Suchergebnisse

The United States of America has been the most powerful country in the world for over seventy years. The U.S. National Security Strategy declares, however, that the return of great power competition with Russia and China is the greatest threat to U.S. national security. Further, many analysts predict that America's autocratic rivals will succeed in disrupting or displacing U.S. global leadership. Brilliant and engagingly written, The Return of Great Power Rivalry, Matthew Kroenig argues that this conventional wisdom is wrong. Drawing on an extraordinary range of historical evidence and the works of figures like Herodotus, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu-and cutting-edge social science research, Mattew Kroenig advances the riveting argument that democracies tend to excel in great power rivalries. He contends that democracies actually have unique economic, diplomatic, and military advantages in long-run geopolitical competitions. He considers autocratic advantages as well, but shows that these are more than outweighed by their vulnerabilities. Kroenig then shows these arguments through the seven most important cases of democratic-versus-autocratic rivalries throughout history, from the ancient world to the Cold War. Finally, he analyzes the new era of great power rivalry among the United States, Russia, and China through the lens of the democratic advantage argument. By advancing a "hard-power" argument for democracy, Kroenig demonstrates that despite its many problems, the U.S. is better positioned to maintain a global leadership role than either Russia or China. A vitally important book for anyone concerned about the future of global geopolitics, The Return of Great Power Rivalry provides both an innovative way of thinking about power in international politics and an optimistic assessment of the future of American global leadership.

For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. So long as the US, or any other nation, retains such an assured retaliation capability, no sane leader would intentionally launch a nuclear attack against it, and nuclear deterrence will hold. According to this theory, possessing more weapons than necessary for a second-strike capability is illogical. This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides the first coherent theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it resolves one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies.

This case study reveals the process for researching and publishing a multi-method article on nuclear weapons proliferation. It explains how the author identified an interesting research question, drawing from a contemporary U.S. foreign policy debate about how best to combat the spread of nuclear weapons. The case study then explains how to locate existing quantitative replication datasets from which to begin statistical analysis. The article also discusses the challenge of publishing research with null findings and one possible strategy for overcoming it. It also illustrates the value of multi-method research designs that combine quantitative and qualitative analysis.

"Iran's rapidly advancing nuclear program may be the world's most important emerging international security challenge. Not only does Iran have confirmed nuclear capabilities, but the country also has the ability to supply them to other regimes--potentially an even greater, imminent global threat. In this dramatic call to action, Matt Kroenig explains why we need to take immediate steps to a diplomatic and, if necessary, a military solution--now--before Iran makes any further nuclear advances. He draws on the current crisis in Syria, an indicator of the devastating potential of just one nation's chemical capabilities. A Time to Attack provides an authoritative account of the history of Iran's nuclear program and the international community's attempts to stop it, explains and assesses the options available to policymakers, and reflects on what the resolution of the Iranian nuclear challenge will mean for the future of international order. As this crisis is still developing, this book provides an insider's account of what is being said in Washington about what our next move must be"--

Explaining nuclear assistance -- The correlates of nuclear assistance -- Israel's nuclear program : French assistance and U.S. resistance -- Common enemies, growling dogs, and A.Q. Khan's Pakistan : nuclear supply in other countries -- Importing the bomb : nuclear assistance and nuclear proliferation

Zusammenfassung
Wie können die Vereinigten Staaten und ihre NATO-Verbündeten russische nukleare Deeskalationsangriffe abschrecken? Die russische Nuklearstrategie fordert im Fall eines Konflikts mit der NATO den frühzeitigen Einsatz von Kernwaffen, mit dem Ziel, westliche Regierungen dazu zu zwingen, um Frieden zu ersuchen, oder aber eine weitere, potenziell katastrophale nukleare Eskalation zu riskieren. Viele westliche Wissenschaftler und Analytiker haben diese Drohung erkannt, aber bislang ist keine klare Abschreckungsstrategie dagegen formuliert worden. Dieser Aufsatz analysiert potenzielle Strategien zur Abschreckung russischer nuklearer "Deeskalationsschläge" und zur Vereitelung russischer nuklearer Zwangsmittelandrohung. Er vertritt die These, die NATO müsse Russland davon überzeugen, dass jeder nukleare Schlag nicht zu einer Deeskalation, sondern zu einer weiteren nuklearen Eskalation führen werde. Anders gesagt, die USA müssen damit drohen, auf russische nukleare Deeskalationsschläge hart und glaubwürdig zu reagieren, und Russland klarmachen, dass dies auch einen begrenzten nuklearen Vergeltungsschlag einschließen könnte.

According to a widespread conventional wisdom, there is a link between US nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation and, therefore, in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other states, the US government must first make changes to its own nuclear arsenal. This article challenges the notion that US nuclear posture has a significant bearing on the proliferation and non-proliferation behavior of other states. Contrary to the received wisdom in policy circles, this article maintains that state decisions on nuclear non-proliferation issues are driven by a range of other security, economic, and political factors and, once these considerations are taken into account, there is little if any remaining variance to be explained by US nuclear posture. Using a dataset on US nuclear arsenal size from 1945 to 2011, this article examines the relationship between the size of the US nuclear arsenal and a variety of nuclear non-proliferation outcomes. It finds that there is no evidence of a relationship between the size of the US arsenal and: the exploration, pursuit, or acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states; the provision of sensitive nuclear assistance to non-nuclear weapon states; and voting on non-proliferation issues in the United Nations Security Council. The results are robust to alternate conceptualizations and measurements of US nuclear weapons and in various subsamples of data. This article breaks new ground on an empirical research agenda on how the nuclear policies and postures of the major nuclear powers affect the spread of nuclear weapons and has important implications for nuclear security policy.