Suchergebnisse

In the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, East Asia's efforts to enhance regional financial cooperation raised the possibility of East Asia playing a more assertive role in global financial governance. However, despite the region's increased voice in governance and economic weight, East Asian financial systems and markets have mostly adapted to global norms developed in New York, London, and Washington, DC. We argue that the failure of East Asia to push an alternative vision of financial governance reflects both the lack of regional political unity and, more crucially, the divisions of interests both between and within key East Asian economies. Despite nearly universal regional dissatisfaction with global standards and institutions in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, these two factors have combined to prevent the development of a distinctive regional model that could be promoted at the global level.

ABSTRACTThis article examines the impact of regional financial arrangements (RFAs) on the global liquidity regime. It argues that the design of RFAs could potentially alter the global regime, whether by strengthening it and making it more coherent or by decentring the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and destabilizing it. To determine possible outcomes, this analysis deploys a 'middle‐up' approach that focuses on the institutional design of these RFAs. It first draws on the rational design of institutions framework to identify the internal characteristics of RFAs that are most relevant to their capabilities and capacities. It then applies these insights to the interactions of RFAs with the IMF, building on Aggarwal's (1998) concept of 'nested' versus 'parallel' institutions, to create an analytical lens through which to assess the nature and sustainability of nested linkages. Through an analysis of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) and the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), the article demonstrates the usefulness of this lens. It concludes by considering three circumstances in which fault lines created by these RFAs' institutional design could be activated, permitting an institution to 'leave the nest', including changing intentions of principals, creation of parallel capabilities and facilities, and failure of the global regime to address regional needs in a crisis.

ABSTRACTThe 21st century has ushered in the emergence of alternative institutions for liquidity provision and development finance, many of which are Southern‐led. The special issue that follows this Introduction assesses the extent to which existing theoretical perspectives and tools are sufficient for evaluating the implications of these alternatives for the global financial architecture. Our analysis finds that while an increasingly varied landscape of diverse institutions designed to foster financial stability and development comes with inherent risks, these new forms of finance bring real benefits to an architecture that has long been deemed insufficient. Larger and more capable Southern‐led institutions not only mean additional sources of financing for emerging market and developing countries, but also could increase their voice in an international financial architecture long dominated by the most advanced economies. That said, the variation in the landscape could create inequities and fault lines between new and existing institutions, which will be difficult to overcome through the coordination of a fragmented and diverse system. Finally, despite the increases in capital for liquidity provision and development made available by these new institutions, significantly more financing and coordination will be needed to achieve financial stability and economic development on a global scale.

Abstract
The global financial safety net (GFSN) has become increasingly voluminous and complex. The ever-increasing capacity for crisis prevention and liquidity support of emergency financing institutions and arrangements at the bilateral, regional, and global level sums up to a total lending capacity of at least US$ 3.5 trillion (Mühlich, L., B. Fritz, W. N. Kring, and K. P. Gallagher. 2020. The Global Financial Safety Net Tracker: Lessons for the COVID-19 Crisis from a New Interactive Dataset. GEGI Policy Brief 10. Boston: Global Development Policy Center. Also available at:www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2020/04/GEGI-GDP_PolicyBrief_FInal.pdf). This represents a more than tenfold increase to available short-term liquidity compared to before the global financial crisis of 2008/09. Yet despite this tremendous increase in resources, the GFSN remains scarcely utilized throughout the COVID-19 crisis. This article develops a framework, that builds upon concepts in economics and international political economy, to analyze GFSN inefficiencies and to evaluate the utilization of the GFSN. Combining balance of payments models with the concept of regime complexity, we analyze and compare patterns of GFSN utilization in response to COVID-19 with past usage. We ask if the current GFSN is adequately built to efficiently respond to such a crisis. We are especially interested in examining the role that the six existing RFAs between EMDEs play in the GFSN.

Abstract
Since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, East Asia has gone from having virtually no regional financial cooperation to having multiple cooperative arrangements. This article focuses on the issue area of emergency liquidity provision, where global (International Monetary Fund), regional (Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization), and bilateral arrangements co-exist and overlap in complicated ways, forming a regime complex. While the overall system offers more options and greater funding than were available in 1997, it also raises questions about how those levels will operate in a crisis. This article shows how national preferences of likely creditor and likely borrower countries have interacted to create the current regime complex, as well as the political compromises and remaining uncertainties about how they will work together. It argues that the evolution and current shape of the regime complex have been driven by the efforts of key states to take advantage of or thwart power asymmetries.

This book shows how regional cooperation and integration have increased massively in scale and scope in recent years, as developing countries seek new ways to shield themselves from economic turbulence and to kick-start their economies in the face of stagnant global demand. The trend is partly a defense mechanism against the limitations of the international financial system, but also reflects a wider search for new and different growth paths more appropriate with developing countries' increasing economic and political voice. As a consequence, the landscape of financial and monetary mechanisms has changed dramatically, especially in the ten years since the economic crisis of 2007-2008. Diana Barrowclough is a Senior Economist in the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development, Division on Globalization and Development Strategies. Richard Kozul-Wright is Director of the Globalisation and Development Strategies Division in UNCTAD. William N. Kring is the Assistant Director of the Global Development Policy Center, a university-wide center housed at the Frederick S. Pardee School for Global Studies. Kevin P. Gallagher is a Professor of global development policy at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies and the Director of the Global Development Policy Center (GDPC).

AbstractWe call for strengthening the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) to manage the economic effects of COVID‐19, in particular the massive capital outflows from emerging market and developing economies EMDEs and the global shortage of dollar liquidity. Both the United Nations (UN) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimate that EMDEs need an immediate $2.5 trillion, yet the financing available to them is just $700 to $971 billion. To meet these immediate needs we propose to: (1) broaden the coverage of the Federal Reserve currency swaps; (2) issue at least $500 billion of special drawing rights through the IMF; (3) improve the IMF's precautionary and emergency facilities; (4) establish a multilateral swap facility at the IMF; (5) increase the resources and geographic coverage of regional financial arrangements; (6) coordinate capital flow management measures; (7) initiate debt restructuring and relief initiatives; and (8) request that credit‐rating agencies stop making downgrades during the emergency. It argues that leaders should swiftly move to address these structural gaps in the GFSN: (1) agree on a quota reform at the IMF; (2) create an appropriate sovereign debt restructuring regime; (3) expand surveillance activity; and (4) adopt IMF governance reform and strengthen its relations with all agents of the GFSN. All of these reforms must be calibrated toward a just transition to a more stable, inclusive, and sustainable global economy.