The President of the European Council as a leader: An application of the Contingency Theory
The Permanent President of the European Council represents the most important institutional development in the EU during the last decade. This paper attempts to apply the contingency model of leadership, developed by Schout and Vanhoonacker (2001) for the study of the sixth-month nation-state Presidencies of the Council of Ministers, to the operation of the office of the Permanent President during the current Eurozone crisis. The findings from the application of the model are then related to the broader principal-agent theory. The author argues that with a non-national and longer-serving President at the helm of the European Council, there is an improved balance and relationship between the demand for, and provision (supply) of, leadership on the part of the Permanent President. This, in the author's view, has implications for the principal- agent relationship that undergirds the functioning of executive institutions such as the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.