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The link between climate change and conflict has been discussed intensively in academic literature during the past decade. This review aims to provide a clearer picture of what the research community currently has to say with regard to this nexus. It finds that the literature has not detected a robust and general effect linking climate to conflict onset. Substantial agreement exists that climatic changes contribute to conflict under some conditions and through certain pathways. In particular, the literature shows that climatic conditions breed conflict in fertile grounds: in regions dependent on agriculture and in combination and interaction with other socioeconomic and political factors such as a low level of economic development and political marginalization. Future research should continue to investigate how climatic changes interact with and/or are conditioned by socioeconomic, political, and demographic settings to cause conflict and uncover the causal mechanisms that link these two phenomena.

This article studies the consequences of inter-and intrastate wars for economic growth in a large cross-section of countries during the period 1960–89. It establishes that cross-country differences in economic growth are systematically related to the severity and duration of war. The combined prewar, contemporaneous, and postwar association between growth and war is negative; that is, economic performance has been lower in countries that fought a severe and/or prolonged war. However, the causal effect of war on postwar economic performance is positive. In particular, the longer or more severe the war, the higher the subsequent long-term rate of economic growth. A possible interpretation of these findings is that war is more likely to occur in poorly performing countries and/or to have a negative direct – contemporaneous – effect on growth. But in the longer term, war creates growth-enhancing possibilities. Interestingly, these effects arise mostly from civil wars and are quantitatively quite substantial. For instance, an increase in war duration by 10% leads to an increase of 2.1% in the average growth rate. The findings of this article are thus consistent with the predictions of the theories of both Organski & Kugler and Olson.

Der Verfasser entwickelt ein quantitatives Rahmenmodell, welches die Dynamik und Auswirkungen im System der internationalen Sicherheit beurteilen soll, die von zwischenstaatlichen militärisch-technologischen Rivalitäten ausgehen. Inwieweit wird die Entwicklung neuer Waffen als Kriterium für die absolute und relative technologische Stellung des Staates im Internationalen System herangezogen? Das Modell wird exemplifiziert anhand des amerikanisch-russischen Raketen-Wettrüstens in den 50er und 60er Jahren und der indischen Nukleartests 1999 (Rivalität Indien-Pakistan). (SWP-Ebg)

Because of the nature of modern weapons, significant innovations in arms technology have the potential to induce dramatic changes in the international distribution of power. Consider, for example, the "strategic defense initiative" (SDI), a program initiated by the United States in the early 1980s. Had the program been successfully completed, it might have led to a substantial devaluation of Soviet nuclear capabilities and put the United States in a very dominant position. It should not then come as a surprise that interstate rivalry, especially among super powers, often takes the form of a race for technological superiority. Mary Acland-Hood claims that although the United States and the Soviet Union together accounted for roughly half of the world's military expenditures in the early 1980s, their share of world military research and development (R&D) expenditures was about 80 percent. As further proof of the perceived importance of R&D, note that whereas the overall U.S. defense budget increased by 38 percent (from $225.1 billion to $311.6 billion in real terms) from 1981 to 1987, military R&D spending increased by 100 percent (from $20.97 billion to $41.96 billion). Moreover, before World War II military R&D absorbed on average less than 1 percent of the military expenditure of major powers, but since then it has grown to 11–13 percent. The emphasis on military technology is bound to become more pronounced in the future as R&D becomes the main arena for interstate competition.

I examine how a nation's absolute and relative position in a race to develop a new weapon affects the intensity of its R&D efforts as well as its incentive to engage in an arms control agreement with its rivals. I find that countries tend to devote more resources to weapons development when they are in a position of technological parity; and that the leader of a race outspends the laggard, but both tend to intensify their efforts when the follower catches up. Moreover, I find that, if the process of R&D is to be restricted through interstate treaties, then such treaties may only be introduced in the beginning stages of the race before any major breakthrough has occurred.