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This book gives the virtue of friendship the prominence it deserves in contemporary virtue ethics. It offers a more realistic version of Aristotelian theory and integrates it with social scientific research on friendship. And it argues for the importance of friendship in moral education, as a path to to the development of virtue.

Virtue ethics sees emotions as central to the good life. But how can emotions over which we have no control be virtuous or non-virtuous? And how can education develop those emotions? Kristján Kristjánsson explores the ways in which six emotions (awe, grief, jealousy, shame, gratitude, and pity) can be understood as virtuous and educable.

Cover -- Dedication -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Mapping the Field -- 1.2 Crossing the Barbed Wire -- 1.3 Emotional Virtues -- 2 The Nature of Desert -- 2.1 Justice and Desert -- 2.2 For a Single-basis View of Desert: the Intuitive Appeal and the Question of Needs -- 2.3 Desert, Responsibility and the Empirical Evidence -- 3 Desert-Based Emotions -- 3.1 Our Reactive Attitudes: Emotionalizing Justice -- 3.2 Other-reactive Desert-Based Emotions -- 3.3 Self-reactive Desert-Based Emotions -- 4 From Development to Justification -- 4.1 Developmental Accounts -- 4.2 The Input from Social Psychology: the Belief in a Just World -- 4.3 A Utilitarian Justification of Desert and Desert-Based Emotions -- 5 From Theory to Practice: The Schooling of Justice -- 5.1 Values Education and Justice -- 5.2 Some Further Educational Concerns -- 5.3 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Index.

When is it correct to say that a person's freedom is restricted? Can poverty constrain freedom? Can you constrain your own freedom, for instance through weakness of the will or self-deception, and are you not truly free unless you act on a rational choice? Kristján Kristjánsson offers a critical analysis of the main components of a theory of negative liberty: the nature of obstacles and constraints, the weight of obstacles and the relation of freedom to power and autonomy. Through this discussion, which examines much of the contemporary work on political freedom, he develops his own theory of negative liberty, the so-called 'responsibility view', which meets many of the goals of advocates of positive liberty while retaining its distinctive 'negative' nature. He also argues for, and implements, a method of naturalistic revision as a way of solving conceptual disputes in social philosophy

AbstractThis paper adds ammunition to recent arguments for the possibility of online character friendships in the Aristotelian sense. It does so by exploring sustained and deep email correspondence orepalshipas a potential venue for the creation, development and maintenance of character friendships, and by drawing an analogy with a historically famous example ofpenpalship: that forged between Voltaire and Catherine the Great. It is argued that epalships allow for various technological extensions in the cyberworld of today that were not available to Voltaire and Catherine; and that augmented with those extensions, there is even more reason for seeing epalships as potentially making the grade as true character friendships than traditional penpalships. However, despite being potentially categorisable as character friendships, mature epalships are vulnerable to the same problems and pitfalls as other examples of character friendships, and perhaps even more so: pitfalls that were mostly overlooked by Aristotle himself.

This article gives an overview of traditional accounts of social freedom (`negative' and `positive') as noninterference with action, and defends their conceptual common ground against recent attacks. Philip Pettit claims that freedom would be better understood as antipower than noninterference. However, it is so far from being the case that accounts of freedom as noninterference and as antipower are necessarily antithetical, that they can in fact be complementary. More specifically, they are not about the same kind of freedom, the first being concerned with free action, but the second with the notion of a free person or a free society. Wayne Norman's arguments against the importance of the notion of free action are subsequently examined and found wanting. In general, we have no good reason for abandoning the post-Isaiah-Berlin conceptual orthodoxy about an analysis of free action being the cornerstone of any viable general theory of freedom.

Phronesis, or practical wisdom, has interested philosophers and psychologists for millennia. In this book Kristján Kristjánsson and Blaine J. Fowers work through some of the relevant puzzles created by the recent phronesis discourse, filling gaps in the current literatures, and pushing the research agenda in new directions.

"Virtues and Virtue Education in Theory and Practice explores questions about the locality versus the universality of virtues from a number of theoretical and practical perspectives. Written by leading international scholars in the field, it considers the relevance of these debates for the practice of virtue and character education. This volume brings together experts from education, philosophy and psychology to consider how different disciplines might learn from each other and how insights from theory and practice can be integrated. It shows that questions about virtue relativity or universality do not only have theoretical significance but also important practical ramifications. The chapters explore different complexities of virtue ethics and different approaches to nurturing virtue and beyond, questioning how well virtues travel across geographical and cultural borders. By examining the philosophical literature and making links between theory and practice in an original way, the book offers scholarly research-informed suggestions for practice. It will be of great interest to researchers and academics and students in educational philosophy, character education, ethics and psychology"--

This book explores recent developments in ethics of virtue. While acknowledging the Aristotelian roots of modern virtue ethics - with its emphasis on the moral importance of character - this collection recognizes that more recent accounts of virtue have been shaped by many other influences, such as Aquinas, Hume, Nietzsche, Hegel and Marx, Confucius and Lao-tzu. The authors also examine the bearing of virtue ethics on other disciplines such as psychology, sociology and theology, as well as attending to some wider public, professional and educational implications of the ethics of virtue. This pioneering book will be invaluable to researchers and students concerned with the many contemporary varieties and applications of virtue ethics

ZusammenfassungDer Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die philosophische und psychologische Literatur zum Begriff der Dankbarkeit bis ins Jahr 2013. Geprüft werden die in beiden Wissenschaften veröffentlichten Arbeiten vor allem hinsichtlich ihrer begrifflichen Grundlagen und der ethischen Bewertung von Dankbarkeit, etwa als Pflicht, Tugend oder Supererogation. Die Analyse zeigt, dass jeweils mit einer Reihe untereinander unvereinbarer Begriffsverständnisse gearbeitet wird, sodass die Debatte von einem komplexen Netzwerk sich überschneidender und überkreuzender Begriffe geprägt ist. Der Beitrag endet mit Vorschlägen für die weitere Forschung. Psychologen wird empfohlen, ihre Konzeptionen von Dankbarkeit präziser zu fassen und zu begründen sowie Bottom-up-Studien zum alltagspraktischen Begriff der Dankbarkeit durchzuführen. Philosophen sollten dagegen der in den Sozialwissenschaften durchgeführten Bottom-up-Arbeit mehr Beachtung schenken.