresponsible" and "blocking progress". China, for its part, has persistently highlighted its developing country status and portrayed itself by presenting an image of a responsible developing country during international climate negotiations. However, "responsibility" is a highly vague concept, and it is not very clear what it means in world politics. What does it mean to be responsible? Who is to judge responsibility in international society? To whom are states responsible and for what? What do states have to do, or refrain from doing, in order to be and be seen as responsible members of international society? This study problematizes many meanings and dimensions of responsibility in the context of international climate politics from the theoretical perspectives of the English School of International Relations. It argues that responsibility is an intentional social practice in which actors define who is responsible for what and to whom. Like all responsibilities, climate responsibility is constructed in social interaction; it is not given or static but it has evolved in social contexts that occur when states present, debate and apply definitions of responsibility. Due to its rising international status, China is undoubtedly an important participant in any practice of international responsibility, but in the context of climate responsibility, China's role is especially central both theoretically and empirically. Therefore, this study investigates the generation and evolution of the international practice of climate responsibility and analyses China's interpretations of and contribution to it. In particular, it studies how China has shaped the evolution of international climate practices and how international climate practices have shaped China's domestic practices. The approach of the study is twofold: the theoretical discussion portrays a picture of the kind of multidimensional responsibilities states ought to shoulder; the empirical parts look at what kind of climate responsibilities states – China in particular – do shoulder in reality. In addition, the study contributes to the English School's continuing debate on the definitions and roles of institutions in international society, using the lenses of the so-called "practice turn of social sciences". It argues that the practice approach can develop conceptualizations of both the primary and the secondary institutions within the English School. The study concludes that climate responsibility is an emerging primary institution of international society, and that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which is the most important secondary institution related to climate governance, functions as a bridging practice between it and the everyday politics of international society. Clearly, climate responsibility remains only an emerging primary institution as there are still wide disputes about its rules and because it clashes with established institutions. A critical question is whether or not climate responsibility will develop as a new "standard of civilization" that defines and validates the practices of "civilized" members of international society – as well as world society – in the future. Crucially, China plays an increasingly important role in this process. Although the referent objects of China's climate responsibility are chiefly the party-state and the Chinese nation and not humankind or the environment per se, China no longer focuses only on national responsibilities. Thus, it seems that China is increasingly identifying itself as a great power, which by definition comes with great responsibilities.
By exploring international practice of great power management, this paper examines how the U.S. (an established power) and China (an emerging power) discursively frame great power responsibility in the context of international negotiations on climate politics. Firstly, this paper will argue that the American discourse on "responsible great powerhood" attempts to redirect and constrain China's position in global politics. Secondly, this paper claims that China defends its interests and responds to Western demands by advancing two, partly conflicting, climate discourses simultaneously. On the one hand, despite its growing international status, China emphasizes its status as a poor developing country. On the other, the rhetoric of being a "responsible major power" is used to assure other nations of China's credibility and benevolence; China is neither a threat to other countries nor to the environment.
In: Kopra , S-K 2019 , China and great power responsibility for climate change . Rethinking Asia and International Relations , Routledge , London . https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315151113
As American leadership over climate change declines, China has begun to identify itself as a great power by formulating ambitious climate policies. Based on the premise that great powers have unique responsibilities, this book explores how China's rise to great power status transforms notions of great power responsibility in general and international climate politics in particular. The author looks empirically at the Chinese party-state's conceptions of state responsibility, discusses the influence of those notions on China's role in international climate politics, and considers both how China will act out its climate responsibility in the future and the broader implications of these actions. Alongside the argument that the international norm of climate responsibility is an emerging attribute of great power responsibility, Kopra develops a normative framework of great power responsibility to shed new light on the transformations China's rise will yield and the kind of great power China will prove to be. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, China studies, foreign policy studies, international organizations, international ethics and environmental politics.
This title is published in Open Access with the support of the University of Helsinki. ; As American leadership over climate change declines, China has begun to identify itself as a great power by formulating ambitious climate policies. Based on the premise that great powers have unique responsibilities, this book explores how China's rise to great power status transforms notions of great power responsibility in general and international climate politics in particular. The author looks empirically at the Chinese party-state's conceptions of state responsibility, discusses the influence of those notions on China's role in international climate politics, and considers both how China will act out its climate responsibility in the future and the broader implications of these actions. Alongside the argument that the international norm of climate responsibility is an emerging attribute of great power responsibility, Kopra develops a normative framework of great power responsibility to shed new light on the transformations China's rise will yield and the kind of great power China will prove to be. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, China studies, foreign policy studies, international organizations, international ethics and environmental politics.
In: Kauppila , L & Kopra , S 2022 , ' China's rise and the Arctic region up to 2049 : three scenarios for regional futures in an era of climate change and power transition ' , The Polar Journal , vol. 12 , no. 1 , pp. 148-171 . https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2022.2058216
Although China has emerged as an increasingly influential global actor over recent decades, it is unclear whether a more fundamental transformation is shaking processes of regionalisation in this context. Our scenario-based case study considers the spatial reconfiguration of the rapidly globalising Arctic with varying degrees of Chinese engagement. More specifically, we examine alternative and transformational configurations of the Arctic in 2049, and ponder upon the plausibility of the hypothesised changes in light of three schools of thought on International Relations – realism, liberal institutionalism and relationalism. Hence, we explore how the rise of China could potentially alter the regional dynamics and whether, consequently, regions should be rethought both empirically and theoretically. We conclude that pluralistic discussion on the multiple regional outcomes is a necessary precondition for achieving a balanced and democratic future in the Arctic and beyond.
This paper analyses the normative underpinnings of China's participation in processes of Arctic regionalization. Building on Gareth Evans' concept of responsible international citizenship, it argues that China's Arctic engagement is chiefly motivated by the government's efforts to promote the wellbeing of Chinese citizens – a state of affairs that the current regime equals with the ideal of social stability. As a responsible international citizen, China should, however, advance this "enlightened self-interest" vis-á-vis other members of the Arctic international society, that is, either internalize the established practices that organize the Arctic region or mold them in peaceful ways. In the empirical parts of the paper, we first identify three concrete aims that drive forward China's participation in Arctic regionalization – creating wealth through more "green" growth, mitigating the effects of climate change on China, and promoting a unifying ideology. We then suggest that China has not directly violated any of the key organizing principles of the Arctic international society, but it has found distinct ways to act out these concrete goals and advance the wellbeing of its citizens. Such means include somewhat challenging the dominant interpretation of these norms and refraining from advocating stricter environmental standards.
In: Kopra , S & Koivurova , T 2020 , Introduction to China's Arctic Engagement . in T Koivurova & S Kopra (eds) , Chinese Policy and Presence in the Arctic . Brill Nijhoff , Leiden , Studies in Polar Law , no. 3 , pp. 1-4 . https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004408425_002
In: Kopra , S & Nojonen , M 2020 , ' The Elusive Norm of Climate Responsibility : The Belt and Road Initiative and COVID-19 ' , Arctic yearbook , vol. 2020 , pp. 13-25 .
Based on the premise that climate responsibility had emerged as an international norm in the pre-coronavirus era, this paper studies to what extent the coronavirus is challenging the policies and strategies of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its offspring the Polar Silk Road. We begin with a critical overview of the BRI and illustrate the practical implications of the fact that the BRI lacks an official strategy, a definition and a governing institution. We elaborate what kind of discourses and standards are attached to the BRI in general, and its latest addition, the Polar Silk Road, in particular. On the one hand, we analyze how China's pre-COVID-19 era Arctic policy and BRI documents (and norms) manifested and set the standards of climate responsibility, and, on the other hand, based on original Chinese policy documents, we debunk how these lofty political goals were rapidly and completely set aside as the new coronavirus epidemic was spreading around. Instead, the Party hastily made stipulations and policies and refocused the BRI to save Chinese overseas investments and the reputation of China in the post-coronavirus era.
In: Kopra , S , Hurri , K , Kauppila , L , Stępień , A & Yamineva , Y 2020 , China, Climate Change and the Arctic Environment . in T Koivurova & S Kopra (eds) , Chinese Policy and Presence in the Arctic . Brill Nijhoff , Leiden , Studies in Polar Law , no. 3 , pp. 62-89 . https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004408425_006
This chapter offers an account of China's ecological footprint in the Arctic. Because China is the world's biggest carbon dioxide emitter and a significant contributor of short-lived climate pollutants, the chapter pays special attention to China's role in international efforts to tackle climate change. In addition to China's domestic climate policies, the chapter elaborates the state's contribution to international climate negotiations under the United Nations climate regime. It also introduces the ways in which China's Arctic policy addresses climate change and reviews China's potential to reduce black carbon and other pollutants.
In: Koivurova , T , Kopra , S , Lanteigne , M , Nojonen , M , Śmieszek , M G & Stępień , A 2020 , China's Arctic Policy . in T Koivurova & S Kopra (eds) , Chinese Policy and Presence in the Arctic . Brill Nijhoff , Leiden , Studies in Polar Law , no. 3 , pp. 25-41 . https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004408425_004
This chapter elaborates on China's evolving strategy in the Arctic. For China, the Arctic is no longer about simply being an observer in the Arctic Council, but much more. The chapter will analyze mainly the specifics of China's Arctic white paper and examine a pair of specific cases, namely China's role in negotiating the Polar Code and the Arctic fisheries agreement. Special attention will be paid to the ways in which China's national policy towards the Arctic has emerged and how it has been viewed by other actors and commentators following China's role in the Arctic. As a sub-section, China's policy towards the Arctic's indigenous peoples will also be studied.
In: Stępień , A , Kauppila , L , Kopra , S , Käpylä , J , Lanteigne , M , Mikkola , H & Nojonen , M 2020 , China's economic presence in the Arctic : realities, expectations and concerns . in T Koivurova & S Kopra (eds) , Chinese Policy and Presence in the Arctic . Brill Nijhoff , Leiden , Studies in Polar Law , no. 3 , pp. 90-136 . https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004408425_007
The chapter focuses on economic presence of China in the Arctic regions. First, it considers the economic relations between China and the Nordic states, North American Arctic and Russia. China and Chinese actors are active in different ways in different parts of the Arctic. Second, it looks at the key Arctic industries, where China's role is or may become relevant: shipping, oil and gas, minerals extraction, and tourism. Finally, the chapter considers the two dimensions of concerns related to Chinese economic activities: the problem of economic and political influence gained through investments and the environment and social performance as well as reliability of Chinese companies.
In: Koivurova , T , Kauppila , L , Kopra , S-K , Lanteigne , M , Shi , M , Śmieszek , M G , Stępień , A , Käpylä , J , Mikkola , H , Nielsson , E T & Nojonen , M 2019 , China in the Arctic : and the Opportunities and Challenges for Chinese-Finnish Arctic Co-operation . Valtioneuvoston selvitys- ja tutkimustoiminnan julkaisusarja , no. 8 , vol. 2019 , Valtioneuvoston kanslia , Helsinki .
The Arctic region is rapidly transforming from a peripheral region to a global theatre with an increasing number of non-Arctic stakeholders. One illustration of this transformation process is the growing presence of China in the Arctic. This report first discusses China's changing role in global affairs (Chapter 1). This provides background for exploring China's interests, role and presence in the Arctic. The study of China's presence in the region is carried out through the lens of the Chinese government's four priority areas towards the region as expressed in the country's first official Arctic statement – the White Paper – from January 2018 (Chapter 2). Further, Chinese interests and actions in the Arctic are studied from the viewpoint of one particular Arctic State, Finland. The authors provide an overview of a broad spectrum of Chinese-Finnish interactions in different contexts, including investments in Northern Finland and co-operation within the areas of Finnish Arctic expertise and research. In addition, concerns and risks related to interaction with Chinese actors are discussed (Chapter 3). Over the past decade, China has undertaken an effort to demonstrate its growing knowledge of, and commitment to, the Arctic region. Some actors and experts are concerned about China's aims and actions in the region, while others express hope for Chinese institutions, investors and companies to contribute to regional development and knowledge-building. The report presents a balanced and multifaceted, although necessarily not fully comprehensive, picture of China's rise as an actor in the Arctic.