Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- ABBREVIATIONS -- I PRELIMINARIES -- II JUSTICE, AGREEMENT, AND DESTRUCTION -- III PERSUADE OR OBEY -- IV CITIZENS AND OFFSPRING -- V PRIVATE PERSONS AND GENERALIZATION -- VI DOKIMASIA, SATISFACTION, AND AGREEMENT -- VII SOCRATES AND DEMOCRACY -- VIII DEFINITION, KNOWLEDGE, AND TEACHING -- APPENDIX Perplexity in the Hippias Minor -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- GENERAL INDEX -- INDEX OF PASSAGES
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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- INTRODUCTION 3 1. Consistency, Hierarchy, Inclusivism, 3. 2. Egoism, 9. 3. An Overview, 11 -- CHAPTER ONE Two Lives -- CHAPTER TWO Self and Others -- CHAPTER THREE Philosophy and Other Goods -- CHAPTER FOUR The Hierarchy of Ends -- CHAPTER FIVE Inclusivism -- CHAPTER SIX Function, Virtue, and Mean -- Bibliography -- General Index -- Index of Passages
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Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply good? Richard Kraut argues that there are not. Goodness, he holds, is not a reason-giving property - in fact, there may be no such thing. It is an illusory and insidious category of practical thought
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The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics illuminates Aristotle's ethics for both academics and students new to the work, with sixteen newly commissioned essays by distinguished international scholars. The structure of the book mirrors the organization of the Nichomachean Ethics itself.Discusses the human good, the general nature of virtue, the distinctive characteristics of particular virtues, voluntariness, self-control, and pleasure
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Aristotle's doctrine that human beings are political animals is, in part, an empirical thesis, and posits an inclination to enter into cooperative relationships, even apart from the instrumental benefits of doing so. Aristotle's insight is that human cooperation rests on a non-rational propensity to trust even strangers, when conditions are favorable. Turning to broader questions about the role of nature in human development, I situate Aristotle's attitude towards our natural propensities between two extremes: he rejects both the view that we must bow to whatever nature dictates, and also the view that nature is generally or always to be suppressed or overcome. This middle position requires that Aristotle hold nature and goodness apart, so that the latter can serve as a standard for evaluating the former. He holds that nature does not treat all human beings alike: just as some are handicapped in their development by a deficiency in their natural abilities or propensities, others are extraordinarily fortunate and have so powerful a disposition to act well that they easily acquire good habits and skills of practical reasoning. Further, he recognizes that sociable inclinations and natural virtues have to compete in the human soul with other natural forces that make ethical life extraordinarily difficult. That is why things so often go so badly for us: we need not only to subdue the external environment, but to overcome certain inner natural obstacles as well. Even so, for Aristotle ethical life is not generally alienated from nature, as it is for other philosophers.