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Christine M. Korsgaard presents an account of the foundation of practical reason and moral obligation, based on a new theory of action and interaction. She proposes that the function of an action is to constitute the agency and therefore the identity of the person who does it, and that only morally good action can serve this function.
In: Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie: ZEMO = Journal for ethics and moral philosophy, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 143-162
ISSN: 2522-0071
In: Journal of Practical Ethics, Band 6
SSRN
In: Women, Culture, and Development, S. 401-404
In: The Tanner lectures on human values, Band 15, S. 19-112
ISSN: 0275-7656
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 24-51
ISSN: 1471-6437
To later generations, much of the moral philosophy of the twentieth century will look like a struggle toescapefrom utilitarianism. We seem to succeed in disproving one utilitarian doctrine, only to find ourselves caught in the grip of another. I believe that this is because a basic feature of the consequentialist outlook still pervades and distorts our thinking: the view that the business of morality is tobring something about. Too often, the rest of us have pitched our protests as if we were merely objecting to the utilitarian account ofwhatthe moral agent ought to bring about orhowhe ought to do it. Deontological considerations have been characterized as "side constraints," as if they were essentially restrictions on ways to realize ends. More importantly, moral philosophers have persistently assumed that the primal scene of morality is a scene in which someone does somethingtoorforsomeone else. This is the same mistake that children make about another primal scene. The primal scene of morality, I will argue, is not one in which I do something to you or you do something to me, but one in which we do something together. The subject matter of morality is not what we should bring about, but how we should relate to one another. If only Rawls has succeeded in escaping utilitarianism, it is because only Rawls has fully grasped this point. His primal scene, the original position, is one in which a group of people must make a decision together. Their task is to find the reasons they can share.
In: Philosophy & public affairs, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 101
ISSN: 0048-3915
In: Philosophy & public affairs, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 325
ISSN: 0048-3915
Hat das Leben eines Tieres einen anderen Wert als das eines Menschen? Nein, sagt die Harvard-Professorin Christine M. Korsgaard und begründet in ihrem Buch "Tiere wie wir", warum Tiere nicht getötet oder benutzt werden dürfen. Sie belässt es aber nicht bei der abstrakten Analyse, sondern erörtert an konkreten Beispielen, warum die handelsüblichen Rechtfertigungen von Massentierhaltung und Tierversuchen moralisch unhaltbar sind. Ihr radikales Buch setzt einen neuen Maßstab in der Debatte und gilt als wichtigster Beitrag zur Tierethik seit Peter Singer.
In: Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy
"The main objective of Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy is to expand the range, variety, and quality of texts in the history of philosophy which are available in English. The series includes texts by familiar names (such as Descartes and Kant) and also by less well-known authors. Wherever possible, texts are published in complete and unabridged form, and translations are specially commissioned for the series. Each volume contains a critical introduction together with a guide to further reading and any necessary glossaries and textual apparatus. The volumes are designed for student use at undergraduate and postgraduate level, and will be of interest not only to students of philosophy but also to a wider audience of readers in the history of science, the history of theology, and the history of ideas"--