Knowing that you matter, matters!: the interplay of meaning, monetary incentives, and worker recognition
In: ZEW Discussion Papers 14-097
In: Labour markets, human resources and social policy
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In: ZEW Discussion Papers 14-097
In: Labour markets, human resources and social policy
In: CESifo working paper series 1794
In: Empirical and theoretical methods
Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come into existence. In this paper we investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in a public goods game. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those where institutions govern only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed frequently as well as that institution formation has a positive impact on cooperation rates and group welfare. However, the data clearly reveal that players are unwilling to implement institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. In sum, our results show that individuals are willing and able to create sanctioning institutions, but that the institution formation process is guided by behavioral principles not taken into account by standard theory.
In: The leadership quarterly: an international journal of political, social and behavioral science, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 101292
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 12540
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Working paper
In: SAFE Working Paper No. 402
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 130, Heft 627, S. 716-739
ISSN: 1468-0297
Abstract
We study the effect of likeability on women's and men's team behaviour in a lab experiment. Extending a two-player public goods game and a minimum effort game by an additional pre-play stage that informs team members about their mutual likeability, we find that female teams lower their contribution to the public good in the event of low likeability, while male teams achieve high levels of co-operation irrespective of the level of mutual likeability. In mixed-sex teams, both women's and men's contributions depend on mutual likeability. Similar results are found in the minimum effort game. Our results offer a new perspective on gender differences in labour market outcomes: mutual dislikeability impedes team behaviour, except in all-male teams.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6523
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In: American economic review, Band 105, Heft 2, S. 747-783
ISSN: 1944-7981
We conduct a social dilemma experiment in which real-world leaders can punish group members as a third party. Despite facing an identical environment, leaders are found to take remarkably different punishment approaches. The different leader types revealed experimentally explain the relative success of groups in managing their forest commons. Leaders who emphasize equality and efficiency see positive forest outcomes. Antisocial leaders, who punish indiscriminately, see relatively negative forest outcomes. Our results highlight the importance of leaders in collective action, and more generally the idiosyncratic but powerful roles that leaders may play, leading to substantial variation in group cooperation outcomes. (JEL C93, D03, O13, Q23)
Previous research shows that firms shroud high add-on prices in competitive markets with naive consumers leading to inefficiency. We analyze the effects of regulatory intervention via educating naive consumers on equilibrium prices and welfare. Our model allows firms to shroud, unshroud, or partially unshroud add-on prices. Results show that consumer education may increase welfare; however, it may also decrease welfare if education is insufficient to alter the equilibrium information and pricing strategy of firms. Educating consumers may do more harm than good and should thus only be considered if the regulator is sufficiently well informed about consumer and firm behavior.
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 117, Heft 516, S. 270-286
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: American economic review, Band 96, Heft 5, S. 1611-1630
ISSN: 1944-7981
We analyze the consequences of control on motivation in an experimental principal-agent game, where the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum performance requirement before the agent chooses a productive activity. Our results show that control entails hidden costs since most agents reduce their performance as a response to the principal's controlling decision. Overall, the effect of control on the principal's payoff is nonmonotonic. When asked for their emotional perception of control, most agents who react negatively say that they perceive the controlling decision as a signal of distrust and a limitation of their choice autonomy.
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 15006
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 16464
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 10825
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 7411
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