Suchergebnisse

¿Qué componentes de los procesos de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración (DDR) son claves para asegurar la paz tras una guerra civil? Aunque prácticamente todos los procesos de paz en el mundo incluyen algún tipo de programa de DDR para ayudar a los excombatientes a convertirse en civiles después de una guerra civil, las razones por las cuales son exitosos en unos casos y no en otros son poco conocidas. Centrándose en tres factores abordados habitualmente por estos procesos ⸻oportunidades políticas, judiciales y económicas para los excombatientes más allá de las ofrecidas en la sociedad en general⸻, este estudio analiza cinco casos en los que la paz prevaleció durante más de una década, y cinco más donde no fue este el caso. El análisis revela la importancia de un equilibrio entre lo ofrecido a los excombatientes y el dividendo de paz para la sociedad en su conjunto, y señala que garantizar el acceso político de los antiguos grupos beligerantes es menos exitoso que permitirles competir en el proceso electoral.

Civil war is the predominant form of armed conflictin the world today, and the risk that a civil war will recur ismuch greater than of a new conflict beginning in a society thathas not experienced one. This paper explores the importanceof respect for human rights in post-conflict countries as a fac-tor that reduces this risk of recurrence. When governments donot respect the citizens' right to life, liberty, and security, asdeclared in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of HumanRights (UDHR), then a country will not be able to re-establishthe necessary trust in politics and between former enemiesto consolidate a stable peace. An analysis of all civil wars be-tween 1946 and 2013 shows that the risk that peace fails issubstantively greater when human rights are violated, and thisis consistent across a large range of post-conflict scenarios.The implication of these findings is that the protection of hu-man rights is not only a positive end in itself, but also a meansto prevent large-scale violence.

¿Qué componentes de los procesos de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración (DDR) son claves para asegurar la paz tras unaguerra civil? Aunque prácticamente todos los procesos de paz en el mundo incluyen algún tipo de programa de DDR para ayudara los excombatientes a convertirse en civiles después de una guerra civil, las razones por las cuales son exitosos en unos casos y noen otros son poco conocidas. Centrándose en tres factores abordados habitualmente por estos procesos #oportunidades políticas,judiciales y económicas para los excombatientes más allá de las ofrecidas en la sociedad en general#, este estudio analiza cinco casosen los que la paz prevaleció durante más de una década, y cinco más donde no fue este el caso. El análisis revela la importancia deun equilibrio entre lo ofrecido a los excombatientes y el dividendo de paz para la sociedad en su conjunto, y señala que garantizarel acceso político de los antiguos grupos beligerantes es menos exitoso que permitirles competir en el proceso electoral. ; Which components in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) are key to ensure the peace after a civil war?Although almost every peace process worldwide includes any sort of DDR programme to help ex fighters to become civilians after a civil war, the reasons why in some cases they succeed and in some other they do not, are quite unknown. Focusing on three factorsusually addressed throughout these processes #political, legal and economic opportunities for ex fighters beyond the ones offered by the general society, this work analyses five cases when the peace prevailed for more than one decade and five cases when it did not. The analysis shows how important is a balance between the offers for ex fighters and the peace gain for the society as a whole. It also indicates that ensuring the political access for those former warring groups is less successful than allow them to compete in the election processes.

Which components in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) are key to ensure the peace after a civil war? Although almost every peace process worldwide includes any sort of DDR programme to help ex fighters to become civilians after a civil war, the reasons why in some cases they succeed and in some other they do not, are quite unknown. Focusing on three factors usually addressed throughout these processes ⸻political, legal and economic opportunities for ex fighters beyond the ones offered by the general society⸻, this work analyses five cases when the peace prevailed for more than one decade and five cases when it did not. The analysis shows how important is a balance between the offers for ex fighters and the peace gain for the society as a whole. It also indicates that ensuring the political access for those former warring groups is less successful than allow them to compete in the election processes. ; ¿Qué componentes de los procesos de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración (DDR) son claves para asegurar la paz tras una guerra civil? Aunque prácticamente todos los procesos de paz en el mundo incluyen algún tipo de programa de DDR para ayudar a los excombatientes a convertirse en civiles después de una guerra civil, las razones por las cuales son exitosos en unos casos y no en otros son poco conocidas. Centrándose en tres factores abordados habitualmente por estos procesos ⸻oportunidades políticas, judiciales y económicas para los excombatientes más allá de las ofrecidas en la sociedad en general⸻, este estudio analiza cinco casos en los que la paz prevaleció durante más de una década, y cinco más donde no fue este el caso. El análisis revela la importancia de un equilibrio entre lo ofrecido a los excombatientes y el dividendo de paz para la sociedad en su conjunto, y señala que garantizar el acceso político de los antiguos grupos beligerantes es menos exitoso que permitirles competir en el proceso electoral.

This article explores the processes that lead to different types of civil war outbreak in postconflict societies, combining quantitative analysis with case studies of Myanmar and Sierra Leone to disaggregate situations in which former rebels resume fighting from those when new rebels emerge in the postconflict environment. The analysis, based in principal–agent theory, illuminates how relations between the government and ex‐rebel elites, group cohesion among rebels, and the relationship between the government and the ex‐combatants all can lead to resumed civil war. Its findings suggest that victories and settled conflicts are the most important outcome for preventing conflict recurrence by former rebels, but do not prevent the rise of new insurgencies. Moreover, the absence of government repression emerges as the factor most likely to reduce the risk of new rebellion.

This article explores the processes that lead to different types of civil war outbreak in postconflict societies, combining quantitative analysis with case studies of Myanmar and Sierra Leone to disaggregate situations in which former rebels resume fighting from those when new rebels emerge in the postconflict environment. The analysis, based in principal–agent theory, illuminates how relations between the government and ex‐rebel elites, group cohesion among rebels, and the relationship between the government and the ex‐combatants all can lead to resumed civil war. Its findings suggest that victories and settled conflicts are the most important outcome for preventing conflict recurrence by former rebels, but do not prevent the rise of new insurgencies. Moreover, the absence of government repression emerges as the factor most likely to reduce the risk of new rebellion.

Ein Strang der aktuellen Konfliktforschung behauptet, Frieden würde durch militärische Siege befördert. Sie brächten, so die These, weniger stark gespaltene Post-Konflikt-Gesellschaften hervor, was Wiederaufbau und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung erleichtere. Diese Sichtweise impliziert, dass internationale Akteure entweder einer Seite zum Sieg verhelfen oder Konflikte sich selbst überlassen sollten, statt sich für Verhandlungslösungen einzusetzen. Das vorliegende Papier argumentiert, dass weniger für einen "Siegfrieden" spricht als dessen Befürworter behaupten. Die erfolgreichsten Konfliktlösungen sind jene, die die Konfliktursachen angehen und viele verschiedene Akteure einbeziehen. Ein Blick auf den Ausgang von Bürgerkriegen seit 1946 legt die Vermutung nahe, dass militärische Siege etwas besser stabilisierend wirken als andere Kriegsausgänge. Eine genaue Analyse von Kontext und Inhalt von Friedenskonsolidierung zeichnet ein ganz anderes Bild. Die häufigste Form der Beendigung von Bürgerkriegen ist weder ein militärischer Sieg noch ein Friedensabkommen, sondern eine Fortdauer der Auseinandersetzung mit begrenzterer Gewaltanwendung. Die Bürgerkriege, die mit einem Friedensabkommen schlossen, dauerten durchschnittlich achtmal länger als jene, die ein militärischer Sieg beendete. De facto gibt es einseitige Siege fast nur, wenn Kämpfe Tage oder Monate, nicht Jahre dauern. Das weist darauf hin, dass Langzeitkonflikte kaum enden, wenn ihnen freier Lauf gelassen wird, und dass Verhandlungen der einzige Weg sind, lang andauernde Kriege zu beenden. Die unterschiedliche Konfliktdauer bedeutet auch, dass die Hindernisse für einen Wiederaufbau nach einer Verhandlungslösung deutlich höher sind als nach einem militärischen Sieg. Internationale Akteure, die nach einem Friedensschluss am Wiederaufbau mitwirken wollen, stehen Gesellschaften mit mehr Opfern, tieferer Spaltung und größeren materiellen Schäden gegenüber. Gleich, wie ein Konflikt ausgeht – der wichtigste Faktor für anschließende Stabilität ist eine geordnete Demobilisierung ehemaliger Kämpfer. Zudem kommt es darauf an, zugrunde liegende Missstände durch gewaltfreie Politik zu beseitigen, etwa indem die Besiegten Gelegenheit erhalten, eine politische Partei zu gründen und/oder sich an der Regierungsarbeit zu beteiligen. Langfristig erfolgreiche Konfliktbearbeitung verlangt die Demontage der Strukturen zur Truppenmobilisierung wie auch jener zur Repression. Armee und Milizen müssen in Kasernen zurückkehren und unter zivile Kontrolle gestellt werden. Externe Akteure können am besten helfen, indem sie Anlaufstellen einrichten, wo Missstände vorgebracht und friedlich beseitigt werden können. Folgende Empfehlungen leiten sich aus diesem Papier ab: Lang anhaltende Konflikte lassen sich nur mit Gesprächen über die Konfliktursachen beenden.

One strand of current conflict research claims that military victories are beneficial for peace. It is argued that these outcomes produce more unified post-conflict societies, thereby facilitating reconstruction and economic development. The implication of this view is that, instead of encouraging negotiated settlements, international actors should either support one side to victory or allow a conflict to run its course. This briefing paper argues that the case for "peace by victory" is weaker than supporters claim. The most successful conflict resolutions address their root causes and involve a broad range of stakeholders. A quick glance at all civil war terminations since 1946 seems to suggest that military victories are slightly more stabilizing than other outcomes. Rough comparisons, however, are insufficient for drawing conclusions or offering policy advice. A full review of the context and content of peacebuilding reveals a very different picture. Focusing only on military victories and peace agreements ignores the most common outcome of civil strife: an ongoing contest between belligerents, albeit with a limited use of force. On average, the civil wars that ended with peace agreements lasted eight times longer than those that were terminated through a military victory. Indeed, a one-sided victory almost only occurs when fighting is counted in days or months rather than years. This indicates that protracted conflicts are unlikely to end if allowed to run their course and that negotiations are the only way to end a long-running war. Differences in conflict duration mean that the challenges for reconstruction are substantially greater after negotiated settlements than after military victories. International actors seeking to contribute to the rebuilding that follows peace agreements are faced with societies with more victims and divisions, and greater physical destruction. Regardless of how a conflict ended, the most important factor for post-conflict stability is the orderly demobilization of former fighters. After a war, it is also imperative for the underlying grievances to be addressed through non-violent policies such as offering the vanquished side the opportunity to form a political party and/or share power in the government. Long-term success in conflict management calls for dismantling troop mobilization structures as well as those used for repression. This includes ensuring that both the army and militias return to the barracks and come under official civilian control. External actors can best contribute by helping to create outlets where grievances can be aired and addressed peaceably. Although it is very important to reduce violence quickly, armed belligerents must not be seen as the sole representatives of conflicting views. The following recommendations can be drawn from this paper: – Talks about the issues are the only realistic outcome of a protracted conflict. – Conflict negotiations should not only involve the violent parties but also other non-violent, legitimate stakeholders. – While peace negotiations must be held in a central location, local efforts to promote intra-societal trust also need to be initiated and supported. Many potential peace-process spoilers are less concerned with the terms of a national agreement than with their immediate local security.

When collecting data, some observations will always be hard to confidently classify in accordance with stated definitions of war, civil conflict, or political violence. This research note draws on the experiences of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in the last decade in managing such unclear cases. After explaining the difference between unclear and non-cases, I describe the data generating process and how this uncertainty is distributed over time in the data. This exercise reveals that the 1980s may have been more conflict-filled than the 1990s, challenging arguments about the stability of the bipolar global order as well as the sudden 'rise' of warfare in the immediate post-Cold War era. The final section suggests different ways that researchers may use existing information regarding unclear cases as a way to conceptualize the nature of civil strife without having to engage in additional data collection. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

When collecting data, some observations will always be hard to confidently classify in accordance with stated definitions of war, civil conflict, or political violence. This research note draws on the experiences of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in the last decade in managing such unclear cases. After explaining the difference between unclear and non-cases, I describe the data generating process and how this uncertainty is distributed over time in the data. This exercise reveals that the 1980s may have been more conflict-filled than the 1990s, challenging arguments about the stability of the bipolar global order as well as the sudden 'rise' of warfare in the immediate post-Cold War era. The final section suggests different ways that researchers may use existing information regarding unclear cases as a way to conceptualize the nature of civil strife without having to engage in additional data collection.

AbstractIs foreign policy influenced by humanitarian concerns, or are concepts such as human security merely rhetoric for traditional power politics? Using a multilevel modeling technique and a unique data set of military and economic European Union (EU) intervention 1989–2008, I find that military and economic interventions by the EU are conducted in response to humanitarian atrocities but that geostrategic concerns also influence EU action. While the EU consistently is more likely to act against countries with greater civilian victimization, the size of the effect is influenced by spatial considerations. The EU is most attentive to human rights violations in non-EU European states, followed by countries in sub-Saharan Africa, while it has been least active in Asia and the Americas.