Suchergebnisse

The inclusion of the three paragraphs in the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit that make reference to the obligations of the state and the international community under the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) has effectively raised a challenge to the traditional understanding of the principle of sovereignty in international relations. More importantly, their inclusion in the Outcome Document has effectively committed its signatories to RtoP as briefly outlined in the Document. The question, however, is whether or not states will hold themselves to this commitment? Among the member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the commitment to RtoP under the Outcome Document is clearly at odds with the oft-emphasized commitment to the principle of non-interference that the members of the Association have long identified with. The establishment of new institutional forms, mechanisms, and blueprints within ASEAN, however, create opportunities for introducing emergent norms into the region. The ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) is representative of these new institutional forms. It is the immediate manifestation of the ASEAN declaration of support for the promotion and protection of human rights in the region. Though criticized as "lacking in teeth" especially on the provisions that have to do with the protection of human rights, the AICHR's mandated functions are very generally ambiguous in the way they are presented in its Terms of Reference. These "ambiguities" arguably open up the interpretation of its functions to a more liberal perspective, more so in terms of opening the envelope on the protective functions of the AICHR. In the same context, the same ambiguities in the TOR of the AICHR may be utilized as entrypoints for introducing elements of RtoP into the region. It also illustrates the need to consider a strategy of incremental localization in pushing the normalization of RtoP in Southeast Asia. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

Teaching IR in the Philippines can best be understood in terms of an evolving process that has been significantly influenced by the country's colonial experience under the United States. The development of the field is largely contextualized as a part of the discipline of Political Science. The latter in turn was situated less as an academic field and more as preparatory course for those pursuing a law degree or a career in the colonial bureaucracy. However, greater attention is now being paid to academic pursuit as an objective of higher education in the Philippines—and the consequent attention to more theoretical research and the teaching of IR as a field of study not completely beholden to the need to produce bureaucrats and technocrats for foreign policy work. There is an increasing diversity in the types of research interests pursued by IR scholars in the country. This diversity ranges from the expansion of the issues being explored to a special focus on widening the theoretical and methodological approaches that local scholars adopt. At the same time, however, the field continues to be embedded in its antecedent purpose of providing training for aspiring diplomats and foreign-policy bureaucrats. The evolution of IR in the Philippines, and the subsequent direction of the field, continue to be influenced by its historical antecedents and its emphasis on a pragmatic appreciation of what needs to be understood through the study of IR. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)

The regional security architecture in Southeast Asia, arguably even within the broader East Asian region, has largely revolved in the last 25 years around the viability of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the driving force behind Southeast Asian (and East Asian) regionalism. Multilateral institutional arrangements established since 1994 had the ASEAN states as their core component, and the "ASEAN way" of conducting foreign affairs as their normative guide. These arrangements were seen as being a critical aspect of maintaining peaceful relations in the region in the face of long standing disputes and historical suspicions. This state of affairs, underpinned by ASEAN's ability to provide the basis for managing regional relations, has now begun to unravel with the intensifying strategic competition between China and the United States. Is the ASEAN‐driven multilateral security architecture sustainable in the face of intensifying great power competition?

The Security structure of the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War is characterized by a web of interlocking bilateral alliances woven by the United States. Through this 'hub and spokes' mechanism, American influence in the region was guaranteed as states dealt with one another by means of their respective bilateral linkages with Washington. This arrangement effectively prevented regional states and actors from challenging the hegemony of the United States over the conduct of regional security affairs. The end of the Cold War, the consequent decline of American military presence in the region, and the emergence of new geostrategic players have made this network of bilateral alliances inadequate, if not outdated, for the complex and uncertain post-Cold War international system. This, in turn, necessitates a rethinking of bilateralism and its place in the new regional security environment. With Philippine-United States Relations as backdrop, it is argued that until multilateral mechanisms are designated to help diffuse crises and, in conditions of conflict, actually enforced the uneven distribution of power among states will continue to provide the reason for small states to seek the assistance of stronger states through bilateral security arrangement. Bilateral alliances with neighbors and other regional actors, should therefore, be enhanced with the view of complementing multilateral efforts towards security cooperation. In the last analysis, however, while bilateralism remains an important aspect of Asia Pacific security, a collective effort is indispensable for ensuring regional stability.

The Philippines is clearly one of the principal "front-line" states with Southeast Asia's identification as the second front of the "global war on terror." Its participation in and strong support for this campaign was commended strongly in the international stage especially by the government of the United States. At the same time, however, this policy was received with mixed feelings within the country itself. There are strong and legitimate fears that the Philippine government's support for the United States places the stability of the country over the short- to medium-term in jeopardy. This is particularly important as the international campaign against terror has come at an inopportune time. The Philippines is currently facing multi-faceted challenges that the government is unable to address because it cannot mobilize the requisite economic and political resources. Terrorism is not the main cause of the persistent instability in the Philippines. The growth and persistence of terrorism in the country, in fact, is indicative of the weak Philippine state.

Transnational networks of non‐government organizations are increasingly becoming a fixture in international relations, particularly their contribution to traditional notions of diplomacy and its objectives. Less noticed, however, is the involvement of transnational NGO networks in alternative channels for diplomatic exchange, which have been referred to as 'track three diplomacy'. Described as a form of civil society that transcends borders and nationalities, track three networks and activities involve NGO networks that are movement based, and concerned primarily with raising public consciousness over issues. While their direct influence on formal processes of foreign policy‐making has been limited, they have contributed to expanding both the scope of debate in international relations and the breadth of participation in those debates. Track three networks provide a forum for those communities marginalized by an international system that gives primacy of place to states and their officially‐declared concerns. Their impact is limited, however, by their lack of institutionalization and their reluctance to cooperate with government agencies – an issue that goes towards both their effectiveness and their identity in the long‐term.