Introduction --Narratives of change in six states --The stability of leadership : how long does "first among equals" last? --The role of committees : independent actors or agents? --Patterns in legislative achievement --Bargaining between the legislative and executive branches --The production of policy innovation --Conclusions --Epilogue : adaptations to term limits.
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Did the new rules implemented by California's top-two system change the electoral game in the statewide primaries of 2014? This article looks first at overall turnout dynamics before focusing on the closely contested races to gain a spot on the November ballot in the governor's, secretary of state's, and controller's races. Drawing on an original analysis of polling data as well as interviews with candidates themselves, I find that the top-two shaped the field of candidates who entered the primary, the partisan ballot designations that they chose, and the campaign tactics that they employed. Yet the new rules did not, in the end, discernibly alter the outcomes of the 2014 primaries. 1
American federalism is constantly in flux. The 'devolution revolution' of the mid-1990s gave states tremendous power to rewrite the rules of their welfare programs, changed the fiscal incentives that states face, and initiated a massive health insurance expansion funded primarily by the federal government but implemented, with great latitude, by states. How did states react? How did this change the social safety net in the United States, and how did it reshape the nation's distinct brand of federalism? This essay explores these questions, both through a close focus how devolution played out in California and through a broader look at trends across the states. Adapted from the source document.
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 123, Heft 1, S. 183-184
In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 410-429
Do term limits constrain a legislature's ability to produce complex & broad policy? I investigate this question by examining patterns of policymaking in six states before & after term limits went into effect in four of them. I find that term limits reduced policy complexity in three hybrid & citizen legislatures, while laws became increasingly intricate in the highly professional California legislature. I conclude that both the institutional context & experience of the term-limited legislators condition the effects of this reform on policymaking. In particular, a legislator's experience -- in either state or local government -- allows him or her to write broad & complex bills, & in legislatures that provide little staff support to compensate for the inexperience of their new members, term limits can reduce overall legislative policy knowledge, thus reducing the complexity of legislation. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.
In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy section of the American Political Science Association, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 410-429
AbstractDo term limits constrain a legislature's ability to produce complex and broad policy? I investigate this question by examining patterns of policymaking in six states before and after term limits went into effect in four of them. I find that term limits reduced policy complexity in three hybrid and citizen legislatures, while laws became increasingly intricate in the highly professional California legislature. I conclude that both the institutional context and experience of the term-limited legislators condition the effects of this reform on policymaking. In particular, a legislator's experience—in either state or local government—allows him or her to write broad and complex bills, and in legislatures that provide little staff support to compensate for the inexperience of their new members, term limits can reduce overall legislative policy knowledge, thus reducing the complexity of legislation.
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 119, Heft 2, S. 377-379