Suchergebnisse

"As the holders of the only office elected by the entire nation, presidents have long claimed to be sole stewards of the interests of all Americans. Scholars have largely agreed, positing the president as an important counterbalance to the parochial impulses of members of Congress. This supposed fact is often invoked in arguments for concentrating greater power in the executive branch. Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves challenge this notion and, through an examination of a diverse range of policies from disaster declarations, to base closings, to the allocation of federal spending, show that presidents, like members of Congress, are particularistic. Presidents routinely pursue policies that allocate federal resources in a way that disproportionately benefits their more narrow partisan and electoral constituencies. Though presidents publicly don the mantle of a national representative, in reality they are particularistic politicians who prioritize the needs of certain constituents over others"..

When the United States goes to war, the nation's attention focuses on the president. As commander in chief, a president reaches the zenith of power, while Congress is supposedly shunted to the sidelines once troops have been deployed abroad. Because of Congress's repeated failure to exercise its legislative powers to rein in presidents, many have proclaimed its irrelevance in military matters.After the Rubicon challenges this conventional wisdom by illuminating the diverse ways in which legislators influence the conduct of military affairs. Douglas L. Kriner reveals that even in politically se

US presidents have routinely ordered the use of force without seeking prior authorisation from Congress. However, this practice does not mean that the legislature is irrelevant, as Congress often influences decisions by exercising informal political levers. One of the most important is through Congress' ability to affect popular support for the commander-in-chief. Through a pair of experiments embedded on nationally representative opinion surveys, this article evaluates whether Congress' constitutional prerogatives in war powers remain relevant when battling the president in the public sphere. Policy criticism significantly decreased support for the use of force, as did challenges to administration actions on constitutional grounds. Although Congress routinely fails to use the constitutional tools at its disposal to check the commander-in-chief, these powers bolster Congress' capacity to influence public opinion. Hence, while presidents enjoy considerable leeway in the military arena, Congress' capacity to erode public support can serve as a check on presidential power.

President Obama's decision to seek congressional authorization for a military strike against Syria caught many political observers by surprise. However, I argue that the decision was more a gambit for political gain than a sincere reevaluation of the scope of presidential war powers. Moreover, Obama's ploy reveals a larger truth about American politics: that Congress often retains considerable influence over military affairs through informal means. An original survey experiment shows that seeking authorization can bolster support for the president and his foreign policies, particularly if the decision is backed by congressional leaders. More importantly, authorization votes may pay political dividends years later by muting congressional criticism of presidential policies. A wealth of data from previous interventions in Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Lebanon suggests that members of both parties who voted to authorize the use of force are much less willing in the future to vote to curtail it or criticize it publicly than are their co‐partisan peers who did not vote for an authorization.