Suchergebnisse

Eine Vielzahl organisatorischer Reformen scheitert aufgrund des Widerstandes der Mitarbeiter (resistance to change). Veränderungen erfordern Offenheit gegenüber Neuem, und viele Menschen empfinden Angst vor dem Ungewissen. Mit Hilfe eines ökonomischen Laborexperimentes untersucht Jan Philipp Krügel die Umstände, unter denen die Akzeptanz für Wandel hoch und gleichzeitig Widerstände gering ausfallen. Die Ergebnisse der Studie legen nahe, dass Mitarbeiter strukturelle Reformen insbesondere dann unterstützen, wenn sie vom Unternehmen im Vorfeld gut behandelt wurden und als fair empfundene Löhne erhalten. Jan Philipp Krügel ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Behavioral Economics, an der Helmut-Schmidt-Universität in Hamburg. Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte liegen in den Bereichen experimentelle Ökonomie, Spieltheorie und Verhaltensökonomik. Many organisational changes fail because of resistance to change by employees. Changes require new ways of thinking, and the general uncertainty that surrounds them tends to make people uncomfortable. Jan Philipp Krügel examines the circumstances under which employees are more accepting of change with a laboratory experiment. His findings suggest that if employees are treated well by their employer in the first place, they are also more willing to help implement changes. The general uncertainty about the outcome of change, however, does not necessarily lead to strong resistance. Jan Philipp Krügel is currently working as a research assistant for the chair of behavioural economics at Helmut-Schmidt-University in Hamburg. His research focuses on experimental economics, game theory and behavioural economics.

The willingness of mere bystanders, or "third parties," to incur costs to sanction non-cooperators in social dilemma situations has been documented in numerous studies. It is, however, not clear yet how different forms of higher-order punishment affect third party behavior and the level of cooperation. This paper experimentally studies incentives for third parties to enforce contribution norms in public-good games. We compare two treatments where the third party is embedded in different stylized institutions to a baseline treatment where this is not the case. In our treatments, the third party is, first, evaluated by another uninvolved individual ("fourth party"), and second, faces competition by another potential third party punisher. We find that third parties punish free-riding public good players more severely if they have to fear negative payoff consequences for themselves. Importantly, our results point to substantial qualitative differences between the institutional arrangements: When the third party is under scrutiny of a fourth party, punishment is more balanced, but also high compared to the other treatments. By contrast, competition between two third party candidates leads to strategic and partial punishment, generating the most profitable outcomes for public good players.

Many organisational changes fail because of resistance to change by employees. Changes require new ways of thinking, and the general uncertainty that surrounds them tends to make people uncomfortable. Jan Philipp Krügel examines the circumstances under which employees are more accepting of change with a laboratory experiment. His findings suggest that if employees are treated well by their employer in the first place, they are also more willing to help implement changes. The general uncertainty about the outcome of change, however, does not necessarily lead to strong resistance.Jan Philipp Krügel is currently working as a research assistant for the chair of behavioural economics at Helmut-Schmidt-University in Hamburg. His research focuses on experimental economics, game theory and behavioural economics.