Suchergebnisse

On December 5, 1981, the Central Committee of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), the organizational matrix of the Hanoi-imposed and -supported People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) headed by President Heng Samrin, announced at the close of its "second ordinary meeting" held in Phnom Penh, that Pen Sovan, the KPRP's secretary general and chairman (i.e. premier) of the Republic's Council of Ministers, had "been permitted to take a long rest in order to cure himself from illness." Though subsequently PRK diplomats affirmed that Sovan really was "seriously ill," allegedly suffering from heart and nervous system ailments, informed sources agreed that Sovan's resignation had been forced and reflected a power struggle within the KPRP and PRK leadership. Indeed, by March, 1982, diplomatic observers in Bangkok believed Sovan to be in Hanoi, being held under house arrest. Sovan was said to have run afoul of his avowedly pro-Moscow political orientation which increasingly had begun to irk the Vietnamese. The latter maintain a 200,000-man military force in that part of Kampuchean territory that is under the PRK's control, and an estimated 5,000 civilian Vietnamese officials and party cadres "assist" and "advise" in the day-to-day operations of the PRK government.

On 20 September 1991, at the General Assembly meeting in New York, Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk announced that the four contending Cambodian factions had reached agreement on all remaining outstanding issues standing in the way of a peace settlement in their war-torn country. A formal peace accord, Sihanouk said, would be signed in Paris by all 19 members of the so-called Peace Conference of Cambodia. However, Sihanouk's confidence contrasted sharply with the reality of the frequent flare-ups of sharp disagreement among the Cambodian factions during the peace discussions. The author explores the problems and prospects of peace in Cambodia. (DÜI-Sen)

The author examines various proposals made by the President of the PRK (People's Republic of Kampuchea), Hun Sen, the Foreign Minister of Singapore, D. Dhanabalan, Prince Norodom Sihanouk among others at the "JIM I" (First "Jakarta Informal Meeting") in July 1988 to resolve the Cambodia conflict, the Sino-Soviet initiative and attempts of the ASEAN to find a solution of the conflict, results of the "JIM II" in February 1989 on the Cambodia issue etc. (DÜI-Sen)

In the night of 30 November, 1989 and into the small hours of the following day, a force of about 3000 rebel troups of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) seized the Villamore airbase and the army's Fort Bonifacio, both on the outskirts of Manila. In subsequent days there were sharp clashes between rebel and loyal AFP supporters. By 9 Dezember several hundred rebel troops had surrendered, however, many insurgents were still at large. The article focuses on the motivations and organizational strength of those involved in the 30 November coup attempt. (DÜI-Sen)

Confronted by a persistent communist guerilla movement, the Philippine government of President Corazon Aquino has attempted to channel existing civilian and paramilitary organizations into a controlled counter-insurgency structure. It has three levels. At the top are the Civilian Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU). Below CAFGU is the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO). Budget allocations are such that the organizational structure and degree of formal government control over CAFGU and CVO remain haphazard. This means that, as in the past, free wheeling vigilante organizations continue to be an important (and third level) element in the government's counter-insurgency programme. Typology of vigilante groups and their internal relationships are discussed. (DÜI-Sen)

Includes discussion of the attitudes of Thailand, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the US towards the Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict.

Der weitere Verlauf des Bürgerkriegs in Kambodscha hängt stark von der Politik der involvierten auswärtigen Mächte ab. Einerseits treten in der einst geschlossenen Front derer, die eine "Vierparteien-Regierungslösung" unter Einschluß der Roten Khmer fordern (USA, ASEAN, China), Risse auf; andererseits scheinen sich die Positionen der beiden Supermächte zu verhärten. Ein weiterer entscheidender Faktor ist, ob die Betonung kambodschanischen Nationalismus', die Durchführung einiger Reformen und das Schreckgespenst einer Rückkehr der Roten Khmer der Hun-Sen-Regierung die erhoffte Legitimität bei der Bevölkerung bringen. (SWP-Whr)

For more than two decades, diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the PRC have been officially suspended. The essay focuses on four recurrent themes (divergent strategic considerations with respect to Cambodia's or Vietnam's future; the question of communist-including Chinese communist subversion in Indonesia; the extent of opposition by various Indonesian strata to normalisation and the importance of Sino-Indonesian trade relationship) that have emerged in recent years in the Sino-Indonesian relationship and that will probably remain in place and structure the rest of the process toward the resumption of regular diplomatic ties between the two countries. (DÜI-Sen)

As the author sees it, during 1988-89 the Cambodian problem seemed to be inching toward a solution, only to have new and formidable obstacles arise as various powers struggled for a compromise. The rollercoaster of hope and disappointment seemed to become especially wearying, as there were clearer indications that the Vietnamese were accelerating their withdrawal from Cambodia, even as the dreaded Khmer Rouge appeared ready to resume their struggle to obtain absolute power in the country. The author looks at Sihanouk-Hun Sen conferences and the "Jakarta Informal Meeting" to resolve the Cambodia problem. (DÜI-Sen)