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This paper discusses foreign direct investment from Southeast Asia to China. With the exception of some government-linked companies, most investments from Southeast Asia have been dominated by the region's overseas Chinese businesses. In addition to cheap labour costs, large domestic market and growing economy, China has provided business opportunities to investors from Southeast Asia thanks to their geographic proximity and ethnic connections, at least during the initial investment period. However, the network effects seem to decline soon after. As the Chinese economy becomes more globalised and more competitive, the success of foreign investment in China will increasingly depend on business competency rather than ethnic relations. (JCSA/GIGA)

This paper discusses foreign direct investment from Southeast Asia to China. With the exception of some government-linked companies, most investments from Southeast Asia have been dominated by the region's overseas Chinese businesses. In addition to cheap labour costs, large domestic market and growing economy, China has provided business opportunities to investors from Southeast Asia thanks to their geographic proximity and ethnic connections, at least during the initial investment period. However, the network effects seem to decline soon after. As the Chinese economy becomes more globalised and more competitive, the success of foreign investment in China will increasingly depend on business competency rather than ethnic relations.

Machine generated contents note: Part I. Households as Corporate Firms: 1. Introduction; 2. Conceptual framework; Part II. Household Financial Accounting: 3. Household surveys; 4. Constructing household financial statements from a household survey; Part III. Household Finance: 5. Financial analysis; 6. An application: liquidity constraints, kinship networks, and the financing of household investment; 7. Discussion: measurement and modeling

This paper utilizes a unique dataset of 500 firms in ten Cambodian provinces and a natural experiment to test a long-held convention in political economy that the predictability of a corruption is at least as important for firm investment decisions as the amount of bribes a firm must pay, provided the bribes are not prohibitively expensive. Our results suggest that this hypothesis is correct. Firms exposed to a shock to their bribe schedules by a change in governor invest significantly less in subsequent periods, as they wait for new information about their new chief executive. Furthermore, the amount of corruption (both measured by survey data and proxied by the number of commercial sex workers) is significantly lower in provinces with new governors. Our findings are robust to a battery of firm-level controls and province-level investment climate measures. Adapted from the source document.