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How "the political" can make the European external action service more effective in the eastern region
In: East European politics, Band 33, Heft 3, S. 355-370
ISSN: 2159-9173
How "the political" can make the European external action service more effective in the eastern region
In: East European politics, Band 33, Heft 3, S. 355-370
ISSN: 2159-9165
World Affairs Online
Analysing the Power of the European Union's Diplomatic Service: Do the eu Member States Control the European External Action Service?
In: The Hague journal of diplomacy, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 26-48
ISSN: 1871-191X
By applying the rational choice principal–agent model, this article examines the European Union member states' principal control of the European External Action Service (eeas) agent. More specifically, the article applies mechanisms of agency monitoring, control and sanctions that are inherent in the principal–agent model to analyse the establishment and functioning of the eeas. These mechanisms aim to ensure the eeas's compliance with its mandate, thereby curtailing its ability to pursue own objectives that are independent from the principal. The findings reveal that the eeas is tightly controlled by the eu member states. Moreover the European Commission has tools to exercise horizontal checks vis-à-vis the eeas. The application of the principal–agent model to control the eeas is not without its limits. The model falls short of conceptualizing the role of the European Parliament, which remains an outlier to this model.
Analysing the power of the European Union's diplomatic service: do the EU member states control the European External Action Service?
In: The Hague journal of diplomacy: HjD, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 26-48
ISSN: 1871-1901
World Affairs Online
The EEAS and the Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: What Institutional Balance?
In: The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy, S. 117-134
Examining the Discretion of the EEAS: What Power to Act in the EU-Moldova Association Agreement?
In: European foreign affairs review, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 373-392
ISSN: 1875-8223
This article applies the principal-agent model to examine the discretion of the European External Action Service (EEAS) agent vis-à-vis the Member State (MS) principals in the negotiation of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). The EEAS was allocated various responsibilities in each of these policy areas. While the EEAS is in charge of negotiations on political association, it does not lead in the area of free trade talks; the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission plays a greater role in this process. Moreover, in the areas of sectoral cooperation pertinent to the EU-Moldova Association Agreement, the EEAS has to rely extensively on the expertise of the European Commission's Directorates General. The European Commission therefore functions as a horizontal check with regard to the EEAS. The article finds that in order to monitor and control the EEAS' action throughout the negotiation of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement, the MS employ ex ante and ex post mechanisms. The control exercised by the MS and the checks applied by the Commission considerably limit the EEAS' discretion in pursuing the Association Agreement and the DCFTA between the EU and Moldova. Besides applying the principal-agent model, the original empirical research of this article contributes to the understanding of the EU's post-Lisbon foreign policy institutional architecture.
The Rationales behind the European External Action Service: The Principal-Agent Model and Power Delegation
In: Journal of contemporary European research: JCER, Band 10, Heft 2
ISSN: 1815-347X
Through application of the principal-agent model, this article investigates the rationales behind the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The study argues that although the EEAS was designed to become the heart of the EU external actions, it has not been given a role of ensuring the credibility of the principals' commitments. In addition, the blame shifting logic that makes the delegation of powers attractive is only partially applicable to the EEAS. Conversely, the efficiency rationale, which includes developing and centralising expertise, resolving incomplete contracting, minimising costs, and improving decision-making procedures, is somewhat pertinent to the EEAS's establishment. Empirical findings provide a basis for upgrading the principal-agent model by including 'coherence' as a rationale for agency creation.
Examining the discretion of the EEAS: what power to act in the EU-Moldova Association Agreement?
In: European foreign affairs review, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 373-392
ISSN: 1384-6299
World Affairs Online
The Civil Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership - Four Years On: Progress, Challenges and Prospects
In: CEPS Special Report, January 2014
SSRN
Spillovers from the Arab Revolts: Is Armenia Next in Line?
In: CEPS Policy Briefs
SSRN
EU-Armenian Relations: Charting a Fresh Course
In: CEPS Research Report No. 2017-14, November 2017, ISBN: 978-94-6138-640-3
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Towards a Fragmented Neighbourhood: Policies of the EU and Russia and their Consequences for the Area that Lies in between
In: CEPS Essays No. 17
SSRN
Towards 'Euronest 2.0': What Should the Next European Parliament Learn from its Predecessor?
In: CEPS Policy Briefs No. 300
SSRN
Moving the EU from a Laggard to a Leader in Democracy Assistance: The Potential Role of the European Endowment for Democracy
In: CEPS Policy Briefs, No. 273, June 2012
SSRN