Public debt asymmetries: the effect on taxes and spending in the European Union
In: Working paper 162
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In: Working paper 162
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Working paper
This paper tests the central predictions of the theoretical tax competition literature for capital tax rates for a panel of European Union countries, notably a race to the bottom in corporate tax burdens. In contrast to the previous empirical literature, empirical support for increasing capital mobility to be resulting in a reduction in corporate tax burdens is found. The results also suggest that other factors driving the corporate tax burden should not be neglected and may provide substantial counterweight to tax competition forces
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This paper proposes a unifying framework for theories of capital tax competition, and surveys and synthesizes the literature within this framework. The synthesis covers various standard tax competition models, models allowing for leviathan governments and democratic elections, in addition more recent contributions to the literature such as cross hauling of investment and models allowing for agglomeration forces to be associated with capital mobility. The paper illustrates under which assumptions the race to the bottom in tax rates results from increasing capital mobility, and when capital tax rates can be expected to increase as a result of higher capital mobility.
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The aim of this paper is two-fold: First, assuming public debts are pre-determined and in their steady state in EU countries, the paper investigates the effect of asymmetric debt service obligations on taxes, primary spending and the tax mix in EU countries. Second, it investigates how increased tax competition may change these effects. The impact of debt service on taxes, primary spending and the tax mix is derived in a simple model of tax competition, and the hypotheses derived from the model are tested empirically for a panel of EU countries. Cross- countrdifferences in public debts are found to lead to asymmetries in taxes and primary expenditures across EU countries, with high debt countries having lower expenditures and higher taxes than low debt countries. Capital mobility is found to increase these asymmetries, and trigger cross-country asymmetries in the tax mix of EU countries.
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In: IMF Working Paper No. 19/85
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In: IMF Working Paper No. 19/185
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In: IMF Working Paper No. 18/97
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In: IMF Working Paper No. 18/191
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5535
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Working paper
This paper carries out an empirical investigation of the impact on bond spreads of the announcement, purchases and exit from the SNB's bond purchase program in 2009-2010. We find evidence in favor of a narrowing yield spread of covered bonds as a result of the program. The effect materialized in the days following the announcement of the SNB's intention to buy bonds issued by private sector borrowers, as markets learned that the SNB was buying covered bonds. The specification of the bond spreads used allows us to identify this effect as a discounted portfolio balance effect of the expected purchases, as distinct from policy signalling. In contrast, we find no evidence of a further effect of the actual purchases and subsequent sales on bond spreads.
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If women make different economic decisions than men on average, then an increase in women's influence in the political and economic spheres of society might change economic outcomes. In this note, we focus on the impact of female enfranchisement on fiscal policy outcomes. We present a simple median voter model and show that if women have different economic preferences than men, then female enfranchisement leads to a change in government budget deficits.
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In: Public choice, Band 136, Heft 1-2, S. 123-138
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 136, Heft 1, S. 123-138
ISSN: 0048-5829
This paper focuses on the observed empirical relationship between fiscal rules and budget deficits, and examines whether this correlation is driven by an omitted variable, namely voter preferences. We make use of two different estimation methods to capture voter preferences in a panel of Swiss sub-federal jurisdictions. First, we include a recently constructed measure of fiscal preferences. Second, we capture preferences through fixed effects with a structural break as women are enfranchised. We find that fiscal rules continue to have a significant impact on real budget balances.
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