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Markus Kornprobst examines the common assumption that states usually respond to crises individually, rather than together. He develops an innovative approach to analyse how crisis co-management comes to succeed or fail. He argues that actors draw from repertoires of taken-for-granted ideas, forming a set of pre-judgments. These are then revisited in justificatory encounters, making various degrees of co-management possible or impossible. This judging and justifying in turn leaves an impression on repertoires put to use for co-managing the next crisis. The author uses this model to analyse the attempts by France, Germany and the United Kingdom to co-manage the crises in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. He links individual reasoning and communication, paving the way for further research into crisis co-management, and providing novel insights into European attempts to act in international affairs.

Introduction -- Irredentism in Europe -- Argumentation and compromise -- Broadening a vision for Europe -- Towards a new beginning -- From exclusion to inclusion -- Constitutional change -- Conclusion -- Appendix I: Coding procedures -- Appendix II: Irredentist cases in Europe and other world regions -- Appendix III: Analysed parliamentary debates and newspaper editions.

Summary
This article introduces the concept of diplomatic peace. It starts by developing a heuristic frame for identifying understandings of peace embraced by the actors we study. This frame encompasses three faces of peace — restraint, compromise and polylogue — and further differentiates different degrees of each of these faces (induced, co-operative and categorical restraint; profitable, principled and iterated compromise; extended, communal and deliberative polylogue). Then, this heuristic is applied to key United Nations General Assembly declarations and conventions that have passed unanimously since 1946. Studying how diplomats define peace yields remarkable results. Diplomats make far-reaching promises about the kind of peace they purport to pursue, strongly endorsing co-operative restraint, principled compromises and deliberative polylogues. The added value of this article is threefold: it systematically enquires into the nexus of diplomacy and peace, develops a multifaceted concept of peace, and reminds scholars and practitioners of how far-reaching already existing diplomatic promises of peace are.

This article addresses the communicative processes through which leaders succeed or fail to generate public support for going to war. In order to answer this question, I rely on the framing literature's insight that cultural congruence helps make frames resonate with an audience. Yet, my argument examines this phenomenon in greater depth. There is more to cultural congruence than selecting commonplaces such as analogies and metaphors from a repertoire that the audience widely shares. Culturally congruent framing also features a genre and more general themes that are taken out of such a repertoire. My empirical analysis of Tony Blair's communicative moves to sway the British public to fight over Kosovo and Iraq provides empirical evidence for this framework. This study makes two important contributions. First, it highlights that public contestations about going to war criss-cross the overly neat categories proposed by most scholars interested in this phenomenon. Second, in identifying different dimensions of framing, this article deepens our understandings of cultural congruence.

This article addresses the communicative processes through which leaders succeed or fail to generate public support for going to war. In order to answer this question, I rely on the framing literature's insight that cultural congruence helps make frames resonate with an audience. Yet, my argument examines this phenomenon in greater depth. There is more to cultural congruence than selecting commonplaces such as analogies and metaphors from a repertoire that the audience widely shares. Culturally congruent framing also features a genre and more general themes that are taken out of such a repertoire. My empirical analysis of Tony Blair's communicative moves to sway the British public to fight over Kosovo and Iraq provides empirical evidence for this framework. This study makes two important contributions. First, it highlights that public contestations about going to war criss-cross the overly neat categories proposed by most scholars interested in this phenomenon. Second, in identifying different dimensions of framing, this article deepens our understandings of cultural congruence.

What explains the European Union's successes and failures in producing a grand strategy? Conceptualizing grand strategy as a composite commonplace linking together understandings of scene, agent, purpose and means (tetrad), I contend that the European Union has a grand strategy. In the early 1990s, advocates succeeded in institutionalizing the diffusion strategy. A decade later, however, the advocates of the European Security Strategy failed to do so. My explanation of this descriptive finding focuses on the constellation of prior agreements on the components of the tetrad. In both cases, widely taken-for-granted agreements on a recently shifted scene (security environment) provided openings for the advocates. But only the advocates of diffusion had the opportunity to work with equally widely taken-for-granted agreements on agent (identity), purpose (interest) and means (power). The advocates for the European Security Strategy, by contrast, were lacking such a favourable social context. Borrowing from rhetorical studies, this study makes a threefold contribution to the study of grand strategy. It moves beyond the literature's statism; shows that grand strategy is constituted by interpretations not just of power and interest, but also of the security environment and identity; and clarifies that explanations of the making of grand strategy need to inquire into the making of agreements rather than merely the interplay of material forces. My findings that the European Union has a grand strategy and came to adopt it by building a new agreement upon already-existing ones also have implications for the study of European Union foreign policy and International Relations Theory.

Existing literature in International Relations has firmly established that public justifications matter in world politics. They make it possible for a range of communities -- nations, security communities, global advocacy networks and so on -- to take political action. This article aims to improve on our understanding of how communities produce such justifications. It seeks to make conceptual and methodological contributions. On the conceptual level, I contend that political judgements generate public justifications and, vice versa, that these justifications shape future judgements. I outline a three-circuit map for studying the communicative processes that link judgements and justifications. On the methodological level, I argue that what I label a structured, focused communication analysis is well suited to put the three-circuit map to use to do empirical research. I tailor the structure and focus of such an analysis to the requirements of research on public justification. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]