Suchergebnisse

For almost six years, American commercial policy has been dominated by the trade agreements program. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was a congressional grant to an administrative agency of authority to alter the American tariff structure. Congress had recognized the desirability of relinquishing direct control over the tariff, temporarily at least, because of the widespread feeling that subordination of group welfare to individual interests was inherent in the system of congressional tariff-making. This new departure was widely acclaimed at first, but opposition soon developed. It was charged that the trade agreement method violated democratic principles, that trade agreements were negotiated in secret starchamber proceedings. As negotiation of individual agreements was announced, producers who feared for their protected position in the home market, importers who desired to see domestic tariffs reduced, and exporters who wished to see the tariff barriers of other countries reduced, all sought to influence the course of the negotiations. This paper analyzes the methods used by the trade agreements organization to deal with these interested persons. Pressure groups have insisted that their interest in the course of trade agreement negotiations rests in the fact that they possess valuable information that the trade agreements organization must have to reach the best "bargain" with the other party to the trade agreements. Evidence to support this contention will be examined. Finally, for purposes of comparison, brief reference will be made to British experience.