Organisation und Management
In: Neue ökonomische Grundrisse
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In: Neue ökonomische Grundrisse
In: Bonn econ discussion papers 2001, 34
In practice, two types of tournaments can be distinguished - U-type and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments, workers receive prizes that have been fixed in advance. In J-type tournaments, the employer fixes an aggregate wage bill in advance, which is then shared among the workers according to their relative performance. The results of the paper show that the outcomes of the two tournament types substantially differ. Especially, an employer will prefer J-type to U-type tournaments if the number of workers is large, whereas the opposite holds for small numbers of workers.
In: Bonn econ discussion papers 2001,33
In: Discussion paper series 74
In: Neue betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung 106
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 76-87
When a multi-plant firm must close one unit due to declining demand it can choose between two alternatives. On the one hand, the firm can announce a certain span of time in which the plants are evaluated according to relative performance with the least performing plant being shut down in the end (shutdown contest). On the other hand, the firm can use given information on the plants' productivities and close the least productive unit. This paper analyzes the selection and incentive properties of both alternatives. Multi-plant firms often operate in an international industry. Hence, in a second step we discuss the effects of governmental support for domestic plants on selection efficiency.
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When a multi-plant firm must close one unit due to declining demand it can choose between two alternatives. On the one hand, the firm can announce a certain span of time in which the plants are evaluated according to relative performance with the least performing plant being shut down in the end (shutdown contest). On the other hand, the firm can use given information on the plants' productivities and close the least productive unit. This paper analyzes the selection and incentive properties of both alternatives. Multi-plant firms often operate in an international industry. Hence, in a second step we discuss the effects of governmental support for domestic plants on selection efficiency.
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In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 164, Heft 2, S. 343
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Band 67, Heft 1, S. 204-214
We introduce a concept of emotions that emerge when agents compare their own performance with the performances of other agents. Assuming heterogeneity among the agents the interplay of emotions and incentives is analyzed within the framework of rank-order tournaments, which are frequently used in practice. Tournaments seem to be an appropriate starting point for this concept because a tournament induces incentives by making agents compare themselves with their opponents. We identify certain conditions under which the principal benefits from emotional agents. Furthermore, the concept of emotions is used to explain the puzzling findings on the oversupply of effort in experimental tournaments.
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 988-1006
In: Journal of economics, Band 88, Heft 1, S. 21-48
ISSN: 1617-7134
This paper discusses the optimal firm size in the presence of influence activities, and the level of individual rent-seeking dependent on the economic situation of the firm. Since firm size has a discouraging effect on the level of individual rent-seeking but also a quantity effect as the number of rent-seekers increases, the interplay of both effects determines whether the employer chooses an inefficiently small or large firm size. In the given setting, a bad economic situation leads to both a higher probability of a substantial loss and a reduction of productivity. The productivity effect and the two other effects together determine the optimal level of individual rent-seeking.
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 2396
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 2059
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