This article reviews Wiliam Bains book and places it in the wider discussion of seciularization vs. secularism taking place in the social science. in general.
AbstractIn putting Wendt's recent Quantum Mind in a larger context both of his own disciplinary engagement and some larger philosophical issues, I try to avoid a hasty dismissal, since the book seems at first blush to offer a 'theory of everything', or an uncritical acceptance, since the desire to know what makes the world hand together has always been part of the knowledge game. As to the first problem, I find it rather odd that Wendt spends little time in justifying his particular take on quantum theory, which is far from uncontroversial. Second, I attempt to understand why he has given up on the profession trying now to solve puzzles in the field by claiming that 'quantum consciousness theory' provides us with an 'ace up the sleeve'. But the fact that wave collapse plays havoc with our traditional notions of cause, location, and mass, does not without further ado entitle us to claim that all or most problems in social science dealing with issues of validity and meaning of our concepts (rather than 'truth/falsity', as decided by making existential assertions) have been solved by quantum mechanics.
AbstractThe comment expands the logic of the critique of the 'judicialisation' in the global era and suggests that arguments in support of this development often engage in confirmatory research which weighs the 'evidence' in light of our wishes and political projects. The talk about 'learning' and 'dialogue' cannot sustain this form of judicial paternalism (at best) as an instantiation of emancipation or celebrate it as a victory for law by dispensing with politics. It is just a politics by other means. But in this politics some traditional remedies for insuring the accountability of the 'rulers' (or rule-handlers) have been weakened. The comment adds several critical observations about the practices of discourse, law, politics and judging which cannot camouflage the problem of power and its legitimisation. Thus we had better consider also a political alternative which relies on a variety of different institutional solutions where courts have to compete with other institutions without fixed hierarchies and where different sources of legitimacy stand in tension with each other.
AbstractThe problem of 'distance and engagement' highlights the Weberian paradox that objectivity in the social sciences cannot be based on demonstrative proof; it has to take into account values as the constituents of our 'interests'. Values should be explicit even if this 'perspectivity' cannot satisfy the criteria of necessity and universality. Allegedly, my skeptical approach to 'social theory' leaves researchers with insufficient 'hope', but one also learns from understanding that something is impossible or conceptually flawed. Moreover, deeper issues of analyzing social action, with existential and moral dimensions, should be considered. These involve our cognitive capacities, experiences, and emotions.
In this response, I answer some of the critiques that were raised in the Forum. In particular, this response clarifies the role of practices and pragmatism, the limits of inter-disciplinarity, and the authority and assumed foundations of law in a post-foundational time. Even though this contribution does not attempt to solve these issues once and for all, it provides avenues for future engagement.
Discusses the personal, disciplinary, methodological, & professional difficulties in engaging in fruitful interdisciplinary scholarship for the fields of international law, international relations, & sociology. References. D. Edelman