Rational Noncooperative Strategic Exploitation of Species in a Predator–Prey Ecosystem with Random Disturbances
In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 57-77
ISSN: 2153-0793
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In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 57-77
ISSN: 2153-0793
In: Journal of income distribution: an international journal of social economics, S. 3
An economic crisis can be described as a rapid development of events manifested by sudden misallocation of resources. High percentages of bankrupt companies or financial institutions, low investment and unusually high unemployment are some examples of misallocation. In a state of resource misallocation, economic efficiency is compromised. The real economy's fundamental ingredients, such as productive potential being one, thereby lose connection to economic outcomes. It is reasonable to think that such misallocation can be detected in the income and wealth distribution. This conjecture and approach is a key motivation behind this special volume. At the same time, whether it be a financial crisis (a stock market crash, the bursting of any financial "bubble"), a banking crisis, a currency crisis, or a sovereign default, some signs of misallocation before the crisis may be detectable in the income/wealth distribution through slower processes that have possibly started years before a crisis. This second conjecture is another key motivation behind initiating this special volume.
In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 94-119
ISSN: 2153-0793
In: DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1991
SSRN
In: China economic review, Band 60, S. 101394
ISSN: 1043-951X
In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 54-83
ISSN: 2153-0793
In: Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 227/EC/2020
SSRN
Working paper
Differential games of common resources that are governed by linear accumulation constraints have several applications. Examples include political rent-seeking groups expropriating public infrastructure, oligopolies expropriating common resources, industries using specific common infrastructure or equipment, capital-flight problems, pollution, etc. Most of the theoretical literature employs specific parametric examples of utility functions. For symmetric differential games with linear constraints and a general time-separable utility function depending only on the player's control variable, we provide an exact formula for interior symmetric Markovian-strategies. This exact solution, (a) serves as a guide for obtaining some new closed-form solutions and for characterizing multiple equilibria, and (b) implies that, if the utility function is an analytic function, then the Markovian strategies are analytic functions, too. This analyticity property facilitates the numerical computation of interior solutions of such games using polynomial projection methods and gives potential to computing modified game versions with corner solutions by employing a homotopy approach.
BASE
Differential games of common resources that are governed by linear accumulation constraints have several applications. Examples include political rent-seeking groups expropriating public infrastructure, oligopolies expropriating common resources, industries using specific common infrastructure or equipment, capital-flight problems, pollution, etc. Most of the theoretical literature employs specific parametric examples of utility functions. For symmetric differential games with linear constraints and a general time-separable utility function depending only on the player's control variable, we provide an exact formula for interior symmetric Markovian-strategies. This exact solution, (a) serves as a guide for obtaining some new closed-form solutions and for characterizing multiple equilibria, and (b) implies that, if the utility function is an analytic function, then the Markovian strategies are analytic functions, too. This analyticity property facilitates the numerical computation of interior solutions of such games using polynomial projection methods and gives potential to computing modified game versions with corner solutions by employing a homotopy approach.
BASE
In: Center for Financial Studies Working Paper No. 614
SSRN
Working paper
In: Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin 2006,22
In: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe
In: CFS Working Paper, No. 640, 2020
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of income distribution: an international journal of social economics, S. 1-3
Editorial to the Special Issue "The role of administrative
data in empirical inequality research"
As the recent chain of EU sovereign crises has demonstrated, after an unexpected massive rise to the debt GDP ratio, several EU countries manage to proceed with fiscal consolidation quickly and effectively, while other countries, notably Greece, proceed slowly, fueling Graccident and Grexit scenarios, even after generous rescue packages, involving debt haircuts and monitoring from official bodies. Here we recursively formulate a game among rent-seeking groups and propose that high debt-GDP ratios lead to predictable miscoordination among rent-seeking groups, unsustainable debt dynamics, and open the path to political accidents that foretell Graccident scenarios. Our analysis and application helps in under- standing the politico-economic sustainability of sovereign rescues, emphasizing the need for fiscal targets and possible debt haircuts. We provide a calibrated example that quantifies the threshold debt-GDP ratio at 137%, remarkably close to the target set for private sector involvement in the case of Greece.
BASE
We develop a dynamic recursive model where political and economic decisions interact, to study how excessive debt-GDP ratios affect political sustainability of prudent fiscal policies. Rent seeking groups make political decisions - to cooperate (or not) - on the allocation of fiscal budgets (including rents) and issuance of sovereign debt. A classic commons problem triggers collective fiscal impatience and excessive debt issuing, leading to a vicious circle of high borrowing costs and sovereign default. We analytically characterize debt-GDP thresholds that foster cooperation among rent seeking groups and avoid default. Our analysis and application helps in understanding the politico-economic sustainability of sovereign rescues, emphasizing the need for fiscal targets and possible debt haircuts. We provide a calibrated example that quantifies the threshold debt-GDP ratio at 137%, remarkably close to the target set for private sector involvement in the case of Greece.
BASE