Suchergebnisse

AbstractA large fraction of affiliates owned by multinational manufacturing companies operate in the wholesale and retail sectors. This paper proposes a model of trade, horizontal FDI, and export‐supporting FDI (ESFDI). ESFDI reduces distribution costs abroad, while production remains at home. ESFDI introduces a complementarity between trade and FDI, while trade and production abroad remain substitutes. German firm‐level FDI data show that ESFDI is quantitatively relevant. In line with the model, most firms choose either ESFDI or horizontal FDI in a given market; ESFDI is chosen by smaller parents and is strongest when distance from Germany is low.

Rent-sharing between firm owners and workers is a robust empirical finding. If workers bargain with firms, information on the actual surplus is essential. When the firm can use profit shifting to create private information on the surplus, it can thereby reduce its wage bill. We study how rent sharing and this wage incentive for profit shifting affect the ability of governments to tax multinational companies in a standard model of international tax competition. We find that if firms only have a tax incentive for profit shifting, rent-sharing decreases the competitive pressure on the large country and leads to higher equilibrium tax rates. When we allow for the wage channel, this result can change. If the wage incentive is sufficiently strong, rent-sharing increases the competitive pressure on the large country, implying a lower equilibrium tax rate.

We are grateful to Giancarlo Corsetti, Omar Licandro and Morten Ravn for constant advice. We would also like to thank Jonathan Eaton, Vincent Rebeyrol, Karolina Ekholm, guest researchers at the Deutsche Bundesbank, participants at the EUI Macro Group and the PSE International Trade lunchtime seminar for fruitful discussions and comments. ; We develop a stylized model of international tax competition between a large country and a tax haven. In the large country, firms in a monopolistically competitive industry generate positive profits which can be taxed by the government. Firms have heterogeneous productivity levels and can choose to undertake 'profit shifting' FDI in order to benefit from lower tax rates abroad. We find that economies with a low degree of firm heterogeneity and a high degree of monopolistic market power are less affected by international tax competition. They face lower outflows of the tax base and can set higher tax rates. ; This work was supported by the Région Ile-de-France.