Suchergebnisse

In this article, abduction is introduced in relation to theorizing in grounded theory. Theoretical insights are inevitable cornerstones of the development of a grounded theory and abduction is worked out as a type of inference that characterizes this development. How abduction could be used in grounded theorizing is shown in a grounded theory research on 'organizing doubt', i.e. the way Dutch army units are formed with self-organizing capabilities that can be deployed during crisis operations. The authors show that two concepts from organizational theory that are central in this grounded theory's analytical framework - i.e. 'dynamic complexity' and 'self-organization' - are developed and embedded in a substantive theory on 'organizing doubt' by abductive reasoning.

Peace operations involving modern armed forces require a system of command in which responsibilities and authorities are delegated throughout the command line: mission command. Although mission command is popular in theory, in practice commanders appear to have problems with the delegation of authority. This study analyzed the practice of mission command in four Dutch case studies. The main analysis shows a relation between the granting of autonomy to subordinate commanders, on the one hand, and the clarity of the objectives, the appropriateness of the means, and the mutual trust between commanders at different levels, on the other. Further analysis shows that the possession of good communication means, the slow pace of operations, the development of routines, the required safety of personnel, the political sensitivity, and the deployment of mixed units are obstacles to mission command as well. The conclusion is that mission command is hard to implement.

AbstractBoin (2019) argues that in transboundary crisis management it is almost impossible to achieve centralization and coordination. This article identifies three principles through which actors in a transboundary crisis can balance centralization with autonomy while shaping coordination along the way. We reanalysed three transboundary cases: the Dutch military mission in Afghanistan, the downing of MH17 and hurricane Irma striking Sint‐Maarten. The principles we found are as follows: (a) reformulating key strategic priorities, (b) flexible adaptation of crisis management protocols and (c) the emergence of multifunctional units. With these three principles, we reflect on challenges in the Dutch crisis response to the corona outbreak and propose improvements for progressing current crisis management efforts.

Boin (2019) argues that in transboundary crisis management it is almost impossible to achieve centralization and coordination. This article identifies three principles through which actors in a transboundary crisis can balance centralization with autonomy while shaping coordination along the way. We reanalysed three transboundary cases: the Dutch military mission in Afghanistan, the downing of MH17 and hurricane Irma striking Sint‐Maarten. The principles we found are as follows: (a) reformulating key strategic priorities, (b) flexible adaptation of crisis management protocols and (c) the emergence of multifunctional units. With these three principles, we reflect on challenges in the Dutch crisis response to the corona outbreak and propose improvements for progressing current crisis management efforts.

Many militaries envision a technologically advanced future with a strong innovative capability and therefore invest in so-called innovation hubs focused on experimenting with new modes of operation with drones and (semi-)autonomous vehicles. However, there appears to be a discrepancy between these military visions and soldiers' lived experiences on the ground. This article presents an ethnographic study of one innovation hub: the Robots and Autonomous Systems unit of the Dutch Army. Examining this unit through an analytical framework of sociotechnical imaginaries and expectations, we first outline how "innovation" and "military" imaginaries are integrated so that technological innovation is presented as necessary, desirable, and inevitable for military futures. Second, we explore soldiers' experiences of military innovation, identifying friction between the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, soldiers experience meaning and purpose in their work whereas, at the operational level, soldiers' expectations, practices, and experiences do not align with the "innovative military future" imaginary, resulting in disillusionment. With this empirical study, we contribute to a better understanding of how large-scale visions of technological "progress" play out in military practice.