Suchergebnisse

Intro -- GROUPTHINK OR DEADLOCK -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction -- MATCHING ADVISORS TO LEADERS -- DOES LEADERSHIP REALLY MATTER? -- WHAT IS LEARNING? -- CONCLUSION -- 2. Who Learns, and When? -- LEARNING STYLE -- MANAGING ADVISORS -- A THEORY OF LEADER-GROUP RELATIONS -- CONCLUSION -- 3. Eisenhower and Reagan: Comparing Learning Styles -- THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION -- Learning Style -- Advisors -- THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION -- Learning Style -- Advisors -- CONCLUSION -- 4. Learning -- LEARNING IN AN OPEN ADMINISTRATION -- The Fall of Dien Bien Phu -- Alaskan Statehood -- LEARNING IN A CLOSED ADMINISTRATION -- The International Debt Shock -- The Withdrawal from Lebanon -- CONCLUSION -- 5. Groupthink -- BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS -- MCCARTHYISM -- CONCLUSION -- 6. Deadlock -- THE BUDGET DEFICIT -- THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR -- CONCLUSION -- 7. Conclusion -- THE POLITICS OF ADVICE -- WHY LEARN? -- Notes -- CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER 2. WHO LEARNS, AND WHEN? -- CHAPTER 3. EISENHOWER AND REAGAN: COMPARING LEARNING STYLES -- CHAPTER 4. LEARNING -- CHAPTER 5. GROUPTHINK -- CHAPTER 6. DEADLOCK -- CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

"Foreign Policy and the Social Construction of State Identity" published on by Oxford University Press.

For over two decades, the theory of groupthink proposed by Irving Janis has remained the most prominent analysis of group dynamics in policy‐making. Suffering from its own popularity, groupthink has become a catch‐all phrase without a clear meaning. Moreover, theories of group decision‐making—even when applied to public policy‐making—have typically ignored political variables, focusing almost exclusively on psychological arguments. This article offers three more narrowly construed propositions about policy‐making groups: (1) that extremes in the distribution of power within a decision group reduces the integrative complexity of that group's deliberations and, thus, a leader's ability to learn; (2) that extremes in group size produce similar effects; and (3) that the integrative complexity of deliberations is improved when power concentration is appropriate to group size. An examination of the Reagan Administration's decision‐making in two phases of the Iran‐Contra affair lends support to these hypotheses and reveals the importance of political structure in decision group dynamics.

Discusses distribution of power, leader's ability to learn, group decision-making, and public policy decisions; focuses on examination of Reagan administration decision-making in two phases of the affair, 1985-87; US.

Reflecting on the debate over constructivisms, disciplinary motives, & the task of social science expressed throughout the volume, the chapter proposes that these arguments over ethics & normative standards enhance international relations scholarship. Constructivism illuminates the centrality of identity, & its basis in language, to international relations & policy interests; but to transcend metatheory constructivists must further theorize agency. 87 References. K. Coddon