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The use of new information and communication technologies both inside the courts and in private online dispute resolution services is quickly changing everyday conflict management. However, the implications of the increasingly disruptive role of technology in dispute resolution remain largely undiscussed. In this book, assistant professor of law and digitalisation Riikka Koulu examines the multifaceted phenomenon of dispute resolution technology, focusing specifically on private enforcement, which modern technology enables on an unforeseen scale. The increase in private enforcement confounds legal structures and challenges the nation-state's monopoly on violence. And, in this respect, the author argues that the technology-driven privatisation of enforcement – from direct enforcement of e-commerce platforms to self-executing smart contracts in the blockchain – brings the ethics of law's coercive nature out into the open. This development constitutes a new, and dangerous, grey area of conflict management, which calls for transparency and public debate on the ethical implications of dispute resolution technology.

Finnish civil procedure has a close connection with other Scandinavian legal systems and co-operation between the States is active. In addition, the legislation, case-law and scholarly doctrine are more and more influenced by European co-operation through the EU and Council of Europe. The principles of free disposition, free assessment of evidence, audiatur altera pars, and burden of proof form the basis for an oral and direct public hearing. It follows from these due process principles that no methods of proof are forbidden but their relevance depends on the court's assessment. The procedural doctrine in Finland is well established and has roots in the Swedish code of civil procedure of 1734, although it has gone through extensive reforms. On February 10, 2015 the Parliament of Finland passed the reform of chapter 17 of code of civil procedure, which contains the legislation on law of evidence. The extensive reform systematically updates and streamlines the previous legislation on evidence in addition to introducing new regulation e.g. on anonymous witnesses and banning invocation of evidence, which has been obtained by illegal means. The reform of chapter 17 concludes the systematic reform.

This article is an examination of human oversight in EU policy for controlling algorithmic systems in automated legal decision making. Despite the shortcomings of human control over complex technical systems, human oversight is advocated as a solution against the risks of increasing reliance on algorithmic tools. For law, human oversight provides an attractive, easily implementable and observable procedural safeguard. However, without awareness of its inherent limitations, human oversight is in danger of becoming a value in itself, an empty procedural shell used as a stand-in justification for algorithmization but failing to provide protection for fundamental rights. By complementing socio-legal analysis with Science and Technology Studies, critical algorithm studies, organization studies and human-computer interaction research, the author explores the importance of keeping the human in the loop and asks what the human element at the core of legal decision making is. Through algorithmization it is made visible how law conceptualises decision making through human actors, personalises legal decision making through the decision-maker's discretionary power that provides proportionality and common sense, prevents gross miscarriages of justice and establishes the human encounter deemed essential for the feeling of being heard. The analysis demonstrates the necessary human element embedded in legal decision making, against which the meaningfulness of human oversight needs to be examined.

This article is an examination of human oversight in EU policy for controlling algorithmic systems in automated legal decision making. Despite the shortcomings of human control over complex technical systems, human oversight is advocated as a solution against the risks of increasing reliance on algorithmic tools. For law, human oversight provides an attractive, easily implementable and observable procedural safeguard. However, without awareness of its inherent limitations, human oversight is in danger of becoming a value in itself, an empty procedural shell used as a stand-in justification for algorithmization but failing to provide protection for fundamental rights. By complementing socio-legal analysis with Science and Technology Studies, critical algorithm studies, organization studies and human-computer interaction research, the author explores the importance of keeping the human in the loop and asks what the human element at the core of legal decision making is. Through algorithmization it is made visible how law conceptualises decision making through human actors, personalises legal decision making through the decision-maker's discretionary power that provides proportionality and common sense, prevents gross miscarriages of justice and establishes the human encounter deemed essential for the feeling of being heard. The analysis demonstrates the necessary human element embedded in legal decision making, against which the meaningfulness of human oversight needs to be examined. ; Peer reviewed

Published online on 29/4/2020 ; In this article I problematize the use of algorithmic decision-making (ADM) applications to automate legal decision-making processes from the perspective of the European Union (EU) policy on trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI). Lately, the use of ADM systems across various fields, ranging from public to private, from criminal justice to credit scoring, has given rise to concerns about the negative consequences that data-driven technologies have in reinforcing and reinterpreting existing societal biases. This development has led to growing demand for ethical AI, often perceived to require human control over automation. By engaging in discussions of human-computer interaction and in post-structural policy analysis, I examine EU policy proposals to address the problematizations of AI through human oversight. I argue that the relevant policy documents do not reflect the results of earlier research which have undeniably demonstrated the shortcomings of human control over automation, which in turn leads to the reproduction of the harmful dichotomy of human versus machine in EU policy. Despite its shortcomings, the emphasis on human oversight reflects broader fears surrounding loss of control, framed as ethical concerns around digital technologies. Critical examination of these fears reveals an inherent connection between human agency and the legitimacy of legal decision-making that socio-legal scholarship needs to address.

In this article I problematize the use of algorithmic decision-making (ADM) applications to automate legal decision-making processes from the perspective of the European Union (EU) policy on trustworthy artificial intelligence (AI). Lately, the use of ADM systems across various fields, ranging from public to private, from criminal justice to credit scoring, has given rise to concerns about the negative consequences that data-driven technologies have in reinforcing and reinterpreting existing societal biases. This development has led to growing demand for ethical AI, often perceived to require human control over automation. By engaging in discussions of human-computer interaction and in post-structural policy analysis, I examine EU policy proposals to address the problematizations of AI through human oversight. I argue that the relevant policy documents do not reflect the results of earlier research which have undeniably demonstrated the shortcomings of human control over automation, which in turn leads to the reproduction of the harmful dichotomy of human versus machine in EU policy. Despite its shortcomings, the emphasis on human oversight reflects broader fears surrounding loss of control, framed as ethical concerns around digital technologies. Critical examination of these fears reveals an inherent connection between human agency and the legitimacy of legal decision-making that socio-legal scholarship needs to address. ; Peer reviewed

Finnish civil procedure has a close connection with other Scandinavian legal systems and co-operation between the States is active. In addition, the legislation, case-law and scholarly doctrine are more and more influenced by European co-operation through the EU and Council of Europe. The principles of free disposition, free assessment of evidence, audiatur altera pars, and burden of proof form the basis for an oral and direct public hearing. It follows from these due process principles that no methods of proof are forbidden but their relevance depends on the court's assessment. The procedural doctrine in Finland is well established and has roots in the Swedish code of civil procedure of 1734, although it has gone through extensive reforms. On February 10, 2015 the Parliament of Finland passed the reform of chapter 17 of code of civil procedure, which contains the legislation on law of evidence. The extensive reform systematically updates and streamlines the previous legislation on evidence in addition to introducing new regulation e.g. on anonymous witnesses and banning invocation of evidence, which has been obtained by illegal means. The reform of chapter 17 concludes the systematic reform.

This article argues that through the EU's technology regulation, technological concepts permeate legal language. Such concepts may function as transplants, even irritants, causing tensions and uncertainties. As technology regulation is increasingly horizontal, i.e. obligating private and public actors alike, these newfound legal concepts remain disconnected from established public law vocabulary and the power constellations it represents and embeds. We approach this evolution of legal language from public law perspective and concentrate on the concepts of 'user' and 'deployer' in the EU's upcoming Artificial Intelligence Act. We discuss these emerging legal concepts in relation to the rich theorizing on the concepts in human–computer interaction research. Our analysis demonstrates a discrepancy between legal and technology-oriented conceptualizations of the 'user-deployer'. We draw three conclusions. First, the digital revolution is taking place in conceptual-linguistic practices of law, and not only when translating law into code. Second, when external concepts are appropriated into law, they are uprooted from their established habitat, which may result in unpredictability in future legal interpretation. Third, in public law, adopting the 'user-deployer' may have some additional challenges, as it introduces a new agent into the relationship between public authority and private entities. Simultaneously, citizens seem to be mainly excluded from the legal conceptualizing, which risks blurring traditional power constellations.