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Understanding the diffusion of military capabilities is a central issue in international relations. Despite this, only a few works attempt to explain this phenomenon, focusing on threats. This article explains why threats alone cannot account for cybercapacity-development diffusion and introduces a more consistent explanation: the role of alliances. Allies with cybercapacity help partner-countries without cybercapacity start developing their own capacity to increase the alliance's overall security by reducing mutual vulnerabilities in cyberspace. Partner-countries that lack cybercapacity are eager to accept this option because it is more favorable than developing cybercapacity on their own. Partner-countries may also start investing in cybersecurity to reduce the likelihood of being abandoned in other, conventional, domains. My new cross-sectional time-series dataset on indicators of a state's cybercapacity-development initiation for 2000–18 provides robust empirical support for this argument and offers important implications for scholarship on arms, allies, and diffusion.

Abstract
Can cyber deterrence work? Existing scholarly works argue that deterrence by punishment using cyberattacks is ineffective because the difficulty of attributing the origin of cyberattacks makes the threat of future attacks less credible. However, these works have told us relatively little about the deterrence ability of public cyberinstitutions (PCIs), defined as publicly observable proactive efforts aimed at signaling a country's level of cyber offensive and defensive capability. This research shows that middle powers (that have scarce cyber arsenals) can use PCIs to deter cyber attacks that cause significant damage to their economy and prosperity; however, this deterrent capability is rather limited. Using an incomplete-information model, we demonstrate that PCIs only deter adversaries that are susceptible to the costs created by these institutions. Despite this limited deterrence ability, middle powers tend to over-invest resources in these cyberinstitutions: Weak cyber states tend to over-invest to convince strong cyber adversaries that they are strong, whereas strong cyber states over-invest so that adversaries do not believe that they are weak states pretending to be strong. By doing so, states reduce their overall cybercapacity. We establish the empirical plausibility of these results using election interference campaigns as examples of strategic attacks. Our focus on the strategic use of PCIs as a deterrent represents a departure from existing literature—which has focused only on cyberoperations—and has important policy implications.

Pundits debate whether conflict in cyberspace is more likely to trigger or preempt conflict in other domains. We consider a third possibility. Rather than directly complementing or substituting for traditional forms of conflict, the Internet could separately affect both virtual and kinetic dispute behavior. Specifically, we argue that a country's increasing Internet access causes it to engage in aggressive cyberspace behavior more often. At the same time, economic and social changes associated with the information age reduce the utility of pursuing more traditional forms of conflict. Cyberspace offers an attractive domain in which to shape the balance of power, interests, and information in a technological era, while territorial conquest has become somewhat anachronistic. We test our theory using an innovative estimation approach, applied to panel data on cyber versus conventional disputes. Our findings confirm this indirect substitutability between cyber and conventional conflict.

Abstract
Cybersecurity represents a unique national security challenge for states: data breaches with the potential for national, macro-level consequences are most likely to occur at the micro-level, originating through the security errors of individual computer users. Thus, aspects of national cybersecurity can often critically depend on the personal attitudes and behavior of average citizens connecting online. However, to date, theories of state cybersecurity have almost exclusively focused on the macro-level, and very little is known about how the mass public reacts to—and protects themselves from—cybersecurity threats. This study addresses this gap, drawing on psychological theories of risk perception to explain why the public simultaneously reports great concern about cybersecurity, yet does little to protect their personal safety online. Using a novel survey experiment, we examine how exposure to different types of data breaches impacts citizens' cyber risk assessments, personal online behavior, and support for various national cybersecurity policies. We find that baseline concerns about cybersecurity and knowledge about safe online practices are very low. However, exposure to a personally relevant data breach heightens risk perception and increases willingness to engage in safer online practices. But these effects are circumscribed—actual online behavior is more resistant to change. These results have important implications for the design of effective state cybersecurity policy.

Recent years have seen growing concern over the use of cyber attacks in wartime, but little evidence that these new tools of coercion can change battlefield events. We present the first quantitative analysis of the relationship between cyber activities and physical violence during war. Using new event data from the armed conflict in Ukraine—and additional data from Syria's civil war—we analyze the dynamics of cyber attacks and find that such activities have had little or no impact on fighting. In Ukraine—one of the first armed conflicts where both sides deployed such tools extensively—cyber activities failed to compel discernible changes in battlefield behavior. Indeed, hackers on both sides have had difficulty responding to battlefield events, much less shaping them. An analysis of conflict dynamics in Syria produces similar results: the timing of cyber actions is independent of fighting on the ground. Our finding—that cyber attacks are not (yet) effective as tools of coercion in war—has potentially significant implications for other armed conflicts with a digital front.

Abstract
Research into cyber-conflict, public opinion, and international security is burgeoning, yet the field suffers from an absence of conceptual agreement about key terms. For instance, every time a cyberattack takes place, a public debate erupts as to whether it constitutes cyberterrorism. This debate bears significant consequences, seeing as the ascription of a "terrorism" label enables the application of heavy-handed counterterrorism powers and heightens the level of perceived threat among the public. In light of widespread conceptual disagreement in cyberspace, we assert that public opinion plays a heightened role in understanding the nature of cyber threats. We construct a typological framework to illuminate the attributes that drive the public classification of an attack as cyberterrorism, which we test through a ratings-based conjoint experiment in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel (N = 21,238 observations). We find that the public (1) refrains from labeling attacks by unknown actors or hacker collectives as cyberterrorism; and (2) classifies attacks that disseminate sensitive data as terrorism to a greater extent even than physically explosive attacks. Importantly, the uniform public perspectives across the three countries challenge a foundational tenet of public opinion and international relations scholarship that divided views among elites on foreign policy matters will be reflected by a divided public. This study concludes by providing a definitive conceptual baseline to support future research on the topic.

Researchers today have access to an unprecedented amount of geo-referenced, disaggregated data on political conflict. Because these new data sources use disparate event typologies and units of analysis, findings are rarely comparable across studies. As a result, we are unable to answer basic questions like 'what does conflict A tell us about conflict B?' This article introduces xSub – a 'database of databases' for disaggregated research on political conflict ( www.x-sub.org ). xSub reduces barriers to comparative subnational research, by empowering researchers to quickly construct custom, analysis-ready datasets. xSub currently features subnational data on conflict in 156 countries, from 21 sources, including large data collections and data from individual scholars. To facilitate comparisons across countries and sources, xSub organizes these data into consistent event categories, actors, spatial units (country, province, district, grid cell, electoral constituency), and time units (year, month, week, and day). This article introduces xSub and illustrates its potential, by investigating the impact of repression on dissent across thousands of subnational datasets.

Big data technologies have been adopted by both the public and private sectors to develop and expand surveillance capacities. This article traces the institutional processes and political‐economic interests of the public and private stakeholders involved in the construction of China's Social Credit System (SCS), which is currently on track for full deployment on 1.4 billion citizens by 2020. The SCS aims to centralize data platforms into a big data–enabled surveillance infrastructure to manage, monitor, and predict the trustworthiness of citizens, firms, organizations, and governments in China. A punishment/reward system based on credit scores will determine whether citizens and organizations are able to access things like education, markets, and tax deductions. While the SCS is widely described by the Western news media as a means of "big brother" or political control, we find that it is a complicated system that focuses primarily on financial and commercial activities rather than political ones. This article presents a framework for understanding state surveillance infrastructures by exploring how various government agencies are cooperating to establish this centralized data infrastructure with the aim of scoring credit, and discussing the distinct but interconnected processes of data collection, data aggregation, and data analytics.