Suchergebnisse

This work tackles the most intriguing type of reasoning which one may employ within the field of law. In addition to the merits and drawbacks of legal analogy, it discusses the orthodox approaches to it, together with their critical analysis, also posing challenges that these conceptions have difficulty in managing. As an alternative, the book advances an account of legal analogical reasoning that correlates well with the division into rational and intuitive thinking that occurs in contemporary psychology. By doing so, many of the unique properties of legal analogy which have been traditionally associated with it and which have often been difficult to explain become readily understandable. Moreover, the very source of the almost mystical faith in power and infallibleness of such analogy is revealed here, while this faith--astonishing or not--not only escapes condemnation, but is shown to be warranted from a scientific point of view. Finally, the book also presents vast scope of application, premises, schematic structures and factors able to influence the force of legal analogy.

This article addresses the issue of the uniqueness of legal reasoning and, specifically, the author advances the thesis that what makes legal reasoning different from the reasoning employed in demonstrative and empirical sciences and matters of everyday life is not the actual form (scheme) of this reasoning but the legal milieu. Thus, he tries to demonstrate that some features of law – such as its normative and prescriptive nature, difficulties with the verification of its content on empirical grounds, its limitations stemming from the physical world and dependence on humans and their minds, as well as the 'unspecialized' character of law agents and the extraordinary role of authority – influence legal reasoning as well. At the same time these features also allow this reasoning to be unique, despite its adoption of forms of inference that are present elsewhere.

This article demonstrates the fallacy of legal deduction as a method supposed to guarantee the certainty and predictability of the law. The Author asserts that legal deduction is in fact not of a logical nature. Their premises are of an uneven character or else one of them must be created in a non-mechanical way. This in turn makes legal deduction, comprehended its mode of inference as infallible, provided its premises are true/valid nothing more than misunderstanding and fallacy. In addition, in this paper, the outcomes of legal deduction are shown to be highly dependent on the direct and indirect context under the threat of their being utterly absurd. Since the lack of fixity and clarity, these contexts, however, may lead one to madness, i.e. at least unless she or he abandons the idea that only logical types of inferences govern legal deduction and are solely responsible for its outcomes. ; The Polish governmental programme: 'Mobilność Plus'.

This article addresses the functions analogical reasoning may have in science and everyday life. The focus ranges from the heuristic and probative value of this kind of reasoning to its illustrative and didactic utility, not excluding the opinion-forming, choice-facilitating, argumentative and justice-dispensing aspects of the inference based upon similarity discernible between instances being compared. In this context, the Author reveals disagreements between the standpoints of several scholars and singles out their most interesting stances and statements. In addition, the question of the making of generalizations and the understanding of notions (terms) present in ordinary language as well as the problem of conceptualization have been touched upon. The relation of analogy to metaphor and its occurrence in humor, literature and poetics have also been not passed over. ; The Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education within the governmental programme: 'Mobilność Plus' ['Mobility Plus'].

This article demonstrates the inadequacy of legal deduction as a method that guarantees the certainty and predictability of law and its outcomes in concrete cases. Inter alia, the Author brings our attention to the far lesser role that the deductive pattern of inference plays in legal thought than one may suppose, since it is rather only a schematic illustration of the decisions that were previously made by recourse to the mental operations of a non-logical nature. In return, he proffers legal analogy as an alternative by which he understands a mode of thinking which helps the reasoner take into account a mass of different factors that are traditionally deemed to be relevant for legal thought and decision-making. ; The Polish governmental programme: 'Mobilność Plus'.

Artykuł podejmuje kwestię tego, czy rozumowanie prawnicze jest unikalne (wyjątkowe). Autor wysuwa przy tym hipotezę, iż to, co sprawia, że rozumowania prawnicze jawią się jako szczególne na tle rozumowań, z jakich korzysta się w naukach ścisłych i empirycznych, bierze się nie z samego schematu tych rozumowań, lecz środowiska, w jakim się je stosuje. Prawo, jego metodologia, jest bowiem samo w sobie czymś bardzo specyficznym – i to pod wieloma względami. Cechami, które mają wpływ na rozumowanie prawnicze i mogą decydować o jego unikalności, są zaś zwłaszcza: a) normatywny (preskryptywny) charakter prawa, b) trudności z weryfikacją poprawności zawartości prawa na gruncie empirycznym, c) związki prawa z umysłem ludzkim i otaczającym nas światem, d) brak na ogół specjalistycznej (technicznej, filozoficznej, psychologicznej, socjologicznej itd.) wiedzy u sędziów i adwokatów, e) nadzwyczajna rola "autorytetu" w praktyce i nauce prawa. ; This article addresses the issue of the uniqueness of legal reasoning. and, specifically, the author advances the thesis that what makes legal reasoning different from the reasoning employed in demonstrative and empirical sciences and matters of everyday life is not the very form (scheme) of this reasoning but the legal milieu. Thus, he tries to demonstrate that some features of law – such as its normative and prescriptive nature, difficulties with the verification of its content on empirical grounds, its limitations stemming from the physical world and dependence on humans and their minds, as well as the 'unspecialized' character of law agents and the extraordinary role of authority – strongly influence legal reasoning. At the same time these features also allow this reasoning to be unique, despite its adoption of forms of inference that are present elsewhere. ; The Polish governmental programme: 'Mobilność Plus'.

Artykuł powstał w związku z badaniami naukowymi, jakie autor przeprowadził na Uniwersytecie Aberystwyth w Wielkiej Brytanii w ramach rządowego programu "Mobilność Plus". ; Artykuł podejmuje problematykę metody stosowania prawa w kontekście bezpieczeństwa, jakie wynikać ma z pewności prawa Unii Europejskiej. W tym też celu autor poddaje logiczno-psychologicznej analizie dwie takie metody: a) wynoszoną na piedestał w common law, prawniczą analogię oraz b) wiązaną ściśle z systemami prawnymi typu civil law, prawniczą dedukcję (przybierającą też postać sylogizmu prawniczego). Przy tym rezultat rozumowania według obu tych metod uznany został za zależny, nie tylko od operacji myślowych przebiegających na poziomie racjonalnego systemu rozumowania, ale również, i to w stopniu znacznym, od wyniku rozumowania intuicyjnego, bazującego na zgromadzonych w pamięci długoterminowej doświadczeniach/informacjach. Ponadto możliwość zwiększania pewności prawa w stosunku do prawniczej dedukcji została tu skorelowana z podnoszeniem progu, do wysokości którego mają być podejmowane decyzje absurdalne (niesprawiedliwe) mające uzasadnienie w językowej analizie tekstu aktu prawnego; podczas gdy intersubiektywność otrzymywanych za pośrednictwem prawniczej analogii konkluzji, ilekroć nie ma się to odbywać poprzez wpływanie na zasoby, z których korzysta rozumowanie intuicyjne, uznana została za ustawioną na względnie stałym poziomie: tzw. oczywistych (bardzo bliskich) analogii. ; The article touches on the issue of the method by which the law is applied in the context of the security flowing from the certainty of the European Union law. To this aim, the Author has analyzed, form the psychological and logical perspective, two such methods: legal analogy (being often regarded as a hallmark of common law) and legal deduction as a typical method of applying canonical texts in the civil law legal systems. The outcomes of both these method turn out to be dependent on the rational, but to a great extent, also on the intuitive system of human reasoning. The latter bases on the experience and data accumulated in the so-called long-term memory, processing all information automatically and preconsciously. Nevertheless, the issue of legal certainty appears to be not the same in each of the aforementioned method. With regard to legal deduction, the certainty of outcomes may be enhanced by the raising of the threshold of absurd (unjust) decision grounded in the linguistic meaning of the wording of a legal provision, while as to legal analogy such certainty is – if we do not wish to standardize the resources upon which intuition operates – the effect of the so-called obvious (in the sense: very close) analogies that are relatively fixed. ; Ministerstwo Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego ; Mak Mak