1. Introduction -- 2. Electoral clientelism in Kenya -- 3. Theory : electoral clientelism as information -- 4. The mechanics of electoral clientelism : descriptive evidence -- 5. Why is electoral clientelism effective? : Experimental evidence -- 6. Who invests in electoral clientelism? : Incumbents versus challengers -- 7. Electoral clientelism and ethnic politics -- 8. Electoral clientelism and the provision of local public goods -- 9. Conclusion -- Appendices.
Candidate debates are increasingly organized during elections in democracies and electoral autocracies. How do debates impact partisan divisions and preferences in these contexts? One theoretical perspective suggests that debates should amplify these preferences and divisions, while another implies debates should attenuate them. This paper evaluates these expectations by studying presidential debates organized during Malawi's May 2019 elections. With an experiment and national panel survey, the paper provides evidence consistent with attenuation: debate watchers were substantially more likely to vote across partisan lines (cross-party voting), became more favorable toward out-partisan candidates, and became less favorable toward co-partisans. Suggestive evidence on causal mechanisms shows that these effects were driven by policy persuasion and debates' impact on perceptions of the candidates' policies and qualities. Results advance debates about information processing, campaign effects, and voting behavior in new democracies and electoral autocracies, and have implications for electoral institutions' impact on partisan divisions.
Individual electoral clientelism involves the allocation of handouts to voters around elections. Why is this strategy common in some contexts but not in others? This article demonstrates that ethnic group institutional structure helps to explain this variation. Where ethnic groups are organized hierarchically and have centralized leadership, politicians leverage this infrastructure to mobilize voters wholesale. Where they are not, politicians forge linkages directly with voters, resulting in more electoral clientelism. I provide evidence from a set of African countries, where there is variation in the social structure of ethnic and religious groups. I show that electoral clientelism is more widespread in countries where ethnic groups have a decentralized organization. An individual-level analysis of electoral clientelism in 15 African countries further shows that members of decentralized groups are most likely to receive electoral handouts. The findings contribute to the comparative literature on clientelism and highlight how the organizational structure of intermediaries can shape strategies of clientelism.
Why is vote buying effective even where ballot secrecy is protected? Most answers emerge from models of machine politics, in which a machine holds recipients of handouts accountable for their subsequent political behavior. Yet vote buying is common in many contexts where political party machines are not present, or where parties exert little effort in monitoring voters. This article addresses this puzzle. The author argues that politicians often distribute electoral handouts to convey information to voters. This vote buying conveys information with respect to the future provision of resources to the poor. The author tests the argument with original qualitative and experimental data collected in Kenya. A voter's information about a candidate's vote buying leads to substantial increases in electoral support, an effect driven by expectations about the provision of clientelist benefits beyond the electoral period. The results, showing that the distribution of material benefits can be electorally effective for persuasive reasons, thereby explain how vote buying can be effective in the absence of machine politics.
The distribution of cash to voters during elections, vote buying, is extremely widespread in many democracies. That vote buying is so widespread raises concerns about the quality of emerging democratic institutions and the potential for elections to deliver better and more accountable government. I develop a new theory to explain why politicians in new democracies distribute money to potential voters. I argue that cash handouts are effective because they convey information to voters about the extent to which a candidate will protect and serve their interests in the future, especially with respect to the provision of patronage resources. I test this informational theory with observational and experimental data collected in Kenya, as well with existing data from a larger set of African countries. As vote buying is secretive and sensitive, and so survey and interview responses are subject to response bias, I use several survey and experimental methods to improve descriptive and causal inferences about vote buying. In a variety of empirical tests, I provide evidence directly consistent with the informational theory; I show that patterns in the prevalence and geographic allocation of vote buying across and within African countries are best explained by the informational theory; and I provide evidence that helps to rule out existing explanations.Chapter 2 analyzes data from a nationally representative survey and survey list experiment, a method that reduces response bias in survey questions, to show that cash handouts influenced the vote choice of about 20 percent of Kenyans during the country's 2007 elections. Chapter 3 presents the informational theory and provides preliminary evidence from existing ethnographic studies and survey data from 18 African countries. Chapter 4 shows that existing explanations for vote buying, which focus on the role of political machines or on the mobilization of voter turnout, are insufficient to explain widespread cash handouts in Kenya and other African settings. Chapter 5 analyzes survey experimental data to show that, when Kenyan voters hear that a political candidate has distributed cash, they prefer that candidate to an otherwise identical candidate who has not done so. This effect is especially strong among poorer voters. Additionally, vote buying increases voters' expectations that a candidate will provide them with patronage and private benefits in the future, direct evidence consistent with the informational argument. Chapter 6 shows that, in conveying this information about patronage, vote buying reinforces and perpetuates patterns of ethnic voting---that is, the propensity of voters to support members of their own ethnic group at the polls. Experimental results show, in contrast to psychological or expressive theories of ethnic voting, that participants only prefer coethnic candidates and only expect to benefit from their patronage when they are engaged in vote buying. I demonstrate external validity by showing that vote buying has the most influence on vote choice when voters are targeted by members of their own ethnic group. Chapter 7 uses data about the geographic allocation of local public goods projects in Kenya to show that vote buying is associated with more patronage allocations after an election. This result is consistent with the idea that handouts can be an informative signal about future performance. Chapter 8 shows that cash handouts not only help to convince voters that they should support a particular candidate, they also mobilize them to turn out to vote in order to gain access to the patronage resources that the patron will allocate in the future. The last empirical chapter, Chapter 9, steps back from the question of why vote buying is effective to ask why vote-getting strategies takes the form of direct vote buying in some places but not others. With data from across Africa, I show that direct vote buying is most prevalent where local intermediaries, in this case traditional rulers, are not present or powerful enough to deliver large numbers of voters in a block. That is, politicians in Africa directly hand out cash in settings where they must win votes without the assistance of strong local brokers, a pattern that the informational theory is best suited to explain. I conclude the dissertation by discussing the implications of the results, which complicate normative interpretations of vote buying.
ABSTRACT Political parties use different methods—such as holding rallies, door-to-door canvassing, and distributing gifts—to mobilize voters during election campaigns across Africa. But how do parties choose which approach to use in each constituency? We propose that parties prefer to hold rallies in core constituencies, and to use targeted strategies—canvassing and handouts—in swing and opposition districts. However, opposition parties may not have sufficient resources to pursue such a strategy. Ruling parties have the dual advantage of being in a strong financial position, and having the ability to target core voters with state benefits between elections. Using post-election survey data from Ghana's 2012 election, we show that the ruling party canvassed the most in districts where they were electorally weak and concentrated rallies in their home constituencies. In contrast, the opposition party focused all of its efforts in its home districts. The results highlight how incumbency status shapes parties' campaign behaviour. They also suggest that ruling parties can combine core and swing voter targeting in different stages of the electoral cycle.
List experiments (LEs) are an increasingly popular survey research tool for measuring sensitive attitudes and behaviors. However, there is evidence that list experiments sometimes produce unreasonable estimates. Why do list experiments "fail," and how can the performance of the list experiment be improved? Using evidence from Kenya, we hypothesize that the length and complexity of the LE format make them costlier for respondents to complete and thus prone to comprehension and reporting errors. First, we show that list experiments encounter difficulties with simple, nonsensitive lists about food consumption and daily activities: over 40 percent of respondents provide inconsistent responses between list experiment and direct question formats. These errors are concentrated among less numerate and less educated respondents, offering evidence that the errors are driven by the complexity and difficulty of list experiments. Second, we examine list experiments measuring attitudes about political violence. The standard list experiment reveals lower rates of support for political violence compared to simply asking directly about this sensitive attitude, which we interpret as list experiment breakdown. We evaluate two modifications to the list experiment designed to reduce its complexity: private tabulation and cartoon visual aids. Both modifications greatly enhance list experiment performance, especially among respondent subgroups where the standard procedure is most problematic. The paper makes two key contributions: (1) showing that techniques such as the list experiment, which have promise for reducing response bias, can introduce different forms of error associated with question complexity and difficulty; and (2) demonstrating the effectiveness of easy-to-implement solutions to the problem.
AbstractSupreme Court job approval is sensibly connected to its decisions, particularly salient ones. We fill a gap in the literature by theorizing—via a presidential appointment mechanism—how partisan alignment with the incumbent president (presidential copartisanship) influences Supreme Court job approval. Analysis of data from 1986 to 2019 (supplemented by longer‐term confidence data) shows that a president's copartisans are significantly more approving of the Court than outpartisans. Analysis of the American Panel Survey surrounding high‐salience events during the transition from Obama to Trump shows that Republicans, who significantly increase in Court approval following Trump's election victory, are anticipatory of Trump's prospects of changing the Court. Democrats, whose approval significantly declines only after Justice Gorsuch's confirmation, are not anticipatory but reactive to the president's confirmed appointee. Our findings generate new evidence of how the president structures public opinion toward the Court, which has important implications for judicial independence and legitimacy.
Judicial power is central to democratic consolidation and the rule of law. Public support is critical for establishing and protecting it. Conventional wisdom holds that this support is rooted in apolitical factors and not dependent on who is in political power. By contrast, we argue that support may be driven by instrumental partisan motivations and therefore linked to partisan alignment with the executive. We test the argument with survey evidence from 34 African countries. To provide causal evidence, we conduct difference-in-differences analyses leveraging Ghana's three presidential transitions since 2000. Across Africa, support for judicial power is high, while trust in courts is lower. However, presidential co-partisans arelesssupportive of horizontal judicial power over the president andmoresupportive of vertical power over the people. The article demonstrates the importance of partisan alignment with the executive in shaping support for judicial power, with implications for judicial behavior and legitimacy.
