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"Many people are drawn towards virtue ethics because of the central place it gives to emotions in the good life. Yet it may seem odd to evaluate emotions as virtuous or non-virtuous, for how can we be held responsible for those powerful feelings that simply engulf us? And how can education help us to manage our emotional lives? The aim of this book is to offer readers a new Aristotelian analysis and moral justification of a number of emotions that Aristotle did not mention (awe, grief, and jealousy), or relegated, at best, to the level of the semi-virtuous (shame), or made disparaging remarks about (gratitude), or rejected explicitly (pity, understood as pain at another person's deserved bad fortune). Kristján Kristjánsson argues that there are good Aristotelian reasons for understanding those emotions either as virtuous or as indirectly conducive to virtue. 'Virtuous Emotions' begins with an overview of Aristotle's ideas on the nature of emotions and of emotional value, and concludes with an account of Aristotelian emotion education."

Virtue ethics sees emotions as central to the good life. But how can emotions over which we have no control be virtuous or non-virtuous? And how can education develop those emotions? Kristján Kristjánsson explores the ways in which six emotions (awe, grief, jealousy, shame, gratitude, and pity) can be understood as virtuous and educable

Mapping out the field -- Crossing the barbed wire -- Emotional virtues -- The nature of desert -- Justice and desert -- For a single-basis view of desert : the intuitive appeal and the question of needs -- Desert, responsibility and the empirical evidence -- Desert-based emotions -- Our reactive attitudes : emotionalising justice -- Other-reactive desert-based emotions -- Self-reactive desert-based emotions -- From development to justification -- Developmental accounts -- The input from social psychology : the belief in a just world -- A utilitarian justification of desert and desert-based emotions -- From theory to practice : the schooling of justice -- Values education and justice

A diverse bandwagon of academics is working with and celebrating the notion of phronesis as a metacognitive capacity, guiding morally aspirational cognition and action. However, this new phronesis discourse is characterised by frequently unrecognised tensions, lacunae, and ambivalences. This text aims to set the recently surging interest in phronesis in context, elaborate on the standard model of phronesis, and to juxtapose that with a recent consensual model of wisdom.

This book gives the virtue of friendship the prominence it deserves in contemporary virtue ethics. It offers a more realistic version of Aristotelian theory and integrates it with social scientific research on friendship. And it argues for the importance of friendship in moral education, as a path to to the development of virtue.

Virtue ethics sees emotions as central to the good life. But how can emotions over which we have no control be virtuous or non-virtuous? And how can education develop those emotions? Kristján Kristjánsson explores the ways in which six emotions (awe, grief, jealousy, shame, gratitude, and pity) can be understood as virtuous and educable.

When is it correct to say that a person's freedom is restricted? Can poverty constrain freedom? Can you constrain your own freedom, for instance through weakness of the will or self-deception, and are you not truly free unless you act on a rational choice? Kristján Kristjánsson offers a critical analysis of the main components of a theory of negative liberty: the nature of obstacles and constraints, the weight of obstacles and the relation of freedom to power and autonomy. Through this discussion, which examines much of the contemporary work on political freedom, he develops his own theory of negative liberty, the so-called 'responsibility view', which meets many of the goals of advocates of positive liberty while retaining its distinctive 'negative' nature. He also argues for, and implements, a method of naturalistic revision as a way of solving conceptual disputes in social philosophy

AbstractThis paper adds ammunition to recent arguments for the possibility of online character friendships in the Aristotelian sense. It does so by exploring sustained and deep email correspondence orepalshipas a potential venue for the creation, development and maintenance of character friendships, and by drawing an analogy with a historically famous example ofpenpalship: that forged between Voltaire and Catherine the Great. It is argued that epalships allow for various technological extensions in the cyberworld of today that were not available to Voltaire and Catherine; and that augmented with those extensions, there is even more reason for seeing epalships as potentially making the grade as true character friendships than traditional penpalships. However, despite being potentially categorisable as character friendships, mature epalships are vulnerable to the same problems and pitfalls as other examples of character friendships, and perhaps even more so: pitfalls that were mostly overlooked by Aristotle himself.