Population Movements in Modern European History. Edited by H. Moller. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964. Pp. vi, 138. $1.50
In: The journal of economic history, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 166-167
ISSN: 1471-6372
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In: The journal of economic history, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 166-167
ISSN: 1471-6372
In: The journal of economic history, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 296-298
ISSN: 1471-6372
In: The journal of economic history, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 494-495
ISSN: 1471-6372
In: Comparative studies in society and history, Band 2, Heft 4, S. 485-487
ISSN: 1475-2999
In the last issue Richard A. Easterlin criticized some arguments which I have advanced. Because I think that his main point is at least partially irrelevant, I shall briefly summarize my argument. I suggested that demographic growth in the pre-industrial West was determined primarily by levels of fertility, levels which depended in large part on economic factors, and that mortality has been the major variable in the demographic growth of most less developed countries today mainly because they do not control fertility in the interest of the maintenance of a given standard of living. From this basic difference, I drew a number of consequences. Among them, but by no means the most important, was the one to which Easterlin devoted most attention. It was my statement: "Hence, there is the possibility that improved nutrition and health will increase birth rates fantastically."1 Easterlin omitted the first six words of the sentence from his quotation.
In: The journal of economic history, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 152-154
ISSN: 1471-6372
In: The journal of economic history, Band 19, Heft 4, S. 528-540
ISSN: 1471-6372
The economic differences between the Europeans on the eve of industrialization and the currently less developed peoples has assumed a certain degree of importance in the recent literature. It has been argued that West Europeans had significantly higher per capita incomes than do most of the peoples of the world today and that the levels of living of many people fell off during the process of early industrialization. Obviously, the argument is important in that the levels of living found in most of today's less developed peoples could not decline significantly widiout the risk of disaster.
In: The journal of economic history, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 471-472
ISSN: 1471-6372
In: Comparative studies in society and history, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 164-188
ISSN: 1475-2999
Current population theory depends heavily on the hypothesis that a demographic revolution occurred in West European countries roughly between 1750 and 1880. According to this hypothesis, European death rates averaged at least 35 per 1,000 prior to 1750; hence, even very high birth rates did not enable populations to recover rapidly from the effects of catastrophes, which are supposed to have been frequent and intense. Only after the advances, mainly hygienic, which began about 1750 did the death rate commence a long-term decline. Because fertility remained high, West European populations grew more rapidly than they had ever done. Eventually, urbanization and industrialization sapped the forces which maintainted high birth rates, and low fertility became the major cause of low Western rates of growth.Since currently under-developed populations have high vital rates, it has been suggested that demographic principles are transcultural and that Western demographic patterns will be repeated.
After decades in which ecology was exclusively about technicalinnovation, it was high time to be talking about society in generaland how we live our lives."The important thing now is not to make plans, but to changesociety and us who live in it. Our competence as architectsand planners is required—we have only to step into these newarenas. However, our constant focus on individual projects tendsto objectify urban development at a time when the perspectiveinstead requires interaction, dialogue and political decisiveness." ; Chapter in booklet QC 20191104
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Oomph' is a book about the women who brought on a revolution in Swedish kitchens, linen closets, living rooms, and in the country's textile and fashion industries. With their work in glass, textiles, and ceramics, and their radical ideas about the future of domestic life, they put Sweden on the industrial design map in the middle of the twentieth century. Many women designers were engaged in the increasingly acute housing crisis, and questioned the way homes were traditionally designed. After the Second World War, new manufacturing opportunities emerged: new customs demanded new designs and materials. But many doors still remained closed to women designers
In: Berliner Debatte Initial 20.2009,1