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The issue of super-intelligent artificial intelligence (AI) has begun to attract ever more attention in economics, law, sociology and philosophy studies. A new industrial revolution is being unleashed, and it is vital that lawmakers address the systemic challenges it is bringing while regulating its economic and social consequences. This paper sets out recommendations to ensure informed regulatory intervention covering potential uncontemplated AI-related risks. If AI evolves in ways unintended by its designers, the judgment-proof problem of existing legal persons engaged with AI might undermine the deterrence and insurance goals of classic tort law, which consequently might fail to ensure optimal risk internalisation and precaution. This paper also argues that, due to identified shortcomings, the debate on the different approaches to controlling hazardous activities boils down to a question of efficient ex ante safety regulation. In addition, it is suggested that it is better to place AI in the existing legal categories and not to create a new electronic legal personality.

This paper explores possible uncontemplated effects and behavioural implications created by duty-to-negotiate provisions in international instruments. More precisely, the paper considers how five different international instruments approach the subject, namely the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) and Common European Sales Law (CESL). The extent to which these international and European legal instruments correspond to recent economic and behavioural findings is examined. Moreover, an economically inspired analysis is conducted of the uncontemplated consequences of the duty to renegotiate that well-intended international lawmakers never anticipated. Further, it is suggested that game theoretical and behavioural reasons might exist for adopting a cautious approach to the duty to renegotiate in instances of unforeseen contingencies as found in the CISG as well as the English, German, US and Scottish law of contracts. JEL classification: C23, C26, C51, K42, O43

In recent years, an extensive debate on the need for harmonization of a European sales law has evolved. The existing diversity of contract laws in the Member States has been perceived as a barrier to trade and hence as burdensome for the European internal market. Moreover, recent impact assessment studies suggest that this diversity is a source of substantial transaction costs. The observed existence of such substantial transaction costs represents a per se overwhelming argument for the adoption of an optional instrument on the European Common Sales Law. The analysis and calculations of opportunity and transaction costs that have been made provide seemingly unbiased, unprecedented, empirical and affirmative answers. However, this paper challenges and critically analyses the results and shows that it might simply be impossible to calculate either the full transaction costs of legal diversity or costs of uniformity. This analysis also shows that: (1) calculations made by the EU Commission rely heavily on subjective observation and selectively biased data; (2) that the obtained results might be severely impaired and over conclusive; and finally (3) that those results merely generate an anecdotal evidence of the possible volume of transaction costs originating from that contract law's differences. In order to obtain a more affirmative answer on the actual amount of transaction costs, this paper provides a list of possible refinements and suggests a set of new quantitative measures that would permit more accurate cross-firm, cross-country and cross-industry comparisons.

We examine the diversification of administrative and procedural costs on patent stockusing a large dataset from the European Patent Office with 15,000firms for the periodbetween 1995 and 2015. The results reveal that administrative and procedural costs aresignificant forfirm-level patenting activity. However, not all administrative and proceduralcosts have equal effects. Higher administrative costs often encourage patent applicationand validation by solving the adverse selection problem and short-run opportunism, aswell as other sources of asymmetric information. The effective administration of intel-lectual property law and low-cost enforcement are found to considerably foster patentingactivity. The effects are robust for various mis-specification checks and do not disappearonce country-level research and development infrastructure proxies are controlled for. Theextreme bounds of administrative and procedural costs are computed across more than 5billion regressions, and the sizeable impact of administration on patent application andvalidation outcomes is confirmed.

We examine the impact of the trans fat ban on a variety of public health outcomes. To this end, we consider a de facto trans fat ban that was introduced by Denmark in 2001. Using the synthetic control method, parallel trends between Denmark and countries in a control group in the years prior to the ban are used to construct a "synthetic Denmark" without any such trans fat ban. Our synthetic control estimates suggest the ban led to substantial improvements in public health. Following the ban, cardiovascular mortality dropped considerably, while the trends of adolescent and child obesity came to a halt and decreased significantly compared to the synthetic control group. Our findings provide new insights into the benefits for public health arising from the banning of trans fats.

Efficient regulatory mechanisms that induce innovation, co-operation and deter competition law infringements have recently been the subject of growing attention. Competition is essential to the innovation process which in general terms enables entrepreneurship. But so too is co-operation between firms which requires an exchange of information and may lead to inefficient collusive behaviour. The optimal trade-off between the provision of stable entrepreneurial incentives and the new European competition law's reform with the self-assessment system has been largely missing from the current scholarly debate. This paper identifies the unintended, harmful horizontal side effects of this new European self-assessment system upon the entrepreneurial activity, offers a legal evaluation of the optimal entrepreneurial incentive mechanisms and provides legal and entrepreneurial arguments for an improved regulatory response.

Abstract:This paper seeks to quantify the impact of transaction costs on cross-country economic growth. Our evidence from a cross-country panel data regression analysis reveals a persistent and robust negative effect of increasing transaction costs on the path of economic growth. The growth-enhancing effects of lower transaction costs are confirmed after controlling for the set of conditioning variables and further demonstrated in a cross-country growth model calibration. The results provide evidence that transaction costs might indeed be central to the study of cross-country productivity differences, suggest the importance of contractual relations and indicate their significant impact on cross-country economic performance over time.

The European continent faces an apocalyptic pandemic that poses mortal danger to millions of citizens. This paper seeks to address the role played by European public policy in addressing the Covid-19 pandemic. Currently, each Member State across Europe is applying its own measures to deal with the coronavirus ; namely, decentralised decision-making that could trigger political tensions among the states. The paper argues that European public policy must change rapidly and fundamentally if these tensions are to be successfully managed ; otherwise, such policy might simply cease to exist. Moreover, the known and notorious problem of collective action, information asymmetries, irrationality, negative externalities and the related free-riding phenomenon persistently are distorting the Member States' combined efforts, resulting in deficient attempts to contain the spread of Covid-19. The paper also argues that the current unprecedented outbreak of this superspreading virus calls for a bigger EU-wide coordinated response. We argue that the Covid-19 pandemic is a good example of an area in which the central EU level holds a comparative advantage over lower levels of government. In addition, the paper offers several substantive insights into ways to improve the public policy response in the 'war' against Covid-19.